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Co-Supervisors:  Paul Woodruff and Jonathan Dancy 
 
This dissertation concerns deontic moral experience, especially guilt. I follow 
Gabriele Taylor’s view that when feeling guilty, one represents oneself as having violated 
one’s obligations and as being stained by that violation. On the basis of this view of guilt, I 
develop several claims in metaethics and normative ethics. I first debunk G.E.M. 
Anscombe’s genealogical attack on the intelligibility of deontic concepts in secular moral 
philosophy: that guilt, an emotion partly constituted by deontic concepts, is present outside 
the Abrahamic Occident is evidence that the deontic moral concepts are intelligible without 
a religious background. I then defend the intelligibility of deontic concept directly, showing 
how the British Intuitionists explained the content of a simple concept like ought without 
defining it.  
Second, I argue that given that the notion of wrongdoing is constitutive of guilt, 
normative ethicists must be careful about what they say about rightness and wrongness lest 
they sow chronic guilt in those who accept their theories. I claim that this is a special 
problem for consequentialists and that Peter Railton and Derek Parfit’s notion of blameless 
wrongdoing does not solve it. Rather, a distinction must be made between what is right all 
things considered (maximization in every action) and what is one’s duty (cultivating 
maximizing character traits, etc.).  
 vii 
Third, I argue that guilt holds the key to explaining what T.M. Scanlon has called the 
priority and importance of moral obligations vis-à-vis nonmoral reasons. I defend Taylor’s 
moral staining view of guilt and use it to show how moral stains ground the priority and 
importance of moral obligations. To explain moral stains, I turn to Christine Korsgaard’s 
view that our actions are constitutive of our personal identities. Finally, in my last chapter, I 
elaborate on the connection between guilt, personal identity, and despair through a study of 
Søren Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death. 
 viii 
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Chapter One, Guilt Feelings and Deontic Thoughts 
 In her 1958 article “Modern Moral Philosophy,” G.E.M. Anscombe argued that 
deontic concepts cease to make sense once severed from an older conception of ethics in 
which the laws of morality are the laws of God.  Anscombe is glad to accept words like 
“duty” and “wrong” when they signify what the civil law or the rules of chess require, and 
she is equally agreeable to the use of “ought” in sentences like “You ought to drop by the 
shop for some milk.” Indeed, she wryly acknowledges the utility of “ought” by stating her 
own prescriptions for philosophy with it. What she is against is the use of words like 
“ought,” “duty,”  “wrong,” and “obligation” in a moral sense.  
In its moral sense, a word like “wrong” says something more about an action than 
that it is an instance of wantonly causing pain or failing to keep a promise. According to 
Anscombe, when correctly explicated in its moral sense, this word says that an action is 
disallowed as contrary to law. But Anscombe asks, what is the law referred to and who then 
is the lawgiver implicitly referenced? Anscombe contends that the only plausible candidates 
are God and his law. At one time—when belief in the God of the Bible was taken for 
granted—this made for a meaningful conceptual scheme. Yet in today’s secular times, to 
declare an action morally wrong is senseless: one calls it illicit without being able to identify 
the being who outlaws it.  
I do not agree with Anscombe. I think that not only are deontic concepts intelligible 
without reference to God and divine law but that we would be making a great mistake by 
ignoring their study, for they are an essential part of common forms of moral experiences 
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like guilt.1 In this chapter, I will take up the latter argument, reserving my direct defense of 
the intelligibility of deontic concepts for the second chapter. 
After summarizing Anscombe’s objections to deontology, this chapter will show that 
the belief that one has transgressed a moral duty is a constitutive thought in guilt. For this 
task, I will rely in large measure on the work of Gabriele Taylor who differentiates guilt from 
other emotions on the basis of the differing beliefs connected with each. Establishing that 
deontic concepts are a part of a basic moral experience like guilt addresses Anscombe’s 
challenge in two ways. First, because guilt is linked to the belief that we have violated our 
obligations, it shows that, we have reason to develop a deontological ethics to better 
understand our obligations. Second, guilt’s primeval psychological profile is evidence 
opposing Anscombe’s thesis that deontic moral concepts are derivative of historical belief in 
a lawgiving deity. 
Once I have presented my case, I will anticipate objections that the Anscombean 
might make. The first is that guilt itself is, like deontic morality, a modern survival in a 
secular age of the Christian belief in a lawgiving God. To respond to this challenge, I will 
offer examples of guilt in cultures removed from Christianity. The second objection is that 
Taylor’s theory of guilt oversimplifies the emotion by ignoring cases in which it is evidently 
decoupled from wrongdoing. My response to this criticism will not deny the existence of 
other forms of guilt but rather insist on the reality of the distinct, recognizable kind of guilt 
that has belief in transgression as an essential part.  
                                                
1 In this chapter, I will use the word “guilt” synonymously with the phrase “experience of 
guilt.” Where later in the dissertation I have cause to distinguish someone’s being guilty from 
someone’s feeling guilty, I will mark the distinction expressly. 
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1. Anscombe’s Argument 
 Anscombe’s article centers around two recommendations and an observation. 
(Anscombe 1958, 1). Her recommendations are that deontic concepts should be jettisoned 
and that moral philosophy as a whole should be left fallow until such time as we have “an 
adequate philosophy of psychology.” Her observation is that any differences between 
Sidgwick and the English moral philosophers writing up to her time are of little significance. 
 What the English philosophers from Sidgwick on down are supposed to have in 
common is a tendency to believe that actions are determined to be right or wrong by 
whether or not they produce the best possible consequences (9). Anscombe sees Ross and 
those whom she calls “Oxford Objectivists” as playing at the same game—the only 
difference being that they hold that some actions have “intrinsic values” which must be 
accounted for along with the value of the consequences (9). Thus, it is just as true of Ross as 
it is of Sidgwick that no action (betraying a trust, for instance) can be said to be wrong tout 
court as the sums might ultimately tabulate in favor it. 
 By counseling a morality of universal expediency, these philosophers have 
committed a woeful abuse of language (10, 17). The term “morally wrong” which they apply 
to the inexpedient action comes to us from an older vocabulary in which it was synonymous 
with “illicit” and “what there is an obligation not to do” (17). The word, “illicit,” in turn, 
meant contrary to the divine law (17). Thus, to call something wrong was to say that one was 
obliged not to do it by the divine law. 
 When Anscombe’s English philosophers had been using the word “wrong,” they 
meant something altogether different than that an action was forbidden by the divine law: 
they meant that an action was a worse action, that it was a bad and inexpedient action. 
Moreover, they failed to recognize that their new meaning was incompatible with the old. In 
 4 
particular, it escaped their notice that it was a hallmark of the old “Hebrew-Christian ethic” 
that actions of a certain description (adultery, for instance) are forbidden without regard to 
consequences (10). 
 The unremarked substitution of the notion of inexpediency for the notion of 
illegality under the mark “wrong” predictably sowed confusion among those exposed to the 
new English moral philosophy (8). In constructing their ethical systems, these men hoped 
that moral philosophy could be kept separate from theology. Terms like “wrong” and 
“ought” used in a moral sense held a “mesmeric” psychological force, presumably imparted 
from the majesty of a law pronounced and enforced by the omnipotent, omnibenevolent 
creator of the universe. The accused philosophers managed to capture this mesmeric force 
and attach it to their own moral systems when they gave new meaning to “wrong” and 
“ought.” The price was paid in lucid thinking: to call an action wrong still conjured a 
peremptory awe but what was meant was that the action was simply inexpedient, not that it 
was verboten (10). 
 In happier times, the word “wrong” clearly stated something distinct from the word 
“inexpedient” or words like “unjust” and “cowardly.” Anscombe asks us to suppose that the 
word “unjust” applies to certain actions purely in virtue of the facts, e.g., “judicially 
punishing a man for what he is clearly understood not to have done.” (16–17). What would 
it add to the description of this action to say that it is not only unjust but (morally) wrong? 
In days when a divine law ethics was accepted, to include the word “wrong” swelled the 
description by telling the hearer that the action was one the divine law obliged us not to 
perform. By contrast, modern philosophers linking the word “wrong” to a chain of 
opprobrium are either adding nothing (though they invoke the word’s mesmeric power) or 
calling the action inexpedient. (17–18). 
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 Anscombe’s cure for the unenlightening, repetitious malaise she observes in English 
moral philosophy is that ethics be placed in abeyance until such time as an adequate 
philosophy of psychology is developed (1). Should the latter come to pass, Anscombe places 
her hopes in a revived moral philosophy centered on the notion of virtue rather than that of 
moral ought or moral wrong. This new ethics would ground its claims about virtue in a 
sound psychology so as to link the virtuous with what makes for human flourishing (18). 
 Whereas Anscombe’s recommendation for ethics as a whole is that it be suspended 
for the time being, she counsels permanent abandonment of its deontological component:  
[T]he concepts of obligation, and duty—moral obligation and moral duty, that is to 
say—and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of “ought,” ought 
to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or 
derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer 
generally survives, and are only harmful without it. 
(1). As the preceding paragraphs have suggested, the problem with these terms has a 
historical explanation.  
Anscombe notes that Aristotle never uses a word with the same sense that the word 
“moral” has in the foregoing examples of modern speech; she also emphasizes that he did 
not speak of obligation, much less moral obligations or moral blame (1–2). Accordingly, the 
“earlier conception of ethics” that left us with these deontic relics was the Christian 
conception of ethics: “Between Aristotle and us came Christianity, with its law conception of 
ethics. For Christianity derived its ethical notions from the Torah” (5). The consequence of 
Christianity’s dominance in the long period between Constantine and the nineteenth century 
was that “the concepts of being bound, permitted, or excused became deeply embedded in 
our language and thought” (5). The terms “right,” “wrong,” and “ought,” in their moral 
senses, were all defined by conformity to law.  
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In calling them relics or survivals, Anscombe indicates that something has changed 
in regard to the status of Christianity in modern culture and philosophy to pull the rug out 
from under the old deontic concepts. For one thing, secular philosophers have been 
attempting to explain the old moral terms without reference to God. But despite their best 
efforts, the notion of a moral law cannot stand without God as lawgiver—nor can any sense 
be made of a general moral obligation without conceiving of God as the being to whom the 
obligation is owed. Our2 persistence in speaking about a moral law or a moral ought is just as 
nonsensical as speaking of a “verdict” when there is no judge and just as psychologically 
predictable as would be our continued use of the word “criminal” to describe theft in a 
world in which the courts and criminal law had vanished (6, 8). Our traditional deontic 
language retains its “mesmeric” power, but these words now refer to broken concepts, and 
as such, are no longer serviceable for moral philosophy (8). 
Anscombe qualifies her fatal mandate for deontic concepts: these “ought to be 
jettisoned,” but only if “this is psychologically possible” (1). In what follows, I show that it is 
not psychologically possible to give up deontology because questions of duty define a 
common form of moral experience. Not only does this establish that Anscombe’s 
psychological exception applies, but insofar as we assume that non- or pre-Christian people 
have shared these experiences, it casts doubt on her position that deontic concepts are 
remnants of a more theistic past.  
                                                
2 It is not clear to me from Anscombe’s article how far the problem with deontic concepts is 
supposed to run demographically. It is plain that she thinks secular philosophers, including 
her English moralists since Sidgwick, have been trying to produce an ethics without 
reference to the divine. Though not expressly stated, it also seems that she believes this is a 
more general problem for the culture as a whole. It would seem, however, that Anscombe 
should have no objection to the continuation of the use of deontic words and ideas among 
any group of people who retain the belief that the rules of morality are the rules of God. 
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2. Guilt a Deontic Experience 
 Guilt is a deontic experience. The thought that separates guilt from other negative 
feelings occasioned by bad deeds, like remorse or shame, is that one has done something 
wrong, that one has infringed one’s obligation. My evidence and analysis in support of this 
claim will come chiefly from Gabriele Taylor, though she shares her conclusion about guilt’s 
deontic character with other philosophers, such as Herbert Morris and John Rawls. 
 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls held that what distinguishes guilt as a moral emotion is 
not a particular “sensation or kinesthetic feeling” but the concept of a moral wrong (Rawls 
1971, 480–81). Feelings of guilt “in the strict sense,” are experienced by morally mature 
human beings who recognize that they have violated the obligations imposed upon them by 
the principles of justice (474–75).  
Herbert Morris likewise tells us in his article “Guilt and Suffering” that guilt 
“incorporate[s] some reference to the conception of a limitation on conduct” (Morris 1976, 
95). In cases of guilt, one sees one’s conduct as “wrong and not just hurtful” (95). Although 
Morris would go on to acknowledge cases of genuine guilt (“nonmoral guilt”) in which the 
idea of wrongdoing was absent, he continued to hold that moral guilt was a distinct class 
conceptually linked with transgression (Morris 1987, 220–22). I will consider what 
significance Morris’ examples of nonmoral guilt have for my thesis at the conclusion of this 
chapter. 
In the extended discussion of Taylor’s view of guilt that follows, I will both present 
the arguments Taylor makes for her theory and complement these with my own points. For 
instance, some of the examples given will be taken from Taylor’s work; others will be 
original to this paper. In either case, whether by relying on Taylor’s reasoning or my own, my 
goal in what follows is to convince the reader that guilt is a deontic emotion.  
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2.1 Taylor’s Method 
In the title of her book, Taylor refers to pride, shame, and guilt as emotions of self-
assessment. What justifies placing each of these emotions under the same heading is that 
each has a common object and is characterized by an evaluative belief about that object. 
Taylor says, “The self is the ‘object’ of these emotions, and what is believed amounts to an 
assessment of that self” (Taylor 1985, 1).  
Although each emotion is directed at the self and includes an evaluation of the self, 
these emotions differ in the form of the content of their evaluations. Throughout her book, 
Taylor uses these divergent forms to differentiate the emotions that her study broaches. She 
is nonetheless humble about her methodology. She neither believes that emotions should 
always be analyzed in terms of their characteristic beliefs nor that such an analysis need 
exhaust the parts of an emotion. “A complete account would normally include consideration 
of other features, such as wants and wishes, sensations and physiological changes” (2). 
Nonetheless, Taylor holds that certain emotions, including the emotions of self-
assessment, are defined by their constituent beliefs. To describe the role that beliefs play in 
identifying emotions, Taylor sometimes says that these emotions “requir[e]” certain beliefs 
and other times that the beliefs are “constitutive” of the emotions (2, 3). Her choice of 
words expresses two distinct points. The first is that certain beliefs are necessary for specific 
emotions to obtain. For example, she characterizes the person feeling a burst of pride as 
necessarily “believ[ing] her worth to be increased” (41). If the person has no such belief, 
then she is not experiencing a burst of pride. The second point is that the beliefs are not just 
necessarily antecedent, coincident, or consequent to the emotion. Rather, Taylor’s choice of 
the word “constituent” communicates that they are among its component parts. Returning 
to the example of a woman’s burst of pride, the belief that her worth has increased is not 
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simply something that precedes, comes along with, or follows on what the woman feels but 
is integral to her emotion itself. 
2.2 Taylor’s Theory of Guilt, Its Evidence 
On Taylor’s analysis, the thought that defines guilt and differentiates it from other 
emotions linked with bad actions like remorse, shame, and regret is the idea that what I have 
done is forbidden or violates an obligation (88). She writes that the “crucial thought here is 
just that what I am doing is forbidden.” “What is important for guilt is just that some form 
of action or abstention should present itself as obligatory to the agent . . .” (89). 
One reason to accept Taylor’s theory is that it accounts for guilt’s mutability—the 
fact that seemingly any action can be the subject of guilt. All that is necessary is that the 
agent believe that his action is one that is contrary to his duty. A person may feel guilty 
about skipping church on Sundays, playing video games rather than attending a party, or 
flipping a light switch on the Sabbath. It is for this reason that Taylor suggests it is helpful to 
describe the person feeling guilt as believing that he has violated a “taboo” (86). To the 
European mind, taboos were sets of disjointed prohibitions, unconnected and unexplained 
by utility, harm, equity, or theology. In like manner, people sometimes feel guilty over 
actions without regarding those actions as harmful, unfair to anyone, offensive to God, or 
disadvantageous for themselves or their community. The common link that remains, 
however, is that what the person does “presents itself as wrong” (86). 
That one who feels guilty need only represent what he has done as wrong points to a 
further feature of guilt captured by Taylor’s account—it sometimes persists in the face of the 
agent’s belief that the prohibition in question lacks justification (86). Guilt, like other 
“emotional responses,” “notoriously do[es] not keep step with rationally arrived at 
decisions” (86). Correspondingly, “Taboos exercise great authority which is often strong 
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enough to survive to some extent and for some time any rational rejection” (86). This is so 
in Taylor’s case of a lapsed believer who “has come to discard the religion with which he has 
grown up,” but still feels guilty when he skips church services (86). When he views the 
matter “from a more rational point of view,” this person may judge that there is nothing 
wrong with his not attending church, and yet, he may continue to experience guilt over the 
action (86).  
Since guilt is not a mere sensation devoid of cognitive content, the affect and the 
belief that one has transgressed are part and parcel of the same emotion. This is true even 
though in a cool hour the person may decide the putative prohibition is invalid and without 
justification. This phenomenon evidences Taylor’s theory by showing that the thought in 
guilt does not concern the grounding or justification for the obligation—be it God, other 
people, or the common good—but solely the deontic fact itself. It is psychologically 
plausible that an agent believes (as part of experiencing guilt) that an action is contrary to 
duty while at the same time holding that there is no good reason for the duty at issue. It is 
less plausible that the agent somehow believes (as part of the experience of guilt) that an 
action is hurtful to his community while at the same time holding that it is benign for the 
community. 
Another reason to take on Taylor’s account of guilt is its ability to distinguish similar 
emotions like shame, remorse, and regret. This strength recommends Taylor’s view in two 
ways. For one, it is a theoretical virtue in and of itself that a theory of guilt distinguishes it 
from emotions with which it is often conflated. Guilt, shame, and remorse can co-occur. 
When this happens, even if we assume that the emotions carry distinct affects (a 
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questionable assumption itself),3 the fraught task of extracting the intertwined threads of 
emotion may leave us with an inadequate analysis. Being able to distinguish guilt from shame 
by the characteristic thought in each leaves us with more insight. 
The second way that Taylor’s ability to distinguish guilt from nearby feelings favors 
her theory is derivative of the strength of these accounts themselves. When we notice the 
cogency in Taylor’s analyses of shame and remorse, we see the conceptual space carved so as 
to leave guilt nowhere to go but the zone she assigns it. This preempts various rival 
anatomies of guilt: what one theory takes for the characteristic thought in guilt—harm to 
those we care about for instance—Taylor gives us positive reason to think is typical of a 
different emotion. 
2.2.1 Guilt vs Shame 
Whereas guilt is concerned with duty and transgression, shame is about someone’s 
sense of how she stands relative to her working model for her life. When someone feels 
shame, she sees herself as degraded because she has not lived up to her self-ideal (68). 
“Thinking of herself as being seen in a certain way has revealed her to herself as inferior to 
what she believed, assumed, or hoped to be” (68). Shame is thus an injury to one’s self-
respect (80). Self-respect is concerned with a person’s expectations for herself—what she 
will and will not do, what she will and will not suffer to be done to her (79–80). The 
expectations at issue are based on what the agent values for herself, that is to say, how she 
conceives the life she would like to lead (80).  
                                                
3 Rawls for one would disagree with this assumption: “What distinguishes the moral feelings 
from one another are the principles and faults which their explanations typically invoke. For 
the most part, the characteristic sensations and behavioral manifestations are the same, being 
psychological disturbances and having the common features of these.” (Rawls 1971, 482). 
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Shame differs in this respect from humiliation, an emotion tied to one’s self-esteem 
(78, 80). Self-esteem is not self-respect. Unlike self-respect, self-esteem involves assigning a 
relative or absolute quantum of value to oneself. The person with self-esteem thinks he is of 
worth because he is a good tennis player, because his forefathers fought at Agincourt, or 
simply because of who he is. Humiliation follows on a diminution in one’s self-esteem: a 
professional tennis player may be humiliated if he is beaten by an unknown amateur. In this 
example, the outcome of the contest contradicts the player’s self-esteem, i.e., his own high 
evaluation of his merits, and it is the discrepancy between self-appraisal and reality that 
makes for humiliation. 
The woman with self-respect, by contrast, need not make a self-appraisal but need 
only have some model of herself she is resolved to follow, implicitly or explicitly. Indeed, to 
have self-respect, one need not be self-conscious4 but may be wholly engaged in action, with 
the ideals constitutive of self-respect as goal and guide. While it is true that when she feels 
shame, she becomes self-conscious and feels degraded relative to her expectations for 
herself, this may be her first occasion to assign a value to herself. Striving to attain an ideal 
does not require that one give oneself an absolute or relative rating. It is only when one falls 
short that one gives oneself a bad grade, and this is still a grade relative only to the 
expectations constitutive of one’s self-respect. 
That injury to one’s self-respect is the correct way to think about shame is evidenced 
by our habit of speaking of the person who has no standards for himself as having no 
shame. Taylor writes, “[I]f someone has self-respect then under certain specifiable 
conditions he will be feeling shame. A person has no self-respect if he regards no 
                                                
4 As we will see in the paragraphs below, the person who is self-conscious thinks of herself 
as an object, regarding herself as others would or as she herself would in a mirror.  
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circumstances as shame-producing” (80). This explains why shame, despite its negative affect 
and disabling fluster, is often treated as a good thing to have. Shame is a sign that a person 
has a sense of value—better to be a shamefaced villain than a bald-faced one (80). 
Furthermore, since shame is keyed to injuries to one’s self-respect, it is ultimately a defense 
mechanism for one’s self-ideal (80–81). 
Taylor’s account should also be credited for its explanation of the connection 
between shame and exposure to an audience. Exposure of one’s nude body to others’ sight 
figures in paradigmatic cases of shame, the shame of Adam and Eve being an early example. 
The connection between shame and an audience is nonetheless more complicated than such 
examples make it seem. Shame remains an emotion of self-assessment, and the relation of 
the eyes of the audience to the person’s judgment about himself varies from case to case. 
A person feeling shame may or may not agree with the judgment of the audience that 
sees him (60–61). We can imagine a poor boy whose new family home falls within the lines 
of an affluent school district. One day in the classroom, another student calls attention to his 
“cheap,” generic sneakers and their connection to the limited means of his “broke” family. 
The boy may agree with the judgment of his peers that his shoes are bad and that being poor 
is bad. In this case, he will feel shame. On the other hand, the boy may disagree with the 
judgment of his peers; he may think that what clothes a boy’s family can afford is something 
unimportant and superficial. This second boy may nonetheless feel shame even though he 
does not agree with the judgments of the audience. He may feel shame because he and his 
family have moved to this district of snobby children and he must go on stomaching their 
ridicule. 
Taylor’s best example is Cordelia in the first scene of King Lear. After watching her 
sisters’ fulsome speeches to her father, Cordelia feels it would now be shameful for her to 
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profess her own love, however much her sincerity would differ from the falseness of her 
sisters. As Taylor explains the character’s mind, Cordelia is thinking of the courtiers and 
their cynicism: “[S]he takes it that they know perfectly well what such fine speeches are 
worth: they will secure each daughter a part of the kingdom” (62). This is the only form of 
motivation the court will understand due to their own viciousness. To play into the court’s 
expectations would be shameful, not because Cordelia would share the audience’s appraisal 
of her actions, but because Cordelia would fail to disassociate herself from the court cynics. 
It cannot be the case that she shares their opinion, for were she to praise her father, she 
would know that her praise was sincere and unmotivated by hope of gain.  
To understand the case, we can think of Cordelia as imagining a further observer 
who sees both her and the court. This observer would see Cordelia’s speech and, in short, 
judge poorly of her for allowing herself to appear to be a cynic in the eyes of cynics. In other 
words, Cordelia would be letting the cynics generalize from their own case to hers, 
attributing their own base motives to her from lack of familiarity with anything better in 
their own persons. As Taylor explains: 
[F]rom a higher order point of view she sees that by making a fine speech in public 
her relation to that audience would change. If she acts as she is cynically expected to 
do she would make common cause with that audience and no longer be able to 
dissociate herself from it. But the audience is a worthless lot, taking it for granted 
that self-interest and gain are the only reasons for action. So from this point of view 
Cordelia sees herself as being seen as one of that worthless lot, and with that point of 
view she does identify.  
(62). 
 What these examples show is that the function of the audience is not the same in all 
cases of shame (60). In a simple case, like the boy who is ashamed of being poor, the person 
feeling shame shares the judgment of his audience. In more complex cases, the person 
feeling shame disagrees with the audience’s judgment but is ashamed that they are seeing her 
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nonetheless. A further lesson to be drawn from Cordelia’s case is that the observer may be 
real, imaginary, or superfluous. While I described Cordelia as imagining an observer who 
would watch her giving a speech to the mean spirited men and women of the court, Taylor 
makes clear that a person in Cordelia’s situation need not imagine a person watching her but 
need only be aware that her actions would appear to fit a certain description (talking of love 
before those who only comprehend sycophancy) (66).  
What the idea of an observer or a description ultimately contributes to shame in all 
cases is a stimulus for self-awareness (67). In shame, one goes from being unselfconsciously 
engaged in one’s tasks to seeing oneself objectively, to seeing oneself as another would see 
one: 
Shame requires a sophisticated type of self-consciousness. A person feeling shame 
will exercise her capacity for self-awareness, and she will do so dramatically: from 
being just an actor absorbed in what she is doing she will suddenly become self-
aware and self-critical. It is plainly a state of self-consciousness which centrally relies 
on the concept of another, for the thought of being seen as one might be seen by 
another is the catalyst for the emotion. 
(67). Taylor’s analysis is plainly influenced by Sartre’s theory that the look of the other is the 
beginning of self-awareness. Taylor even uses Sartre’s example of the man making a vulgar 
gesture who becomes ashamed and self-conscious when he realizes he is being watched (57). 
The fact that shame involves a transition from unselfconscious engagement with the world 
to a painful awareness of self is further marked in Taylor’s work by her insistence that the 
man with self-respect need not make a self-appraisal until he feels the blow of shame. 
Taylor’s theory is that in shame—when the possibility of our being seen in a certain 
way dawns on us—we see ourselves as low, ugly things. As such, her theory is evidenced by 
the close association between hiding and shame. The characteristic motivation of the person 
feeling shame is to conceal herself, just as you might attempt to hide an unsightly piece of 
furniture by stuffing it in a back room (90). 
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Taylor’s account of shame has two features that contrast with guilt and thereby set 
off the latter’s deontic character. The person feeling shame is thinking in terms of value and 
appraising herself as a human being. In other words, shame is concerned with value as 
opposed to duty and with the self as a whole, not one’s particular actions. 
Guilt is not concerned with value but with obligation. “[T]he person who feels guilty 
thinks in terms of duties not performed and obligations not fulfilled” (87). Hence, guilt is 
about the person’s actions rather than her character. If someone makes a false promise to 
marry, what is shameful is to be a cad, while what is guilty is the breach of faith. 
This is what we should expect for both guilt and shame. Insofar as shame is 
concerned with what a person is, it must be a matter of the person’s worth—a person, strictly 
speaking, cannot be something right or wrong but only something good or bad. Likewise, to 
call an action good or bad appears to either be a case of using the words synonymously with 
deontic terms or a metonymy. If the latter, they mean that an action has good or bad 
consequences, that it is done with a good or bad will, or is the kind of action that a virtuous 
or vicious person would perform. Thus, deontic concepts go with actions while value 
concepts go with persons and things.  
Guilt applies to actions and to persons only in virtue of their actions (including their 
voluntary thoughts).5 Whether in the casuist’s armchair or the courtroom, the question of 
guilt is a question of actions and intentions. The link between guilt and action is especially 
strong in modern liberal jurisprudence. In such a legal system, it is commonly thought that 
liability to punishment is a concomitant of guilt and that punishment is only for a person’s 
actions and not what she is (89). 
                                                
5 We shall soon see though that the practice of speaking of guilty people is not also a 
metonymy but makes good conceptual sense. 
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Although we must be careful to distinguish the question of a person’s guilt vis-à-vis a 
system of positive laws from both her moral guilt and her guilt feelings, the conceptual link 
between guilt and action is the same in each. As Taylor explains, when we think of a 
country’s legal system, whether or not someone is guilty is a fact about what she has done 
and whether the law forbids it (85). Of course, a person may deny the authority of a law, 
recognize the fact of her guilt, and not feel guilty (85). When Steve McQueen’s character was 
recaptured in The Great Escape and tossed in the “cooler,” he certainly knew he had violated 
the rules of his Luftwaffe prison camp (i.e., that he was guilty of trying to escape), but he had 
no compunctions as he tossed his baseball against his prison’s walls.6 On the other hand, 
there will be a link between guilt and guilt feeling just in case a person accepts the authority 
of the law she violated (85). 
On Taylor’s analysis, the concepts shared by juridical guilt and guilt feeling point to 
another contrast between guilt and shame: whereas shame is global and covers the whole 
person, guilt is local and fixed by specific transgressions. Guilt, in both its juridical and 
emotional forms, recognizes the difference between a bad man and a man’s misdeed. 
“[G]iven that he has at one time broken one law, it does not follow that he has also broken 
others, or that he will go on breaking the law” (89). While this is a truism of contemporary 
legal systems, emotionally, the person feeling guilt knows this as well. According to Taylor, 
he “accepts that he has done wrong but does not think of this wrong-doing as affecting his 
overall standing as a person” (90). The person experiencing shame takes a different attitude 
towards his misdeeds. He does not see himself as a man “who at some point, for instance, 
committed a burglary, but rather sees himself as a burglar” (90). “What he has done is not 
alien to himself but on the contrary expresses what he really is” (90). 
                                                
6 The rules of a POW camp are John Deigh’s example. 
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Here again we see why the characteristic response of the person feeling shame is an 
urge to hide. If one is essentially a scoundrel, “[t]here is nothing to be done, and it is best to 
withdraw and not to be seen” (90). The hallmark motivations of the person feeling guilt, by 
contrast, reflect its limited character. “If I have done wrong then there is some way in which 
I can ‘make up’ for it, if only by suffering punishment” (90). (We could mention reparation 
and supererogatory acts in this connection as well). 
Her insistence on guilt’s attention to particular actions notwithstanding, Taylor is still 
committed to the view that guilt, like shame, is an emotion of self-assessment. To experience 
guilt, the action in question must still be regarded as my action (91–92). Even in cases when 
culpable choice is lacking (a morally hapless lorry driver perhaps), one still must think of 
oneself as a causally responsible agent, albeit perhaps an unwitting one (91). This conceptual 
limitation is marked by the fact that you may feel shame for what your children do but 
cannot feel guilt over their actions (unless it is guilt for something you did in raising them) 
(91–92). 
This idea of responsibility directs us to Taylor’s secondary message about guilt—that 
it is a weight, a burden, a stain.7 “Guilt is a burden he has to carry, he cannot disown it, it 
must leave its mark upon him” (92). The guilty person sees himself as having disfigured 
himself by an isolated violation of obligation but otherwise regards himself as retaining his 
status and character. In Taylor’s example, the communist who feels guilty about his 
privileged status regards his privileges as “the stain” “on an otherwise admirable communist” 
(92). On the other hand, if such a person feels ashamed at his privileged status, then he will 
think of his privilege as “threatening his status as a communist altogether” (92). When I am 
ashamed, “I see myself as all of a piece, what I have just done, I now see, fits only too well 
                                                
7 I will present my own arguments for this view in Chapter Four. 
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what I really am” (92). With guilt, by contrast, I think of myself as having done something 
forbidden and in this respect “disfigured a self which otherwise remains the same” (92). 
The idea of a moral stain meshes well with the motivation of the guilty person to acts 
of expiation (93). Just as a piece of furniture can be restored by removing the tea stain on it, 
the guilty person hopes to be restored through punishment, repayment, or supererogation. 
Here again, a contrast is possible with shame. There is nothing to be done but to hide or 
discard a piece of furniture that is essentially ugly or shoddy, one made of rotten wood or by 
an inept craftsperson. 
2.2.2 Guilt vs Remorse 
Taylor persuasively rebuts a competing hypothesis about guilt—that it is about harm 
done to others. Given guilt’s mutability, it is not uncommon for a person to feel guilty about 
an action which has caused no harm. Taylor gives examples of people who feel guilty for 
failing to develop their talents or suffer from bad conscience after a suicide attempt about 
which no one else knows (88). The most compelling feature of Taylor’s argument, however, 
is its association of the harm attendant upon a moral wrong with remorse rather than guilt. 
Remorse is an emotion felt about a wrongful action and its consequences that an 
agent now wishes she had not done (98). It is like regret in lamenting what has happened but 
unlike regret in that what has happened is the agent’s own moral wrong and its results. 
Regret need not pertain to a moral wrong (one can regret seeing Fantastic Four instead of Ant 
Man) nor even an action (regret for the passage of summer) (98). The person feeling remorse 
necessarily wishes to undo what she has done: if she could make her decision again, she 
would choose differently. The person experiencing regret over her actions may sometimes 
wish she had acted differently, but she need not always feel this way. “It is possible to regret 
an action but accept it as the thing to do under the same description: she regrets sacking the 
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employee because the girl was so easily crushed, but she had to be sacked, nevertheless, 
because she was so inefficient” (99). Insofar as it is possible to “turn back time” by repairing 
the harm done, a person claiming to experience remorse is suspect if she does not take the 
reparative steps available to her (99). 
Like guilt, remorse is a moral emotion. Where it differs from guilt is its focus on 
harm done and the concomitant motivation to fix that harm. Unlike guilt, remorse is not an 
emotion of self-assessment. “The thought in remorse . . . concentrates on the deed rather 
than on the agent as he who has done the deed” (98). As we saw in the discussion of shame, 
guilt is about violating a duty and the stain left by that violation. Guilt is an emotion of self-
assessment because the guilty agent thinks of herself as disfigured or stained by her violation 
of duty.  
This is demonstrated by the fact that atonement for guilt need not take the form of 
repairing any outward harm done or of compensating the victim but may consist of activities 
collateral to the offending act such as the acceptance of punishment, self-imposed 
austerities, or supererogatory acts to benefit a person other than one’s victim (103–04). The 
remorseful person by contrast would like to undo what has been done and failing this, 
attempts to repair the damage she believes that her wrong has brought about (99). 
This is not to say that guilt and remorse do not often go together and do not often 
result in the same actions. If the lion’s share of moral prohibitions a person accepts concern 
actions that harm others, then a person may experience both guilt and remorse and respond 
to them in the same way—by seeking to put back together the pieces of that which she is 
broken. Consider a guilty, remorseful shoplifter. He returns to the scene of his crime the 
next day and puts the merchandise he stole back in its place. In this single act of restoration, 
the shoplifter attempts to undo the harm he has done to the merchant and at the same time 
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expunge his guilt. In an example given by Taylor, remorse and guilt are felt about the same 
event and expressed in succession. After murdering Duncan, Macbeth first expresses his 
remorse, saying, “Wake Duncan with thy knocking: I wish thou could’st” (100). Later, his 
inability to say “amen” is a sign of the embarrassing weight of guilt upon him (100). 
There are also cases in which remorse is present but guilt is not. Consider a modern 
teenager (Sarah) who lives on a farm. She prides herself on her gentleness and sensitivity. To 
provide for an unexpected guest, however, she gives permission for a pet lamb (one she had 
named and nursed from a bottle after its mother died) to be slaughtered. This young woman 
may then feel shame (because allowing one’s pets to be killed is not the thing a ladylike girl 
of a tender heart would do) and remorse (because she thinks of the harm to the lamb—its 
pain, its loss of blood, its loss of life). Since she experiences remorse, she wishes she had not 
given her permission and regards the killing of the lamb as something bad and deplorable. 
She does not, however, regard the killing of the lamb as something wrong. If she initially 
feels glimmers of guilt, these feelings are forestalled through moral reasoning. She simply 
does not believe that slaughtering animals for food (with the exception of dogs and cats) can 
be wrong. On the contrary, she believes that people may use livestock animals for food. 
Hence, even though she laments the death of her lamb, she does not think she has done 
something prohibited.   
In contrast with this first teenager, consider a girl of thirteen (Violet) who has 
recently become a vegetarian because she thinks it is wrong to kill animals for food. We may 
add that she considers her new commitment a pledge that she will not be party to the killing 
of animals for cuisine. On arriving at her older cousin Sarah’s house, her younger cousin Iris 
devilishly informs her that Sarah’s lamb was killed in anticipation of her arrival—“too bad 
she did not inform her uncle’s family sooner of her new convictions.” Violet may feel shame 
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(because she has compromised her new vegetarian identity), remorse (because she thinks of 
the harm to the lamb—its pain, its loss of blood, its loss of life), but also she may feel guilt 
(because something she has done or neglected to do has resulted in the killing of a lamb for 
her meal). Unlike Sarah, who sees the killing of pet livestock as simply bad and to be 
avoided, Violet believes not only that killing animals for food is wrong but that it is wrong 
for her to do so because of her vegetarian pledge.8 Hence, in this case, she believes she has 
violated her obligations and experiences guilt. 
Finally, there are instances in which a person experiences guilt but not remorse. 
Taylor gives two examples. The first is from Greek myth and illustrates how you may think 
that an action was the only reasonable choice given the interests at stake but was nonetheless 
wrong. Agamemnon believed that he had to sacrifice his daughter for the Greek fleet to sail. 
In his mind, the departure to Troy was “the overriding good” (99). So long as he believed 
this, the king “could not have felt remorse” (100). He could have felt regret, wishing that 
circumstances had not forced him to sacrifice his daughter for the sake of his goal, but so 
long as he continued to believe that Iphigenia’s death was necessary for the Greeks’ 
enterprise and that the enterprise was of predominant value, he could not have the 
remorseful wish to undo his deed.  
                                                
8 A study of vegetarian children from non-vegetarian families revealed that these children 
cite animal suffering rather than personal preference (e.g., taste) as the reason for their own 
abstention from meat (Hussar and Harris 2010, 634). Surprisingly, these same children 
(moral vegetarian children) do not morally condemn those who do not opt to be vegetarian 
(634). A later study found that moral vegetarian children do condemn hypothetical children 
who first become vegetarian for moral reasons but then backslide and eat meat (637–38). In 
fact, all children in the study (family vegetarians, vegetarians who cited taste and inclination 
as their reasons, and non-vegetarians) condemned the hypothetical backsliders (637–38). To 
the researchers, this result confirmed their hypothesis that moral vegetarian children 
conceived of their vegetarian commitment as a promise that a backslider would be violating, 
a basis for condemnation not applicable to the unpledged (637). 
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That he continues to accept the paramount importance of the Greek war effort, 
however, need not prevent Agamemnon from experiencing guilt. Without claiming that the 
figure of the stories did suffer from guilt, Taylor points out that one in Agamemnon’s 
position “could have” felt it (100). The obligation not to kill the innocent, or the taboo 
against killing one’s own offspring, need not be relaxed, even when circumstances make 
killing the best option. Agamemnon could have believed that he had transgressed by killing 
his daughter, while believing that the importance of avenging the honor of the Greeks made 
the killing the better course. A person may stand in this position because one’s deontic 
beliefs, one’s sense of duty, may dictate different actions than one’s value beliefs, one’s sense 
of what is better and worse.  
A guilty Agamemnon would also know the burden that transgression brings with it. 
The guilty person who has done the better action is not exempted from guilt’s moral stain—
“that an action is thought to be necessary under given circumstances does not interfere with 
the adverse effect which having done the deed may have on the agent” (100). A ruler like 
Agamemnon, who feels the weight of guilt but does not repent what he has done, may 
comprehend his position with the thought that guilt is one more burden of kingship, one 
more reason that the head that wears the crown lies uneasy. Indeed, it is controversially said 
of people in charge that the willingness to dirty their own hands for the greater good is an 
exemplary, if not essential, part of leadership. By these lights, a queen must stand willing to 
render herself evil for the benefit of her people. Thus viewed, guilt is another instance of the 
personal sacrifice that a leader must make. 
Taylor’s second example is of a blackmailed person who kills his blackmailer (100). 
Having suffered for some time under the exactions and cruelty of the blackmailer, the 
person who frees himself by killing his tormenter may feel guilt but not remorse. He feels 
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guilt because he believes that killing is wrong outside of war or to preserve one’s own life. 
Yet all the same, he is not remorseful: he thinks the world is a better place without his 
victimizer, and he could not bear to return to his prior vulnerable and exploited state. 
After the fact, the blackmailed person remembers too well his former pain and 
desperation to wish the blackmailer still alive. Indeed, the same indignation, the same hatred 
he had felt when plotting the homicide are still with him. His attitude towards the act (it was 
good that the blackmailer, a low, wicked person die) is unchanged but his attitude towards 
himself has been altered, for he is now the one guilty of murder. Certainly, the criminal law 
does not excuse or justify the person who kills his blackmailer. After all, the blackmailed 
person has a further option for terminating the extortion—he may reveal the compromising 
truth himself—and killing one’s blackmailer is not self-defense. Even the members of a jury 
may say, “Yes, the world is a better place without this cruel man, but the law permits none of 
us to take such a step.” In like manner, a person’s own conscience may convict him by the 
same deontic logic. 
3. Deontology a Perennial Concern 
The lesson I draw from Taylor’s work is that the idea of obligation is constitutive of 
the experience of guilt. A person feeling guilty represents himself as having done something 
wrong. This fact has two consequences relevant to Anscombe’s recommendation that we 
give up deontology.  
The first consequence concerns the psychological need for deontology. Anscombe 
conditioned her call to abandon deontology on its being psychologically possible to do so. In 
section 3.1, I will show that this qualification on Anscombe’s thesis applies: if moral theory is 
to possess an answer for the guilty person wondering whether her guilt is appropriate—i.e., 
whether she has in fact done something wrong—it must concern itself with deontology. So 
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long as we take it to be psychologically impossible to render healthy people insusceptible to 
guilt, guilty people will continue to query what morality requires of them and whether they 
have met those requirements. If moral philosophy is to be of use here, it must include 
deontology.  
The second consequence is a greater threat to Anscombe’s position. The link 
between guilt and the deontic shows not only that we contemporary Occidentals cannot do 
without a moral theory that encompasses deontology but that, contra Anscombe, deontology 
is not dependent upon the idea of a divine lawmaker in the first place. For given its primeval 
profile, guilt is not on its face an appendage of Christian culture. And if guilt is not an 
appendage of Christianity’s divine command ethic, then neither are the deontic concepts 
embedded in guilt feelings. In section 3.2, I will develop and defend this argument. Initially, I 
will contend that guilt is a basic, universal human emotion, and as such, is not specific to 
cultures that subscribe to an ethics of divine command. Recognizing reasonable doubts, 
however, about the strong claim that guilt is a universal emotion, I will make the same point 
about guilt’s independence through the weaker thesis that people in at least some cultures 
without a divine command ethic experience guilt. My example for this purpose will be a 
study by psychologist Olwen Bedford on guilt in China. Lastly, I will consider an objection 
to the treatment of guilt as a monolithic, deontic phenomenon that is based on the existence 
of “nonmoral” forms of guilt identified by Herbert Morris. 
3.1 Guilty Minds 
I have contended that in feeling guilty, a person believes that she has done 
something wrong. Such a person, however, can and at least sometimes should question 
whether her guilt feelings are justified. Whether or not they are justified depends upon 
whether or not her belief that she has done something wrong is reasonable. In order to 
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answer that question, she may reflect on the features of the situation in which she acted, 
compare cases, consider what a virtuous person would have done, or seek and apply moral 
principles. Philosophical reflection after this fashion and about the larger question of what 
makes actions right or wrong is deontology. Thus, the questions that Anscombe 
recommended philosophers eschew are just those questions that are pertinent to a person 
struggling with conscience. In the paragraphs that follow, I will present examples of ordinary 
people whose consciences confront them in deontic terms.9 
Suppose that a man (Marc) suspects that his married friend (Josh) is having an affair 
with another woman. On a date of his own at a restaurant, he sees Josh across the room 
romantically kissing this woman. Josh calls the next day, fretful and abashed, asking that 
Marc keep his secret. Marc values this friendship and is averse to confrontation; so he tells 
Josh, “your secret’s safe with me.” A few months later, Marc is having lunch with Sue, Josh’s 
wife. Sue tells him that she and Josh are hoping to conceive a child next year. Unable to let 
her make this decision without knowing of her husband’s infidelity, Marc tells her about 
what he saw at the restaurant.  
That night, Marc is troubled by the dramatic turn of events. Initially, during his drive 
home, he feels guilty about telling Sue the truth about Josh. This is not a comfortable feeling 
for Marc, and his agitation holds his attention on his conversation with Sue. His guilt feeling 
                                                
9 To be clear, the need for deontology is not a special mandate for those moral systems that 
are usually labeled deontological, such as Kant’s a priori ethics or Ross’ intuitionism. Even 
those ethical systems which are said to “prioritize the good over the right” nevertheless 
contain a deontology or the materials for one. In Mill’s moral theory, pleasure is good, and 
actions are right insofar as they tend to maximize pleasure and minimize suffering. According 
to the virtue ethics espoused by Rosalind Hursthouse, some actions are required by certain 
virtues (Hursthouse 1999, 6). One can be a consequentialist or a virtue theorist and yet be of 
service to the person wondering whether what she did was wrong, so long as one provides a 
way to derive what actions are right and wrong from what traits, people, or states of affairs 
are good or bad, virtuous or vicious. 
 27 
tells him that he has done something wrong. Later, once Marc is back home with time to 
reflect, he asks himself whether his guilt is warranted, whether what his guilt is telling him 
about the rectitude of his conduct is true. On the one hand, he had told a friend he would 
keep a secret and failed to do so. On the other hand, Sue stood to suffer greatly bringing a 
child into a relationship with an unfaithful husband. In his mind, he tosses over a multitude 
of considerations: promises are to be kept, children of broken homes are apt to suffer, 
adultery is wrong, friendship should be cherished. After having time to deliberate, Marc 
changes the initial opinion reflected in his guilt feelings. He comes to the conclusion that 
telling Sue was the right thing to do. With this new conviction, Marc’s feelings of guilt 
subside. 
The significance of Marc’s case is that guilt is prodding him to ask deontic questions. 
His unquiet, guilty mind presses rational consideration of the belief, implicit in his guilt 
feelings, that he has done something wrong. Marc’s experience can be compared to a person 
who feels disgust contemplating a used pair of shoes. The disgusted person represents the 
shoes as dirty—the belief that the shoes are dirty is part of her disgust. Noticing her feeling 
of disgust, she may then go on to question and rationally assess whether the shoes are in fact 
dirty. Remind herself that they have been washed in hot water and sprayed with disinfectant, 
her disgust may vanish along with her belief that the shoes are dirty. 
In Marc’s case, we see an example of a person feeling guilty, questioning whether his 
guilt is appropriate, and attempting to reach an answer—straining and chewing over the 
disparate pieces of putative moral knowledge in his possession. The pertinent question for 
Marc is, “Did I do what I ought to have done?” In keeping with the above analysis of guilt, 
Marc’s question is not that of the person experiencing remorse or regret—he is not 
wondering whether he could have done better. Rather, his question concerns what 
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Anscombe called the “moral sense” of “ought.” It asks whether he has done something 
impermissible; it is a deontic question on all fours with Kant’s query, “What must I do?”  
Marc’s problem contains just the kind of question that Anscombe recommended 
moral philosophy ignore, and yet it seems that moral philosophy could be of use to Marc. 
Even if different philosophers would reach different verdicts in Marc’s case, they can 
nonetheless offer guidance. At the level of formal moral theory, a utilitarian might guide him 
by advising him to focus on the consequences and remind him of the long-term harm he has 
likely averted by allowing Sue to break off a doomed relationship before children came into 
the home. A virtue theorist could remind him that friendship lies in the mean between 
obsequiousness and superciliousness. A student of Ross could teach him that the duty to 
keep your promises is not always decisive but must be balanced against other duties like the 
duty of beneficence. 
The prospect of guilt can also play a role in prompting us to probe the ethics of our 
future actions. It sometimes happens that when we contemplate doing something we believe 
would be wrong, we think of the guilt that would follow and are dissuaded from our 
meditated course of action. There are also times when we imagine ourselves doing an 
immoral action and experience guilt, just as if we had imagined stepping off a precipice and 
felt the anxiety we would experience were we actually on the edge of a cliff.  
A person like Sue may feel guilty when she thinks about getting a divorce despite her 
belief that it is the best course of action. However, she may alter her judgment after 
considering whether there is good reason to believe that divorce would be wrong in her 
circumstances. As was true of Marc, the issue for Sue concerns the content of her 
obligations, and deontological philosophy is capable of offering guidance about the rectitude 
of divorce in Sue’s case and the reasons bearing on the decision. 
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I have asserted that thoughtful lay people can learn something from philosophers 
who have contemplated what makes actions right or wrong. Even if one feels that 
philosophers should not be preachers and counselors, the theoretical need for deontology 
remains. Questions of obligation will not disappear from human life even if philosophers 
eschew them while at their writing desks. Insofar as there are preachers offering advice about 
right and wrong and as long as there are people—including philosophers themselves in their 
private lives—seeking answers to deontic questions with rigor, philosophy will be invited to 
study deontology to oblige them, although it may leave the immediate business of counseling 
and casuistry to others.  
A philosophical theologian who investigates the attributes of God might wish to 
separate what he does from preaching too. Nonetheless, we would think him remiss to 
ignore a question about God’s nature that often recurs for the pastor. The congregant asks, 
“Why did God take my baby son and not me; I have sinned and he is innocent?”  The pastor 
is unlikely to recite a scholarly tome to such a man, but the analysis of a philosopher–
theologian thinking about the problem of evil could help the pastor explain how God could 
let the innocent die yet suffer the guilty to live. Thus, the philosophical theologian has reason 
to arm the pastor by analyzing the compatibility of God’s omnipotence and benevolence. 
And indeed, should a comparable tragedy befall him, the theologian will find himself asking 
the same question posed by the congregant and in need of the same intellectual assistance 
sought by the pastor. 
3.2 Guilt in Cultures Without an Ethics of Divine Command 
 Anscombe’s argument that deontic moral concepts are dependent on a divine law 
theory of ethics is premised on the historical claim that deontic morals come from 
Christianity. By pointing to the pious past, Anscombe aimed to show us how deontic 
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concepts were coherent and meaningful with God but ceased to be so without him. The 
presence of deontic concepts in guilt, however, casts doubt on this position. So long as we 
accept that guilt is found in cultures that have not held a divine command view of ethics, 
then we have reason to believe that deontic notions have subsisted without such a view. This 
subverts Anscombe’s genealogical argument in two ways. First, if guilt and deontic thinking 
can exist apart from ethical monotheism, then Anscombe’s genealogical argument lacks its 
raison d’être, there being no special need to explain how deontic morality appeared at any 
particular time or place. Secondly, insofar as we still hold to the assumption motivating the 
genealogical argument that belief in moral duties and the “moral sense of ought” would not 
have arisen had they not once been coherent and meaningful thoughts, the existence of 
deontic ideas among peoples without a divine command ethic suggests that they are 
conceptually sound exclusive of this religious background. 
In this section, I will offer reasons for accepting that guilt is and was familiar to 
people living in cultures without a divine command ethic. I will first argue for the stronger 
thesis that guilt is an emotion encountered by people of all places, at all times. My arguments 
for this will focus on the intuition that all emotions are part of a common human nature. 
Acknowledging reasons to doubt the stronger thesis, I will then offer examples of guilt 
feelings in a culture that lacks a divine command ethics. 
3.2.1 Guilt a Universal Emotion 
 Earlier in this chapter, I described guilt as having a “primeval profile.” This assertion 
reflects my sense that guilt, like other emotions such as fear, disgust, envy, joy, and sadness, 
is rudimentary to our humanity. This impression, I think, is motivated by the stirring, 
sometimes violent force in the affective component of our emotions. We feel shame in our 
hearts, sudden bereavement in our guts, and fear in our skin. The connection of affects with 
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the body suggests to us that we are meeting forces that are primal, animal, and hence 
acultural. This seeming connection between feeling and physicality is bolstered by the belief 
that at least certain emotions (though probably not guilt and shame) are shared with other 
animals who lack culture and higher cognition. 
 In this section, I will review some of the empirical work in psychology and 
anthropology bearing on the question of whether guilt and other familiar emotions are part 
of universal human nature or instead culturally contingent. The literature reveals that this is a 
fraught topic about which there is limited consensus among empirical researchers. 
Ultimately, while we will see that the extant research furnishes evidence to believe that guilt 
is universal, there remain disagreements over the correct way to interpret that evidence. In 
light of these disagreements, we must be cautious about asserting that, for any given English 
emotion term familiar to us, there is an emotion experienced by people of all cultures 
corresponding in every part with the referent of our term. 
 In the psychological literature on whether emotions are culturally specific, Charles 
Darwin’s book The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals appears as an influential 
forerunner of the contention that the emotions are part of shared human nature. Darwin’s 
volume describes in great detail the changes in bodily attitude and facial expression 
accompanying various emotions in both humans and animals. To develop these descriptions, 
he sought information from correspondents in far-flung countries and incorporated 
photographs to illustrate the common changes in posture and countenance that he 
identified.  
Notably, Darwin included guilt in the emotions surveyed. He reports that his 
worldwide correspondents agreed that a distinct expression of guilt could be recognized 
“amongst the various races of men” (Darwin 1899, 428). The guilty man is reported to 
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“avoid looking at his accuser, or to give him stolen looks”; he “waver[s] from side to side” or 
his eyelids are “lowered and partly closed” (428). 
By including descriptions of emotion expression in animals alongside those of 
humans, Darwin was not simply spreading the scope of his study but also seeking an 
explanatory principle. Expressions of emotion, like other traits, could be accounted for as 
inherited adaptations (587–96). Likewise, Darwin’s interest in expressions of emotions in 
faraway lands was not a mere matter of completeness; he had a theoretical interest in 
whether the expressions of the emotions were innate or acquired. Insofar as they were 
inborn, their variety could be subsumed into the evolutionary account (585–86).  
In his conclusions, Darwin allows for the influence of custom on emotion 
expression but gives pride of place to innate endowments. He admits that there are a few 
expressions that are learned, as words of a language are learned, and points to the nodding or 
shaking of the head for approbation or disapprobation as examples (572–73). Nonetheless, 
most are innate dispositions. Darwin writes, “That the chief expressive actions, exhibited by 
man and by the lower animals, are now innate or inherited,—that is, have not been learnt by 
the individual,—is admitted by everyone” (570). He adds, “So little has learning or imitation 
to do with several of them that they are from the earliest days and throughout life quite 
beyond our control; for instance, the relaxation of the arteries of the skin in blushing, and 
the increased action of the heart in anger” (570). As further evidence, he tells us that these 
changes are even seen in children of two or three years and in those born blind (570–71). 
Apart from the expressions themselves, Darwin conjectured that the ability to 
recognize them in others was likewise innate and inherited (580). The tenor of his 
conclusions shows that he was less confident in this thesis than the former (580–81). He 
allows, for instance, that the ability of monkeys and dogs to recognize a small number of 
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human facial expressions (smiling, for instance) could have been learned by individual 
creatures through association (581). At the same time, he sees significance in the reactions he 
observed to the photographs used in the book; Darwin found that nearly everyone to whom 
he showed them identified each photograph with the same emotion (584–85). 
During the late 1960s and 1970s, psychologists inspired by Darwin’s theories began 
performing experiments to test his claims about the expressions of emotion and their 
recognition (Mesquita, Frijda, and Scherer 1997, 257). Paul Ekman was a leading researcher 
in this new field. He conducted an early study that found subjects from New Guinea, 
Borneo, the United States, Brazil, and Japan largely agreed about which of six translated 
emotion words (words for happiness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise, and sadness) to assign to 
each of several photographs of American faces selected by the researchers (Ekman, 
Sorenson, and Friesen, 1969). Follow-up trials by Ekman and other researchers, notably 
Carroll Izard, replicated these results in studies that embraced more countries or used 
photographs of New Guineans rather than Americans (e.g., Izard 1971; Ekman 1972).  
While this research tested the recognition of expressions of emotions across nations, 
other investigations studied expressions themselves. For instance, Paul Friesen conducted an 
experiment in which a series of Japanese or American students were left in a room alone 
with a concealed camera to watch four films (Ekman 1973). One of the films depicted a 
pleasant canoe trip while the other three—labeled “stressful” by the researchers—were 
graphic recordings of invasive medical procedures. The experimenters reported that the 
facial expressions of the Japanese and American subjects while watching the films did not 
differ. Another study of people born deaf and blind performed by Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt 
found that they produced the same facial expressions as sighted and hearing persons for a 
range of emotions (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1973). 
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In the early 1990s, Klaus Scherer and Harald Wallbott published the results of a 
mammoth global study of emotion response—the capstone of the universalist research 
program in psychology (Scherer and Wallbott 1994). While standing in the same tradition as 
Ekman and Izard, Scherer and Wallbott’s work surpassed what had been done before in 
breadth and complexity. Their study covered thirty-seven countries from five continents and 
employed a large team of global collaborators to test whether seven emotions were universal 
or culturally specific (310). In a significant difference from the work reviewed above, they 
included guilt alongside joy, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, and shame (313).  
Scherer, Wallbott, and their confederates obtained data by administering 
questionnaires (314). They divided the questionnaires into seven sections for each of the 
emotions studied. At the top of the first page of each section, they wrote the relevant 
emotion word, translated into the local language. For each of these words, they asked the 
subjects to recall a time when they had a strong experience of the emotion named. For the 
next step, the questionnaires asked about several components of emotion: (1) subjective 
feeling state, including duration and intensity; (2) physiological symptoms, including 
expressive reactions (e.g., frowning or smiling) and behaviors (e.g., approach or withdrawal); 
and (3) verbal reactions, including changes in tone of voice (313). To guide their answers, 
respondents read lists and checked those features they remembered being part of the 
emotion in question (314). 
 Statistical analysis performed on the data collected from the questionnaires revealed 
strong patterning for each of the emotions surveyed. (326) That is to say, reports of each 
emotion component were not evenly spread but clustered around each emotion. For 
example, the data with respect to guilt revealed a profile distinct from that of the others: far 
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fewer reports of aggression and smiling but far more reports of the emotion lasting a long 
time and the subject remaining silent (320, 323). 
 In line with the patterning effect described above, analysis of variation performed on 
the data revealed that the emotion at issue was strongly predictive for each emotion 
component in the study (317). By contrast, the same form of analysis revealed that the 
country in which the survey was conducted was a much weaker (though nonetheless 
statistically significant) predictor of reports of the emotion component. Likewise, the 
interaction effect (here, a measure of the effect of the country variable on the predictive 
strength of the emotion variable) was even weaker. This last statistical measure is especially 
meaningful because it evidences the independence of the predictive value of asking about a 
particular emotion from the country in which the question is asked. 
 As Scherer and Wallbott acknowledge in their paper’s conclusions, the most 
significant result from their study is the way that emotion components—encompassing 
reports of physiological changes, behaviors, verbal expressions, and felt experiences—cluster 
about particular emotions (326). The clustering of these components is evidence for a 
universal set of emotion-component patterns. However, as we will see, whether the cross-
cultural incidence of these patterns demonstrates that the emotion with which each is 
associated is actually the same emotion in each country cannot be taken for granted. 
 While the above evidence for the universality of the emotions has come from the 
field of psychology, much of the evidence in favor of their cultural relativity consists in the 
ethnographic work of anthropologists.10 Unlike the large cross-cultural surveys conducted by 
psychologists like Ekman and Scherer, the ethnographic work favoring cultural relativity is 
                                                
10 The difference of opinion and perspective between the two groups is strikingly illustrated 
by the scathing review Margaret Mead gave one of Ekman’s books (Mead, 1975). 
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composed largely of dispersed but deep reports of anthropologists embedded among one 
people for an extended period of time. Returning from the field, these anthropologists often 
reported that thought, feeling, and behavior did not fall along the familiar lines defined by 
our emotion concepts; frequently, they observed that there was no local equivalent for an 
English emotion term like “sadness” or “anger.”  
For example, anthropologist Jean Briggs, who lived for a number of years with the 
Inuit reported that anger was very rare among them and greatly feared and disfavored. 
Moreover, there were multiple emotion words in the Inuit language having to do with verbal 
aggression, violent aggression, and sullen or peevish behavior, none of which was a true 
equivalent of our word “anger” (Briggs 1970, 328–34). Tellingly, each of these words was 
negative; none of them could be used as terms of praise for a justified attitude of an adult to 
another adult as is sometimes the case in the West (328).  Similarly, Cliff Goddard recounted 
that the Malay language has no synonym for our word “anger” (Goddard 1996, 437). The 
word to which it is often translated, marah, comes nearer to “offended” or “resentful” as it 
describes a passive, brooding state triggered by personal slights and disrespect (437–39). The 
literature is not limited to anger: Robert Levy related that the Tahitians have no word 
corresponding to our term “sadness” (Levy 1973, 305). Speaking of two “[f]airly competent 
French-Tahitian bilingual speakers,” he reported that they “did not understand the meaning 
of triste in its sense of ‘sorrowful, mournful, sad, melancholy, dejected’ and defined and used 
it as haumani, ‘fatigued,’ or maru, ‘gentle’” (305). 
Apart from reporting on the absence of seemingly basic emotions in other cultures, 
anthropologists have reported the presence of unfamiliar emotions among non-Western 
peoples as well. Michelle Rosalado describes an emotion among the Ilogot people of the 
Philippines that they call liget, a feeling comparable to a nebulous mixture of envy, anger, and 
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raw, undirected excitement or passion (Rosaldo 1980, 22, 48). Briggs reports three emotion 
words in the Inuit language for sadness at the thought of being left alone but no generic 
word for sadness (Briggs 1970, 351–52). To give a final example, Japanese psychiatrist Takeo 
Doi has emphasized the Japanese emotion of amae, a feeling of warmth and dependence as 
one has towards one’s mother or other doting benefactor, as key to understanding the 
nation’s culture (Doi 1971, 8, 45). 
Given the disagreements among empirical researchers about whether the emotions 
are universal, what should we say about the status of guilt? Scherer and Wallbott’s study 
provides us with evidence that guilt is associated with a definite profile of behavioral, 
pathological, and expressive characteristics. However, the anthropological evidence should 
teach us caution in interpreting this data. If other cultures appear to lack emotions that we 
have and to have emotions that we lack, we must be open to the possibility that emotions 
such as guilt, shame, and remorse, with all their precise cognitive differentiae, are as peculiar 
to the West as amae is to Japan. 
One way of reconciling these two perspectives is to be meticulous about the level of 
description at which we are posing the question of universality. As psychologists Batja 
Mesquita and Nico Frijda have argued, the problem of transcultural emotions is best 
broached by breaking up an emotion like sadness, anger, or guilt into its different 
components and then asking which of these components is present in a foreign culture 
(Mesquita and Frijda 1992, 179–80). The psychological research evidences that some of 
these components cluster together around translations of familiar English emotion terms. 
Nonetheless, while the distinct profile of emotion components associated with the word 
“guilt” and its translations in the languages of the Scherer–Wallbott study may represent a 
basic human potential, we should be hesitant to identify that profile with our fully 
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articulated, monolithic concept of guilt. As the discussion of Taylor’s models has taught us, 
the boundaries between emotions may depend upon cognition and context as much or more 
than they do a distinct affect, bodily changes, or behaviors. The Japanese emotion amae, for 
instance, is defined by interpersonal relations (dependence, nurturing) as much as it is by a 
particular feeling (warmth) (Doi 1971, 8, 45). 
At the end of the day, the results obtained by Scherer and Wallbott should make us 
confident that there is a set of emotion components in the neighborhood of guilt, call it 
guilt*, that is universal. However, we should hesitate to assert that guilt itself, fully analyzed 
and explicated in this paper as a deontic emotion, is a cross-cultural constant. In other 
words, the present state of empirical work on the emotions does not allow us to assert that 
wherever there is guilt*—presumably everywhere in the wake of Scherer and Wallbott’s 
work—then there is also guilt. 
The purpose of the foregoing incursion into psychology and anthropology has been 
to determine whether we are warranted in asserting that guilt is a universal emotion. The 
relevance of this point for the arguments of this chapter is that if guilt is universal, so are its 
constitutive deontic concepts. If that is the case, then we can simply assume that deontic 
moral concepts are present in cultures without a divine-command ethic—skipping the 
demonstration that guilt is experienced in any particular civilization. However, per the 
conclusion reached in the previous paragraph, the empirical research does not warrant us 
treating guilt monolithically in cross-cultural contexts. Therefore, to assert with confidence 
that there are peoples without a divine-command ethic who are nonetheless familiar with 
guilt, we must take a closer look at a candidate culture to check that any putative local 
example of guilt actually possesses the deontic character that is essential to it. Only then will 
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we be sure of having a case of guilt that casts doubt on Anscombe’s claim that deontic 
morality originated in moral monotheism.  
3.2.2 Chinese Guilt, One Example of Guilt Without Divine Command Ethics  
  Far from acknowledging that guilt forms a part of human nature, the partisan of 
Anscombe’s view may respond by asserting that guilt too is a derivative of our pious 
Medieval past. Such an opponent will not allow us to invoke counterexamples of guilt from 
contemporary American or European life, even if the persons we choose are convincingly 
faithless and secular, because guilt may have outlasted theism in the culture just as the 
deontic is alleged to have done. With this objection in mind, I will present evidence of guilt 
feelings experienced by people in modern China, a culture without a history of a divine-
command ethic. 
 In contrast with Anscombe’s contention that Western moral thinking during the 
Middle Ages was theological, Sinologists and scholars of world religion variously describe 
Chinese ethics as “humanistic” or “naturalistic” and grounded in social relations. Sinologists 
have long noted that anthropomorphic deities are inessential to Chinese religion.11 Indeed, a 
transcendent God with the divine attributes assigned in the West does not appear in 
conventional Chinese cosmology: “Chinese people do not have an omnipotent, 
omnipresent, and all-knowing God” (Wu 1969, 101). 
Affirming the focus on mankind and social relationships in Chinese beliefs, Julia 
Ching describes the nation’s dominant Confucian ethical system as a “humanism that is open 
to religious values” (Ching 1993, 52).12 As such, the central virtue in Confucian teaching, jen 
                                                
11 In other words, for the Chinese, religion is “something not necessarily linked to a belief in 
God (as Buddhism has shown to be possible)” (Küng 1989, 229). 
12 Sinologist Laurence Thompson affirms that Confucianism provides the dominant moral 
paradigm, even among those influenced by Buddhism and Daoism: “But whatever personal 
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[benevolence, humaneness], is “always concerned with human relationship, with relating to 
others” (Ching 1993, 58). Swiss theologian Hans Küng echoes Ching’s judgment; he writes, 
“[C]entral to the interests of Confucius was the human person with his or her natural and basic 
family (and thus also social) relationships” (Küng 1989, 109). Confucianism is 
“anthropocentric” (109). 
In his Chinese Religion, Laurence Thompson makes the contrasts with Western ethical 
monotheism explicit:  
The universe of the ancient Chinese was naturalistic in the sense that it was 
characterized by the regularity that Western philosophy has called “law”—but it 
lacked the Western assumption of an outside “lawgiver.”  
. . . 
The Chinese religion, while giving to Heaven power to punish people’s misbehavior, 
defined this misbehavior as actions inimical to the harmonious workings of the 
universe.  
(Thompson 1996, 1, 7). Given such a view of “Heaven” or the divine, a command theory of 
ethics is inapt. Erin Cline, a professor of comparative and Chinese religion, states, “[I]t is 
important to remember that for Kongzi [Confucius], Heaven is not an agent with a distinct 
personality, and as a result, we should not understand Heaven as commanding humans to 
behave in a certain way” (Cline 2009, 120–21). 
 The absence of a divine-command ethic in China has proven no defense from guilt 
pangs: psychologist Olwen Bedford affirms that the feeling is a recognized emotion in 
contemporary Chinese life. In her article “The Individual Experience of Guilt and Shame in 
Chinese Culture,” Bedford reports the results of ethnographic interviews with bilingual 
Taiwanese living in Taiwan (Bedford 2004, 30). Through the interviews, she aimed to 
                                                                                                                                            
religious views one might hold, all Chinese shared general and specific concepts about the 
social order and individual conduct, derived from those Literati [Confucian] texts to which 
we have so often alluded” (Thompson 1996, 11).  
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identify Mandarin equivalents to “guilt” and “shame,” record examples of their application, 
and fix their definitions (30). She concludes that Mandarin does possess equivalents for 
“guilt and “shame” and that the feelings at issue are familiar to speakers of the language (44). 
She adds, however, that some of the situations which arouse the emotions are different from 
those in English speaking nations and that the Chinese possess more terms to express 
different types of guilt and shame (49). 
 Bedford conducted interviews of thirty-four Taiwanese women between the ages of 
twenty-four and thirty-one (30). None of the women had travelled abroad, although all of 
them possessed “at least intermediate English skills” (30). Each informant was interviewed 
for one or two hours in a quiet room at her workplace (31). Bedford explains how the 
questions were asked: 
The two main questions asked were ‘What do you think of when I say the word 
shame (guilt)?’ Participations then freely talked about their experiences, and the 
interviewer only occasionally prompted them to continue by repeating as a question 
the last few words the participant had spoken. The only other questions asked were 
to confirm understanding of the participants’ descriptions. 
(31). The transcribed interviews were sorted to create lists of the descriptive statements and 
concrete examples associated with each emotional term mentioned in the interview (31–32). 
The researchers then generated descriptions for each emotion by analyzing the semantics of 
the associated word (31–32). 
 Bedford reports three terms used by the informants that she classifies as guilt words. 
The first is nei jiu:  
Nei jiu is the feeling that one has failed in one’s personal responsibilities. It implies 
feeling obligated in some way to other people and not fulfilling that responsibility. 
One has the sense of owing others, whether those persons think so or not. It 
overlaps with feeling sorry, but not with feelings of shame. No one else need know, 
or even be of the opinion that one ought to feel it for nei jiu to be experienced. 
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(32). Nei jiu is distinct from the other guilt terms Bedford identifies in several respects. It is 
“personal guilt” in a double sense. First, it is always felt towards another person, the person 
to whom one feels obliged. Second, it “concerns only self-expectation and self-demands.” 
(32). The person feeling nei jiu believes that there are obligations she must uphold but does 
not expect others to have the same sense of obligation. Similarly, “[f]eelings of nei jiu may 
occur even if one does not have the capacity to fulfill the obligation, or when the person to 
whom one feels obligated does not hold one responsible” (33). 
 Bedford tells us that nei jiu is usually connected to one’s abilities. She presents a 
statement from one of the informants as an example: 
Like just now, [my student] asked me to help, but I don’t have much time so I feel 
nei jiu. And I know I could do this, but I just don’t have time, and I have to say to 
her, ‘Oh, sorry, I don’t have time.’ This is nei jiu—this kind of guilt.  
(33). Bedford interprets, “The informant experiences nei jiu because as a teacher she feels 
that she ought to have time to help her students. She feels obligated to assist them, but she is 
not always able to satisfy her feelings of obligation to her students” (33). 
 The second form of guilt that Bedford identifies is zui e gan, “the feeling of moral 
transgression, much like the feeling of having sinned in the English language” (33). Zui e gan 
is a feeling of having “done something terribly wrong, and not of being evil or inferior” (33). 
An informant reported, “If [someone] feels zui e gan he will think about it every night. He 
can’t sleep. You feel really guilty in your mind, and it won’t get out. That’s zui e gan” (33). 
According to Bedford, the “capacity to experience zui e gan develops with a sense of 
morality”; “small children do not generally experience it” (34).  
 Zui e gan is felt over violations of one’s “personal morality” (34). A subject told 
researchers, “You have your own personal morality and within this morality you do 
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something bad, then you will feel guilt. You know it’s not right, but you have done it and so 
you feel zui e gan . . . it’s not like a rule or law” (34).13 
In being concerned with personal morality, zui e gan is like nei jiu. It also resembles nei 
jiu in that it is solely concerned with “one’s own behavior, or events for which one takes 
personal responsibility” (34). While some instances of zui e gan concern other people, it 
differs from nei jiu in that it is not felt towards others: “The central issue is not the harm done 
to the other person—it is the fact of the transgression of one’s personal morality: what the 
self has done” (34). The focus on wrongful action is evident in the following explanation 
from a study subject:  
I kill somebody. Even though he is my enemy, I will feel zui e gan. Maybe he is good 
father. Maybe has a family to support. I feel zui e gan because I am good person. I 
can think other things. I did not have to do that. 
(34). The emphasis on transgression in zui e gan is also indicated by the fact that the emotion 
can be felt because of violations of rules, so long as “one believes it is morally wrong to 
break the rule” (34). An informant stated:  
You want to steal something very beautiful. You really want to own it, but at that time I 
will get this kind of feeling, I can’t steal it, and then morality comes up and if you steal [it 
you] will feel guilty in your mind. Oh, my heart is dirty. 
(34).  
 The final form of guilt Bedford describes is fan zui gan. Whereas zui e gan concerned 
the subject’s personal morality, fan zui gan is triggered by violations of social rules that the 
agent accepts as binding not only for oneself but for society as a whole (35). As an informant 
                                                
13 Bedford later explains that, while not rules or laws, the obligations at issue in cases of zui e 
gan are still such that one usually “expects other people to adhere to similar standards” (45). 
With this in mind, where the informant says that zui e gan is not like a matter of laws or rules, 
I think it should be understood as similar to the attitude that a feminist might have to the use 
of a sexist word: it is wrong to use, but doing so is not the kind of thing that is (or perhaps 
even should be) criminal. 
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explained, “We say fan zui gan. That means I am feeling like I violated a law. This sometimes 
meaning guilty, or just feels guilty” (35). 
In Bedford’s terms, fan zui gan concerns “external” obligations rather than the 
“internal” duties that are the province of nei jiu and zui e gan. “External obligations are those 
that an individual recognizes as ones to which one ought to adhere, not because one 
particularly feels bound as an individual, but because these rules apply to everyone, and 
society is better if everyone adheres to the rules” (35).  
As external obligations (criminal laws, for example) usually do not require one to 
possess a certain ability, it is typically not possible to experience fan zui gan over lack of a 
capacity. This forms a strong contrast with nei jiu, which may be felt over one’s inability to 
fulfill an obligation to help another (35).  “Not felt towards people, it is merely the internal 
recognition of breaking a requirement” (35). 
That fan zui gan is not felt towards people points to a further point of difference 
between it and both nei jiu and zui e gan. Unlike the latter, which are “personal” in Bedford’s 
lexicon, fan zui gan is “impersonal” in several senses (35). Not only is it not felt towards other 
people, but it need not concern harm to other people—only the violation of a rule. 
Furthermore, it is concerned with externally enforced and promulgated rules. 
Still, there are important respects in which the individual experiencing fan zui gan 
internalizes the social rules at issue. Contrary to its characterization as impersonal, fan zui gan 
can “only be experienced toward oneself, and one may experience it without anyone else 
knowing about one’s transgressions” (35). “Feelings of fan zui gan range from long-lasting 
and difficult to escape to very mild, lasting only as long as the actual transgression” (35). 
Bedford notes that “[o]ne feels it strongest when violating a rule that also has moral 
connotations” (35). Observing that “[m]any legal requirements are grounded in the general 
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social morality,” she tells us that in such cases, fan zui gan and zui e gan are apt to coincide. 
(35). Indeed, “[s]ince many situations arouse both emotions simultaneously to about the 
same degree,” a few of the informants “claimed that these two guilt feelings were the same 
thing” (35). Nevertheless, Bedford insists that the emotions are distinct and that different 
people experience them to different degrees in situations implicating both, depending on 
whether the individual’s thoughts stress breaking the positive law of the community or her 
moral transgression. (35). 
In her article’s conclusions, Bedford describes nei jiu, zui e gan, and fan zui gan as 
different types of guilt feeling (47). As she puts it, “In Mandarin it is possible to distinguish 
among types of subjective guilt in a way that is not possible in English” (47). Referencing 
Western authors who have held that guilt “implies transgression,” whereas shame “implies 
issues of identity,” Bedford finds this mode of distinguishing guilt from shame holds true 
across in the Chinese case as well (47).  
In accord with Taylor’s contention that the person feeling guilt believes himself to 
have violated a duty, in all three forms of Chinese guilt identified by Bedford, the idea that 
the sufferer has violated an obligation is present. In zui e gan and fan zui gan, the transgression 
is, respectively, of morality or a social rule that one accepts as authoritative. Nei jiu is less 
clearly about transgression of a duty: it is felt only towards another person and only about 
“not having lived up to a personally defined obligation or responsibility” towards that person 
(47). Still, the idea of obligation is present, albeit phrased in terms of responsibility to 
another rather than obedience to a law. That responsibility is a deontic notion is evidenced 
by the fact that we speak of a person’s responsibilities in terms of what he owes another, as 
if responsibilities neglected were debts unpaid.  
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For guilt to encompass both nei jiu and fan zui gan should not surprise us if we recall 
guilt’s mutability. To feel guilty about an action, the action need only “present[] itself as 
wrong” (Taylor 1985, 86). What the agent will feel guilt about is then a matter of which 
actions she believes to be wrong. While making due allowance for the persistence of an 
emotion and its constituent belief in the face of contrary evidence and argument, we should 
also allow that an agent’s moral beliefs and feelings may be rationally tractable. With respect 
to fan zui gan, Bedford emphasizes that a person must not simply recognize that the external 
command at issue applies to her but accept its authority as well. Moreover, accepting its 
authority will often be a matter of recognizing its justification—its utility for instance. In a 
case of fan zui gan, the agent has violated an external obligation which she “recognizes as 
one[] to which one ought to adhere . . . because these rules apply to everyone, and society is 
better if everyone adheres to the rules” (Bedford 2004, 35) (emphasis added). 
Turning to nei jiu, varying cultural ideas about the scope of obligation explain why 
this form of guilt seems askew from a Western standpoint. In particular, nei jiu may seem at 
odds with Western guilt and Taylor’s theory in particular, because it can occur over 
omissions that stem from one’s lack of an ability. As the quoted analysis shows however, the 
existence of nei jiu guilt in China can be chalked up to differences in opinion about our 
positive obligations to those others (family and society) upon whom we are broadly 
dependent for our lives and our prosperity: 
Guilt in the West does not usually occur with respect to capacities that one does not 
hold because Westerners do not usually feel morally obligated to possess particular 
capabilities. . . . In Chinese culture, however, the sense of duty and obligation to 
family and group is much more strongly experienced, so guilt may be aroused over 
lack of capability. 
(47). 
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 There are two more elements familiar from Taylor’s theory that are matched in 
Bedford’s study. The first is that guilt is about one’s actions or omissions, not who one is. 
For Taylor this is a key difference between shame and guilt, and it is one that Bedford 
affirms her study bears out: “[R]esearch on Americans suggests shame implies issues of 
identity, and guilt implies transgression of some sort . . . . The same is true for Chinese 
people” (47). The second is that the idea of a moral stain, which Taylor emphasizes as a 
component of guilt feeling, surfaces in the interviews regarding zui e gan. One woman 
imagines the aftermath of stealing a coveted object—“Oh my heart is dirty”—while another 
describes how zui e gan lingers—“[H]e will think about it every night. He can’t sleep. You 
feel really guilty in your mind, and it won’t get out.” 
 3.2.3 An Objection, Nonmoral Guilt 
 It may be objected that in my discussions of guilt feeling I have oversimplified in 
treating it as a monolithic phenomenon. While Taylor’s analysis of guilt as a deontic emotion 
may be correct in some cases, it does not exhaust the range of guilt experiences. As Herbert 
Morris has described, there are cases of appropriate and genuine guilt feeling that do not 
involve action, much less culpable wrongdoing, on the part of the guilty person. Morris 
refers to these as cases of “nonmoral guilt” (Morris 1987, 220). They include guilt 
experiences over mere thoughts or wishes, guilt over unjust enrichment, “survival” guilt, 
metaphysical guilt, and vicarious guilt felt for the actions of others (221).  
Guilt over unjust enrichment embraces cases of windfall and lucky escape: one 
brother is born healthy, his sibling disabled, and the former feels guilty; one daughter is 
favored in her mother’s will, her sister is exempted from it, and the former feels guilty upon 
receiving an unexpectedly large inheritance (232–33). Survival guilt includes the familiar case 
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of a soldier who returns home from a war that took the lives of her comrades and feels guilty 
thinking about how she survived and they did not. 
Metaphysical guilt was identified by Karl Jaspers and acknowledged by Morris. John 
Donne’s line, “Ask not for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee,” could serve as its motto. 
Metaphysical guilt is a breach of the human bond Donne acknowledged; it is “the lack of 
absolute solidarity with the human being as such—an indelible claim beyond morally 
meaningful duty” (Jaspers, 71) (quoted at Morris 1987, 235). It has similarities with both 
survivor and unjust enrichment guilt: “This solidarity is violated by my presence at a wrong 
or a crime. It is not enough that I cautiously risk my life to prevent it; if it happens, and if I 
was there, and if I survive where the other is killed, I know from a voice within myself: I am 
guilty of still being alive” (Jaspers 1947, 71) (quoted at Morris 1987, 235). 
 Granting the existence of nonmoral guilt, are the arguments of this chapter upset? I 
think not, for as Morris himself acknowledges, his observations regarding nonmoral guilt 
should not raise doubts as to the existence and validity of moral guilt. In fact, he tells us that 
“we should continue to view moral guilt as importantly different from any nonmoral kind we 
may come upon” (Morris 1987, 222), and as we saw earlier, he affirms that cases of moral 
guilt do involve the idea of a transgression (225). The existence of nonmoral guilt should, 
however, teach us caution in interpreting examples of guilt. For present purposes, we should 
recognize that not every case of guilt identified from history or literature can be assumed a 
case of moral guilt having the deontic features Taylor has analyzed. Yet even acknowledging 
this last lesson, Bedford’s study of contemporary Chinese guilt remains a sound example of 
that emotion in a culture without a divine command ethic. As we saw, violation of an 
obligation was a feature of each type of guilt Bedford recognized. 
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4. Conclusion 
 My goal in this chapter has been to demonstrate that guilt is a deontic emotion so as 
to vindicate deontology in the face of Anscombe’s attacks on the worth of that endeavor. I 
began by summarizing Anscombe’s position in “Modern Moral Philosophy.” I then shifted 
to evidence and arguments for guilt’s deontic character, primarily the work of Gabriele 
Taylor but also the views of John Rawls and Herbert Morris; in short, all three believe that 
the idea that one has violated an obligation is a constituent thought in guilt.  We then saw 
the strengths of Taylor’s theory of guilt—the way it accounts for guilt’s mutability and 
persistence in the face of contrary rational evidence, as well as its cogent separation of guilt 
from shame, remorse, and humiliation.  
Having established guilt’s deontic character, I then considered its impact on 
Anscombe’s claims. First, we witnessed how deontology can help the person struggling with 
conscience, the person who wonders whether she should or should not feel guilty. This 
indicated that Anscombe’s condition on her thesis—that deontology should be abandoned 
only if psychologically feasible—applied. Next, we considered the impact of guilt on 
Anscombe’s genealogical account of deontic concepts. Both guilt’s appearance as a basic 
human emotion and the evidence of guilt feelings in China belied her contention that the 
deontic concepts constitutive of guilt were a relic of the devout Middle Ages or that guilt 
itself was merely another such antique. Lastly, we briefly looked at an objection premised on 
Morris’ identification of genuine nonmoral types of guilt. As we recognized, however, the 
existence of nonmoral guilt did not undermine the significance of cases of moral guilt to the 
arguments of this chapter. 
 In the second chapter, I will turn to face Anscombe’s claim that deontology is 
conceptually incoherent in the absence of a divine lawgiver. Whereas the arguments of this 
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chapter have argued the need for deontology and undermined Anscombe’s skeptical 
genealogy of deontic morals, they have not squarely addressed the charge of incoherence. I 
will show in the next chapter that deontic concepts are intelligible without a divine lawgiver. 
This work will rely primarily upon the theories of the British intuitionists, especially A.C. 
Ewing. 
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Chapter Two, Parsing Deontic Concepts 
 Anscombe charges that the concept of moral obligation—signified by the moral 
sense of words like “ought,” “right,” and “wrong,”—is no longer a “really intelligible one,” 
and that the word “ought” “no longer signifies a real concept at all” (Anscombe 1958, 6, 8). 
In a helpful illustration, she says that the idea of a law is dependent on the idea of a lawgiver 
as the idea of a verdict is dependent on the idea of a judge. Her argument is that the deontic 
concepts are unintelligible without God in the picture—they describe something which she 
contends cannot be coherently thought, a law without a lawgiver. 
 I will demonstrate in this chapter that the deontic concepts are intelligible without 
reference to a divine lawgiver. What “ought” expresses is that an action is the action to-be-
done. This is a coherent concept. It is a concept we understand even though it is difficult to 
say more about it without merely paraphrasing by using different words like “should,” 
“must,” and “right.”  
At this point, I am just insisting that we do understand the deontic concepts 
independently of God and that they are coherent and intelligible. Anscombe, of course, 
denies this assertion. In order to demonstrate that the deontic concepts are intelligible, I will 
turn to the work of the British intuitionists. As Tom Hurka has explained, these thinkers 
explained deontic concepts to their readers “structurally” (Hurka 2003, 627–28). Rather than 
attempting to reductively define the concept, a structural explanation explains a normative 
concept using other normative concepts. As we will see, structural explanations have the 
advantage of being neither reduction nor paraphrase.  
To be clear, structural explanations of the deontic concepts are relevant to refuting 
Anscombe because they demonstrate that we already do coherently grasp the deontic 
concepts without God. They do this by making perspicuous what is implicit when we use the 
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concepts. This method of explanation is comparable to one used in teaching arithmetic. A 
teacher seeking to explain the concept of multiplication might do so by drawing a rectangle. 
To illustrate that three times four is equal to twelve, the instructor, starting with a piece of 
graph paper, could draw a line three spaces in length. To show the meaning of three 
multiplied by one, she could then draw a line one space in length and shade the 
encompassed spaces. Next, to demonstrate the meaning of three multiplied by four, she 
could extend the top line three spaces and shade the boxes encompassed to form a rectangle. 
While this is not a reduction of the concept of multiplication, it is an explanation of the 
concept and not a mere paraphrase. Furthermore, were the child to perform this exercise 
rather than the teacher, we would take that as evidence that the child understood the 
concept of multiplication and was not simply parroting her four-times table.14 
My examples of structural explanations of a deontic concept will come from the 
work of the British intuitionists. A.C. Ewing, for instance, spoke of an action’s being the 
fitting action to perform in the circumstances. Instead of accounting for the deontic in terms 
of the non-deontic (e.g., the form of an autonomous will or the commands of God), the 
explanation illuminates the structure of an ought—a relation of fittingness holding between 
action and circumstance—without asserting that ought is reducible to these facts. Notably, 
                                                
14 Compare Derek Parfit’s claims about the concept of a reason: “Like some other 
fundamental concepts, such as those involved in our thoughts about time, consciousness, 
and possibility, the concept of a reason is indefinable in the sense that it cannot be helpfully 
explained merely by using words” (Parfit 2011, 31). Consequently, we must “explain such 
concepts in a different way, by getting people to think thoughts that use these concepts” 
(31).  Parfit says the same of an indefinable sense of “wrong” used in moral claims. He dubs 
this sense “musn’t-be-done” (165). Like the notion of a reason, musn’t-be-done cannot be 
“helpfully explain[ed] merely by using words” but “must be explained . . . by getting people 
to think certain thoughts” (165). The teacher drawing rectangles in my example is using this 
type of explanation: she explains multiplication by getting the student to think certain 
thoughts about shape that use the concept of multiplication, of three extended four times 
over. 
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the intuitionists saw no need for a fourth or fifth point—law or lawgiver—in the 
configuration of an ought or duty. 
 While the deontic concepts can be thus elucidated after the fashion of the British 
intuitionists, at least one of their number believed that the concept of an action being the 
fitting action to perform in the situation was insufficient to capture the special character of 
moral obligation. Ewing thought that the ought of moral obligation should be distinguished 
from the ought of fittingness and that the former was fittingness-plus. On his view, all 
obligatory actions are fitting, but something else distinguishes actions that are merely fitting 
from those that are moral duties. In Definition of Good and Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, 
he groped for an account of the plus that distinguished moral duty, canvassing several 
candidates without reaching a conclusion. One of those considered was theological: the 
concept of moral obligation might “necessarily involve theology” (Ewing 1947, 134). If so, 
then Anscombe’s claim that the deontic concepts are unintelligible without God would be 
vindicated. 
 Accepting the distinction between the ought of moral obligation and the ought of 
fittingness that Ewing draws, we can still articulate an intelligible concept of moral obligation 
without bringing in God. Conceptually, moral obligations are distinguished from non-moral 
oughts by their peremptory character. Moral duties can do more than outweigh their non-
moral counterparts; they preclude or forestall them—rule them out of consideration in 
advance—as a matter of precedence. For example, it may be true that I ought to read the 
book with artful prose, but if I have promised to read a friend’s poor genre novel instead, 
the latter moral obligation precludes the nonmoral ought that dictates I read the superior 
piece of literature.  
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 We should acknowledge that there remains obscurity in the idea of a moral 
obligation. Yet when properly understood, this obscurity is in the grounding of moral 
obligation, not in the concept. We understand the concept—we know what it is for an action 
to be demanded by a peremptory ought that cuts off other considerations. Comprehending 
the concept of something, however, is a different matter from understanding why that 
something is the way it is. In the moral case, this means that though we understand the 
peremptory character of moral obligation, we do not know why moral obligations possess 
such preclusive importance or why we generally come under them.15  
An answer to these questions would not consist in a structural explanation but what 
Hurka would call a “foundational” explanation (Hurka 2003, 627–28). Unlike structural 
explanations, foundational explanations explain the normative using another domain of 
concepts—those of metaphysics, natural science, or theology. In so doing, foundational 
explanations seek to ground the normative in the nonnormative. The claim that you ought 
not to hit your brother because God forbids it is an instance of such an explanation. Unless 
it is meant as a definition, this statement concerns why hitting your brother is something you 
ought not to do and does not concern the concept of ought.  
Assuming that we are avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, we must already understand 
the concept of moral obligation if the idea of God is to help illuminate moral obligation. The 
role for the idea of God in deontic theory lies not in making the concept of moral obligation 
coherent but in grounding moral obligation. Given a winning argument for the theory, the 
divine command view would light the foundations and chase the obscurity away from the 
grounds of moral obligation. Accordingly, if it is ultimately able to help us understand moral 
obligation, theology will only do so by explaining why moral obligations have their 
                                                
15 I propose an answer to this question in Chapters Four and Five. 
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peremptory force and why we are subject to them, not by elucidating the concept of a moral 
obligation, which we can already grasp without thinking of God as the duty’s source. 
 This concludes the introduction. In the section that follows, I will summarize 
Anscombe’s argument that deontic concepts are defective without divine underpinning. By 
way of rebuttal, I will then present an analysis of ought that shows it can be intelligibly 
thought without incorporating God. The analysis in this section will be an instance of 
Hurka’s structural explanation and will be modeled on A.C. Ewing’s fittingness account of 
the deontic. In the next section, I will explain how moral oughts may be conceptually 
distinguished from nonmoral ones. Finally, I will argue that, while there is obscurity in the 
idea of a moral obligation, this obscurity is safely located in the foundations of moral 
obligation and not in the concept thereof. 
1. Clarifying Anscombe’s Critique 
 In her attack on philosophers’ talk about moral obligation, Anscombe makes clear 
that it is only the moral sense of a word like “ought” that is flawed. “Ought” and “should” 
are fine words when used with other meanings. Anscombe would not object to speaking 
about what one “ought” to do or “must” do when it is a lawyer discussing the statutes in 
England. Nor would she object to a friend telling her pal that she “ought to study harder.” 
As used by the friend, Anscombe thinks that “terms [like] ‘should’ or ‘ought’ or ‘needs’ relate 
to good and bad: e.g. machinery needs oil, or should or ought to be oiled in that running 
without oil is bad for it, or it runs badly without oil” (Anscombe 1958, 5). 
 According to Anscombe, these “ordinary (and quite indispensable) terms” acquired 
their special moral sense “by being equated in the relevant contexts with ‘is obliged,’ or ‘is 
bound,’ or ‘is required to,’ in the sense in which one can be obliged or bound by law, or 
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something can be required by law” (5). This of course, is supposed to have been a historical 
change, wrought by the rise of Christianity and its “law conception of ethics” (5). 
 Anscombe’s primary protest against the attempted secularization of deontic concepts 
by moral philosophers is that there can be no law without a lawgiver. This is meant to be a 
conceptual rather than substantive objection. Confused perhaps by words like “ought” and 
“must” that are not apparently about law, moderns have thought that they could retain the 
idea of moral duty without acknowledging that there must be a lawgiver, the prescriptions 
and proscriptions of whose laws are invoked by the use of “ought.”  
 To use “ought” in a moral sense while holding God in abeyance is to say something 
unintelligible. Anscombe says that the moral sense of “ought” in the hands of a modern 
contains “no intelligible thought” and is no longer “a real concept at all” (8). But what does 
Anscombe mean in distinguishing an intelligible thought from an unintelligible one and a 
real concept from a false one? Anscombe’s comparison of a law without a lawgiver to a 
verdict without a judge is instructive. The idea of a lawgiver is integral to the idea of a law as 
the idea of a line is integral to the idea of an angle. The concept is defective without it. A 
defective concept is one that can be thought but not coherently thought. The person 
attempting to think a law without a lawgiver can juggle one or the other concept, law and 
lawgiver, trying to keep them apart in his mind but ultimately will not be able to hold onto 
the concept of law so long as he refuses to keep that of a lawgiver with it. A familiar example 
of a defective concept comes from time travel fiction. In popular literature, a character may 
travel backwards in time to prevent her own birth, but the concept of a person doing so is 
incoherent. This trope’s appearance in literature illustrates how some things can be thought 
in a defective way so as to deserve to be called  “no intelligible thought” or not “a real 
concept at all” in Anscombe’s idiom. 
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 The association of the word “ought” in its moral sense with the laws of God gave to 
the word a psychological potency or “mesmeric” force. When the idea of God the lawgiver 
is alienated from the moral sense, the word “will remain to be spoken with a special 
emphasis and a special feeling in these contexts” (6). Anscombe compares this to what might 
happen to the word “criminal” in a future where penal laws and courts have been abolished. 
 Anscombe seems to be arguing not only that the actual deontic concepts in 
circulation with the moral philosophers of her day are incoherent but that there is no 
intelligible, secular deontic concept to be salvaged anywhere. Thus, she curtly dismisses the 
views of several ethicists that offer explanations of the deontic. Of Bishop Butler, she says 
that he “exalts conscience, but appears ignorant that a man’s conscience may tell him to do 
the vilest things” (2). She credits Kant with “introduc[ing] the concept of ‘legislating for 
oneself,’” which she says is “absurd” (2). Her reason for calling it absurd, however, is telling. 
She asserts that the “concept of legislation requires superior power in the legislator” (2). This 
assertion adds to her principal claim that there cannot be a law without a lawgiver.  
Ultimately, Butler and Kant are supposed to be unable to make sense of the moral 
ought without bringing in God because one’s own reason or conscience cannot count as the 
“superior power” imposing the moral law. Anscombe’s rejection for this reason of the idea 
of first personal lawgiving points to an important element in her critique of deontic 
concepts—the idea of being bound. Rather than say that there can be no law without a 
lawgiver, Anscombe could have made her dictum “no duty without being bound.” The fault 
in speaking of a law without a lawgiver reduces to the fault of speaking of an obligation that 
does not bind the person obligated.  
Anscombe assumes that making God the lawgiver was sufficient to establish the 
bindingness of the moral law for medieval Europeans. Her assumption shows in her 
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response to the claim that making God the lawgiver fails to settle whether the law ought to 
be obeyed, i.e., whether the law is binding. She argues that the person posing the objection is 
confused in the following way. 
Consider a person who lives in a world in which people have largely forgotten about 
laws and judges but still speak of verdicts. This person is challenged with the objection that 
one needs a judge and laws to have a verdict. He responds, “Not at all, for if there were a 
law and a judge who gave a verdict, the question for us would be whether accepting that 
verdict is something that there is a Verdict on” (8). The person who objects to the adequacy 
of the divine law conception of ethics by saying, “there is still the question of whether you 
ought to obey the divine law,” is supposed to be arguing in the same mistaken way. For, 
given what Anscombe has said about the legal meaning of “ought” in its moral sense, this 
person is really asking whether there is a law about obeying the law. 
 The reader will notice that Anscombe’s argument fails to explain the concept of 
being bound. God’s law is supposed to be binding, which is why it is supposed to be a poor 
question to ask whether one ought to follow it, but there is no explanation of what being 
bound is.  
If Anscombe means to identify being bound with the command of our creator, she 
does not do so explicitly. Furthermore, identifying being bound with the command of God 
requires committing the naturalistic fallacy,16 and while Anscombe tells us in passing that she 
finds accounts of the fallacy unimpressive and incoherent, she does not marshal arguments 
against it as one would expect if she meant to propound and rely on a super-naturalistic 
theory of the moral ought that identified it with the will of God. 
                                                
16 I follow G.E. Moore here in using the phrase “naturalistic fallacy” to refer not only to 
definitions in terms of natural objects, but also those that define good in terms of 
“supersensible” or “metaphysical” beings like God (Moore 1903, 39, 112). 
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The significance of Anscombe’s failure to explain the bindingness of moral 
obligation in her preferred terms (God’s law) is that we are given no assurance that including 
the idea of God gives one a coherent concept of moral obligation. Whether or not one 
agrees with Anscombe about the unintelligibility of moral obligation, she has not shown us 
that the concept of God is an intelligibility-maker here. 
 I will return to the idea of being bound further on in the chapter when I discuss the 
distinctiveness of the moral ought. Suffice it to say here that bindingness is the aspect of 
moral obligation that Anscombe thinks only divine law can render intelligible. Leaving the 
question of a specifically moral ought aside, I will show, in the following section, that the 
idea of ought is coherent and can be clarified in the manner of the British intuitionists.  
2. A Structural Account of Deontic Concepts 
 Contrary to Anscombe’s claim that the deontic concepts are incoherent without 
reference to God, the deontic concepts can be explained in terms of a two-place relation 
holding between an action and the circumstances. As Ewing states, “If I ought to do 
something there must be a certain relation between the action and its environment such that 
the action is fitting, appropriate, suitable, and its omission unfitting, inappropriate, and 
unsuitable” (Ewing 1947, 132). To say that you ought to do something implies that there is a 
feature of the situation that calls for that action.17 The idea of a lawgiver need not be 
introduced to render the concept coherent. 
                                                
17 The converse is true as well for Ewing so long as we are speaking of the ought of 
fittingness and not the stronger ought of moral obligation.  That an action is fitting implies 
that I ought to do it, where “ought” is not referring to moral obligation. Although the quote 
from Ewing does not state a biconditional, he is best interpreted as affirming one. Later in 
the book, when moral obligation is not at issue, he explicitly allows that “ought” signifies 
fittingness (Ewing 1947, 151). The foregoing notwithstanding, Ewing affirmed that ought 
was indefinable (48–49), and for the reasons discussed below, he should not be interpreted 
as offering a definition of either the ought of fittingness or that of moral obligation. 
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 Ewing’s description has explanatory power because it makes explicit the structure 
that is implicit in the deontic concepts. Indeed, the matter-of-fact simplicity of this structure 
was a key point for the intuitionists in their opposition to grander reductive views. They 
emphasized that when the ordinary person thinks of his obligations, he is typically not 
thinking about net utility (or the law of God, I might add) but about some definite 
circumstance that makes the action right. For example, Ross writes: 
When a plain man fulfils a promise because he thinks he ought to do so, it seems 
clear that he does so with no thought of its total consequences, still less with any 
opinion that these are likely to be the best possible. He thinks in fact much more of 
the past than of the future. What makes him think it right to act in a certain way is 
the fact that he has promised to do so—that and, usually, nothing more. 
(Ross 1930, 17). The idea of a law is unneeded for describing Ross’s prima facie duties 
because “[e]ach rests on a definite circumstance which cannot seriously be held to be 
without moral significance” (20). 
  A partisan of Anscombe’s position might object that the descriptions offered by 
Ewing and Ross fail to explain the deontic concepts but only paraphrase the statements 
about duty and ought the meaning of which they are supposed to analyze. To call an action 
“fitting,” they would say, is to substitute one deontic word for another. While it is true that 
neither Ewing nor Ross effects a proper definition of his target, it is equally true that they 
each succeed in producing more than a rewording. By a “proper definition,” I mean a 
definition in the third sense given by Moore in Principia Ethica. In this sense, to define 
something is to divide it into its component parts and identify the relations between those 
parts. Moore illustrates a definition of this kind for horses: “We may mean that a certain 
object, which we all of us know, is composed in a certain manner: that it has four legs, a 
head, a heart, a liver, etc., etc., all of them arranged in definite relations to one another” 
(Moore 1903, 8). 
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 Neither Ewing nor Ross produces a proper definition of the concept of ought. That 
this is the case, however, should not surprise or displease us. Ross, in the first chapter of The 
Right and the Good, firmly asserts that rightness is indefinable in Moore’s third sense. 
According to him, the word “right” is sometimes used synonymously with “ought to be 
done” or “morally obligatory” (Ross 1930, 3). In this deontic sense, the idea of a right action 
is “irreducible” to “simpler objective elements” (12). For his part, Ewing also asserts that the 
concept of ought is indefinable (Ewing 1947, 48–49, 78–79). 
At first glance, Ewing’s claim that ought is indefinable appears at odds with his claim 
about fittingness. While he unpacks the concept of ought into a relation of fittingness 
holding between an action and the environment, this is not a proper definition of the 
concept, nor does he intend it to be. Ewing stands by his claim that ought is indefinable 
while at the same insisting that “[t]his does not imply that its nature cannot be known—it 
may be very distinctively known—only that it cannot be reduced to anything else” (78). He 
adds, “It may perhaps turn out possible to say a great deal more about it; only what is said 
will never exhaust its nature without residuum” (78).  
In giving his description of ought in terms of fittingness, Ewing demonstrates the 
truth of his restriction, that whatever more is said, it will not exhaust the nature of ought 
“without residuum.”  This is because the idea of fittingness is itself a deontic concept. In 
effect, the idea of the deontic reappears in the description but is expressed by words with a 
different connotation, viz., “fitting, appropriate, suitable” (132). Both the word “fitting” and 
the word “ought” point to the idea of an action that is to be done. If the mere pair—action 
and circumstance—are left without the notion of fittingness, they fall short of the concept of 
ought. If we add fittingness, however, the deontic reappears in the definiens. This leaves us 
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without a proper definition, for we have included a reference to the whole in what Moore 
tells us is supposed to be a reduction of the whole to its parts and their relations. 
That ought is not susceptible of a proper definition does not mean that Ewing’s 
fittingness description is no more than a paraphrase. On the contrary, it is an instance of 
what Hurka called a “structural” or “inherent” “explanation” (Hurka 2011, 20). He writes of 
this form of explanation: 
Inherent explanations explain common-sense moral judgements by connecting them 
to principles that are more abstract but use similar concepts, so they are continuous 
with the common-sense judgements and concern the same general subject. Because 
they are more abstract, the principles have independent appeal and can therefore 
both explain the judgements and increase our warrant for believing them. But they 
operate within the same circle of concepts rather than concerning some other, 
allegedly more fundamental topic.  
(20). Before Hurka characterized the method in these terms, Ewing gave his own account of 
what he and the other intuitionists were doing when they gave descriptions of concepts they 
insisted were indefinable. He describes two ways to “define A” without defining it in the 
Moorean sense: (1) “giv[ing] properties which accompany A and constitute a distinguishing 
mark of the presence of A” and (2) “fix[ing] the place of A in the system of concepts” 
(Ewing 1947, 79).   
 Ewing and his fellow intuitionists practiced both methods to illuminate moral 
concepts. With regard to the second technique, Hurka has emphasized that it was 
characteristic of the intuitionists to deploy a scanty set of normative concepts to explain a 
profusion of substantive normative claims (Hurka 2014, 43). They often did this by 
arranging them recursively—e.g., a virtue (itself a good trait of a person) consists in the love 
of what is good or the hatred of what is bad. Alternatively, they simply defined more 
complex value notions in terms of a value concept and an intentional attitude—e.g., beauty 
is that of which the admiring contemplation is good (34, 148). Other times, they linked value 
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and deontic concepts together while leaving both undefined. For example, in The Right and 
the Good, Ross affirmed both that there was a prima facie duty to promote the good of others 
and that the desire to do one’s duty was a good (a virtue) (Ross 1930, 26, 134). Faced with 
someone who claimed not to understand either duty or goodness, Ross could have related it 
to the other concept, not to define it, but to show its content in its relationship to other 
ideas. This is similar to the way in which a teacher might explain subtraction to a student as 
“the opposite” of addition. 
 The first technique—“giv[ing] properties which accompany A and constitute a 
distinguishing mark of the presence of A”—is illustrated by Ewing’s characterization of 
ought in terms of fittingness. By his lights, a distinguishing mark of the presence of an ought 
is the presence of a certain relationship between the environment and an action. Whenever it 
is the case that one ought to perform some action, there will be these things, standing in this 
relation. It is a clunky manner of speech to be sure, but it shares this fault with other 
attempts at explaining the very simple or the indefinable. For instance, if someone asks, 
“What is a word?” you may answer, “A meaningful series of sounds.” This is not a proper 
definition of the idea of a word, for it leaves the concept of meaning implicit in the idea 
unanalyzed, but it has explanatory value because it identifies what usually goes understood 
but unspoken when we deploy the concept.  
As Hurka might describe it, Ewing’s account of ought is “more abstract” but uses 
“similar concepts.” It is more abstract to speak of a relation of fittingness holding between 
an action and the environment than it is to say that an agent ought to do such and such. The 
quality of fittingness is abstracted from the several relata, and it is this abstract relation that 
helps us understand the deontic. But how does this increased abstraction serve to explain? 
The answer is that once it is abstracted, the idea that an action is “fitting, appropriate, 
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suitable” can be more clearly seen. Once Ewing’s hearer has the notion of fittingness in 
focus, it may become plain to her what is going on when the concept of ought is applied. 
The hearer may say, “I get it now. When I ought to do something, it is the case that there is 
some action that fits this situation, just like there is some jigsaw piece that should be played 
next to fit the gap in a puzzle.” Were she pressed, this person could not properly define 
fittingness anymore than she could properly define ought, but her words show she 
understands and knows how to deploy both of them nonetheless. 
I do not wish to mislead the reader of the previous paragraph that “ought” and 
“fittingness” signify distinct moral concepts. For Ewing, there is only one indefinable moral 
concept at issue. Expressed in neutral language, both “fittingness” and “ought” mean that an 
action is the action to-be-done.18 As I stated, it is for this reason that Ewing’s fittingness 
characterization is not a proper definition of ought. Yet as I also affirmed, the use of 
“fittingness” instead of ought has explanatory power: (1) it teaches us that certain properties 
(Ewing’s two point relation) always accompany and are a distinguishing mark of oughts and 
(2) it helps us to isolate the notion of fittingness from its relata. 
I now wish to make a third point about the explanatory power of Ewing’s use of 
“fittingness.” Ewing uses three words, “fitting, appropriate, suitable.” Why does he not 
choose one word to state his meaning clearly? Writers sometimes create these chains for 
euphony, but I think that in Ewing’s case, the synonym mongering is functional. For, as 
Ewing explains elsewhere in Definition of Good, synonym substitution can help us understand 
what a writer means. In the passage in question, he is defending Moore’s suggestion “that we 
                                                
18 “To-be-done,” of course, is merely another synonym for “ought” and “fitting” in the sense 
at issue.  
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might take as a synonym for ‘good’ as applied to an experience the phrase ‘worth having for 
its own sake’” (Ewing 1947, 146). Ewing comments: 
To say this is not necessarily inconsistent with the view that good is indefinable, for 
there might be various phrases which could be properly used as verbal synonyms in 
order to help people to see more clearly what is meant by a term without being 
themselves eligible as definitions of the term. It might be the case that “worth” in 
“worth having for its own sake” could itself only be defined in terms of “good,’ so 
that the phrase would be quite useless as a definition of the latter, and yet it might be 
appropriately used to help some people to become clear as to what they meant by 
“good” . . .  
(146–47). I believe that Ewing could have said the same thing about his use of fittingness to 
characterize ought. “Fittingness” in Ewing’s account could itself only be defined in terms of 
“ought,”19 such that the description as a whole could not serve as a definition of ought. At 
the same time, “fittingness” has different connotations than ought, and it is these 
connotations that we saw can help a person get clear what she means by “ought.” A 
connotation is something that a word calls to mind in addition to its meaning. For example, 
the word “gold” means a certain metal but connotes wealth. Significantly, “fittingness” has 
spatial connotations that “ought” does not. Hence, we earlier imagined a person using the 
analogy of a fitting jigsaw puzzle piece to articulate her understanding of the action she 
ought to do.  
3. Moral Obligation a Special Domain 
 In the last section, we examined Ewing’s fittingness account of ought in order to 
demonstrate that the deontic concepts are intelligible without the idea of God as lawgiver. In 
this section, we will consider whether the same is true of moral obligation if we distinguish 
an ought of moral obligation from an ought of fittingness. As we will see, Ewing believed 
                                                
19 Or some other synonym, “should,” “right,” “to be done,” etc. 
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that the two oughts are distinct and that the ought of moral obligation cannot be reduced 
without remainder to that of fittingness.20 
 In The Definition of Good, Ewing avowed “that ‘ought’ really covers two different 
concepts, the concept of fittingness, and the concept of moral obligation” (Ewing 1947, 
132). That an action stands in a relation of fittingness to my environment is “a different 
concept from the concept of a moral obligation which we must fulfill or be guilty of sin” 
(132). While he thus insists that they are discrete concepts, Ewing is equally clear that “the 
latter concept [moral obligation] must always be based on the former [fittingness],” for “[s]in 
cannot occur unless our action is inappropriate in some way to the situation or at least we 
believe it to be so” (132). We know nonetheless that moral obligation is separate from mere 
fittingness: in cases of moral obligation, “We feel that we are under binding laws which we 
cannot break without being ourselves evil in a more serious and quite different way from 
that in which pain is evil” (133). 
 Ewing breaks off at this point to consider the objection “that the concept of moral 
obligation in so far as it goes beyond fittingness is theological” (133). In response, he neither 
affirms nor denies that the concept of moral obligation has a theological component. 
Instead, he insists that if it were so, then the certainty we have that we stand “under binding 
obligations” would furnish us with the premise for a valid proof of God’s existence (134). 
 Not willing to endorse the theological view of moral obligation, Ewing considers 
alternatives. He believed that good was definable in terms of ought: “We may therefore 
define ‘good’ as ‘fitting object of a pro attitude’ . . .” (152). This left him with two remaining 
indefinable moral concepts (fittingness and moral obligation) and the philosopher’s urge to 
                                                
20 Thus far, I have used the phrase “deontic concepts” to refer both to the ought of 
fittingness and that of moral obligation. If one wishes to confine the adjective “deontic” to 
the latter, I have no objection. 
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see if one could be reduced to the other (168). With this goal in mind, Ewing proposes that 
moral obligations are actions: (1) that are fitting for one to perform and (2) that if one 
omitted to perform them, one would be a fitting object of “the emotion of moral 
disapproval” (168). The emotion of moral disapproval he equates with blame (perhaps what 
we would today call a “reactive attitude”) and believes that these can be specified in 
nonnormative, psychological terms (168–69).21 
 As was true of the theological account however, Ewing is ultimately unwilling to 
endorse the blameworthiness view of moral obligation he has proposed. “It may be 
doubted,” he writes, “whether the analysis given brings out the full specific nature of the 
ethical ought” (170). If the blameworthiness analysis is inadequate to the ought of moral 
obligation, what are the other candidates for the plus in the fittingness-plus of moral 
obligation? One option we have seen is theological—or rather, metaphysical: “the notion of 
a personal God, or at any rate . . . the idea of sin as going against the fundamental nature of 
reality so that we are fighting against the main stream of the universe when we act 
wrongly”22 (170). A third option is that we simply have two indefinable concepts covered by 
deontic language—the plus in fittingness-plus being irreducible to any combination of 
fittingness and a natural or super-natural concept.  
 Were she to grant that fittingness is coherent, a partisan of Anscombe’s position 
facing this crossroads would affirm that God is the plus and deny that the plus was otherwise 
intelligible. As such, my task in what follows is to demonstrate that we do understand the 
                                                
21 Jay Wallace and Stephen Darwall attempt to discriminate moral obligations on a similar 
basis (Darwall 2006; Wallace 2013). Both philosophers stress the appropriateness of the 
reactive attitudes and in Darwall’s case, second personal accountability, as essential to moral 
obligation. 
22 I will not pursue the other metaphysical suggestion here but only note that it presents a 
possibility for an alternative attack on Anscombe’s insistence that moral obligation cannot be 
understood absent a law and lawgiver.  
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plus without bringing in God. I will do so in the same manner that I illustrated the coherence 
of the ought of fittingness in the previous section: I will offer a structural explanation of 
moral obligation that is neither a proper definition nor a paraphrase. 
 I believe that moral obligation is distinguished from the ought of fittingness by the 
former’s peremptory character. It is part of the concept of a moral ought that it has 
preclusive effect, cutting off other considerations that call for action that is inconsistent with 
the imperative. A moral obligation to help a person in distress, for instance, does not simply 
outweigh the fittingness of the non-moral ought dictating that I make it to my theatre seat 
before curtain—it precludes it from consideration. This is not to say that it ceases to be of 
normative significance that I have a ticket for a witty play; it is still the case that is fitting for 
me to make it to the show on time. It is simply that the moral ought in question 
preemptively mutes the non-moral one. 
 This picture of moral obligations is comparable to that offered by John McDowell in 
his article “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” According to him, when an 
agent accepts a moral obligation, nonmoral reasons are not merely outweighed but are 
“silenced altogether” (McDowell 1978, 26). He writes: 
[T]he dictates of virtue, if properly appreciated, are not weighed with other reasons 
at all, not even on a scale which always tips on their side. If a situation in which 
virtue imposes a requirement is genuinely conceived as such, according to this view, 
then considerations which, in the absence of the requirement, would have 
constituted reasons for acting otherwise are silenced altogether—not overridden by 
the requirement. 
(26).23 On close inspection, McDowell’s notion of silencing is cashed out in terms of the 
influence (or lack thereof) that a reason has on a virtuous agent’s will. “If one is clearly aware 
                                                
23 It must be noted that McDowell is speaking of what happens to nonmoral reasons when a 
moral obligation is accepted. A reason, unlike an obligation, is not an ought but something 
that contributes to an ought. As McDowell says, “[T]he reason is not expressed by the 
‘should’ statement itself. The reason must involve some appropriate specific consideration 
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of a moral requirement to behave differently, one will not take the prudential consideration 
as the reason it would otherwise be. . . . [T]heir rational influence on the will is conditional, 
not upon a desire, but upon the influence of a clearly grasped moral requirement to do 
something else” (29). 
 As Jeffrey Seidman has noted, McDowell’s silencing thesis is not restricted to the 
claim that the virtuous agent is not actually motivated by the silenced consideration—that 
she has no desire to act upon it or for it (Seidman 2005, 68–69). Rather, McDowell stands by 
the stronger thesis that the agent does not believe that the silenced considerations are 
reasons for him to act (68–69). Seidman calls the former type of silencing “motivational 
silencing” and the latter “rational silencing” (69). Moral requirements are “rationally 
silencing” on McDowell’s view, for they make the “rational influence” of the nonmoral 
considerations on the agent’s will conditional on their presence or absence. 
 McDowell’s endorsements of the rational silencing view of moral obligations should 
also be distinguished from the position taken by Joseph Raz concerning the exclusionary 
effect of certain reasons upon others. To explain the authority of law, Raz argues that laws 
function as “exclusionary reasons” (Raz 1979, 17). Exclusionary reasons are reasons to 
“refrain from acting for a reason” (17). According to Raz, some reasons are both vanilla 
reasons favoring an action and exclusionary reasons to refrain from acting for other reasons. 
These he calls “protected reasons” (18).  
 Raz tells us that exclusionary reasons do not, strictly speaking, conflict with lower-
level reasons (Raz 1990, 40). Given two first-order reasons p and q, if p is a reason to 
                                                                                                                                            
which could in principle be cited in support of the ‘should’ statement” (14). In terms of 
Ewing’s fittingness relation, McDowell’s reasons correspond to one of its members—the 
circumstance (e.g., that I have tickets to a witty play). Contrasting with McDowell, the 
arguments of this section concern the distinction between nonmoral and moral oughts.  
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perform action A and q is a reason to perform incompatible action B, then p and q are 
strictly speaking conflicting reasons. As such, they must be weighed against each other to 
determine what the agent ought to do. By contrast, given a second-order reason r not to act 
for reason p, it is not the case that r and p conflict or are weighed against each other. Their 
encounter is “resolved not by the strength of the competing reasons but by a general 
principle of practical reasoning which determines that exclusionary reasons always prevail, 
when in conflict with first-order reasons” (40). 
 While Raz’s account of protected reasons is broadly consistent with McDowell’s 
silencing view of moral obligations, there is at least one notable difference. Whereas for 
McDowell, reasons that are silenced in the presence of a moral requirement are not taken 
into account in deciding what to do all things considered, Raz contends that exclusionary 
reasons give us reason not to act on the balance of reasons, “if the reasons tipping the 
balance are excluded by an undefeated exclusionary reason” (40). Thus Raz asserts that laws, 
qua secondary reasons, make it the case that one ought not to act on the balance of reasons. 
In contrast, McDowell claims that moral obligations, being rationally silencing, exclude the 
silenced considerations from the balance. 
 I believe that McDowell’s portrait of the rational silencing effect of moral 
requirements accurately describes the peremptory force of moral oughts. Moral obligations 
do not alter which actions are pro tanto fitting. For instance, it does not cease to be fitting to 
be on time for the humorous play when I have a moral obligation to stop and render aid to 
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the person in distress. As McDowell would agree,24 recognition of a moral obligation does 
not prevent me from understanding that my action continues to be fitting in this way.  
Nonetheless, the recognition of a moral obligation rationally silences the nonmoral 
ought at issue, depriving it of its “rational influence on the will.” When I must decide what I 
ought to do all things considered, the pro tanto fittingness of a nonmoral ought is to be 
treated as a normative nullity. And indeed, McDowell’s virtuous agent treats it as such—he 
does not regard it as bearing on what he ought to do.  
The qualification “rational influence” means that the fittingness of another action 
may have some influence on the will but that any influence it has will not be in virtue of its 
strength as an ought. According to McDowell, it is only in the fully virtuous person that 
those considerations that have no rational influence on the will do in fact have no influence 
on the will. For most of us, however, the persistent, albeit nonrational, effect on the will of 
nonmoral oughts manifests in the phenomenon of temptation examined below. 
 In our earlier discussion of Anscombe, we noted that she objected to the idea of 
first-personal lawgiving in Butler and Kant on the grounds that law requires “superior 
power” in the lawgiver. This led us to the conclusion that it was the supposed bindingness of 
moral obligations that she believed only the concept of divine law could render intelligible. 
Contra Anscombe, I believe that the bindingness of moral obligations can be explained in 
terms of their peremptory character. In order to understand what it means to be bound by a 
moral obligation, we need not include the concept of God as lawgiver but only that of a 
peremptory ought. 
                                                
24 McDowell writes, “It is not plausible to suppose that perception of the moral requirement 
effects this by tampering with one’s understanding of what it is for a fact to concern one’s 
future” (McDowell 1978, 29) 
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 This is not to assert, however, that we can give a proper definition of moral 
obligation. It is only to affirm that, as was the case with fittingness, we do have our hands on 
a coherent concept when we speak of a moral ought that is not regarded as a divine 
commandment. In order to demonstrate that the concept of a binding obligation is thus 
coherent and intelligible, I am offering a structural explanation in terms of peremptoriness. 
As was the case in the previous section, the goal is to produce a description that is neither a 
definition nor a mere paraphrase. 
 One of the ways in which we can explain a concept without defining it is to fix its 
place in the system of concepts. To speak of a moral obligation as a peremptory ought is to 
do just that. Moral obligations are similar to nonmoral oughts in that they also involve a 
relation of fittingness between the situation and an action. They are different from nonmoral 
oughts in that they are preclusive in relation to them. 
 Another way we have seen to explain a concept without defining it is to identify 
properties that accompany it and “constitute a distinguishing mark” of its presence. With 
respect to the preclusive character of moral oughts, a distinguishing mark of its presence is 
the phenomenology of temptation. While not every instance of moral obligation is one in 
which moral duty perempts a nonmoral ought, the experience of being bound to perform 
one action while wanting to do another supported by countervailing considerations (often 
pleasure or self-interest) is familiar and distinct. As Prichard characterized matters, “Any one 
who stimulated by education, has come to feel the force of the various obligations in life, at 
some time or other comes to feel the irksomeness of carrying them out, and to recognise the 
sacrifice of interest involved . . . .” (Prichard 1912, 21). The phenomenology of temptation 
does not define the peremptoriness of moral obligations, but it does vividly illustrate it. 
Specifically, no matter the strength of the nonmoral consideration in question, moral 
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obligation does not yield to superior force but rather stands on a different plateau removed 
from the normal competition between nonmoral oughts. We can see this by comparing our 
experience of weighing two nonmoral oughts with our experience of facing a nonmoral 
ought and a moral one. Whereas the fittingness of jogging may outweigh that of having a 
cup of coffee at the café this morning, a moral obligation cannot be bested in this manner. 
With respect to a nonmoral ought, we can always imagine a more powerful one that could 
override it. Assuming that the pleasure we feel in eating a certain dessert makes it fitting that 
we eat it, we can envision a dessert more pleasurable to consume that would be more fitting 
and ought to be the one to be eaten were the two both options. The same cannot be said if 
the choice is between eating a pleasurable dessert and, say, avoiding telling a lie. 
 We can explain the bindingness of moral obligation in terms of the peremptoriness 
of moral oughts. The point in doing so is not to demonstrate the reality of moral obligation, 
nor is it to explain how moral obligations are possible or identify the sources of normativity. 
As Prichard affirmed, we “feel the force of the various obligations in life,” and it is a 
separate (in his opinion mistaken) question whether and why we really must comply with 
them (Prichard 1912, 21–22). It should be obvious that the point is not to discern a 
fundamental normative principle (e.g., the categorical imperative) from which we could 
derive particular moral conclusions. The point of the explanation is simply a conceptual one, 
to demonstrate that moral obligation is a coherent concept without the idea of God the 
lawgiver. When we take ourselves to be morally obligated in everyday life, we know what we 
are about, that is to say, “we feel no doubt about the nature of the demand which originates 
the subject” (21). The use of talking of peremptoriness is simply to explain as best we can 
what it is we believe when we take ourselves to be under a moral obligation. 
4. Conclusion 
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 As familiar as the experience of moral obligation is, its familiarity has not forestalled 
a sense that it is a queer thing. It may prompt us to ask what it is that binds us when we are 
morally bound to do so-and-so. This may or may not be a worthwhile question to ask 
(Prichard did not seem to think so), but it is critical to our response to Anscombe that it be 
distinguished from any conceptual defect in the idea of moral obligation. 
The question of what binds us to do what we morally ought to do touches a sore 
spot for moralists. The question arises from explaining moral oughts by analogy to the civil 
law. The comparison is helpful for expressing the peremptory force of moral obligation. At 
the same time, following the analogy between the two invites Anscombe’s objection that a 
moral obligation is unintelligible without a moral law and lawgiver. A comparison with the 
civil law is apt for describing the bindingness of moral obligations; for like the civil law, the 
moral law rules out of consideration certain other fitting actions.25 For example, the law of 
wills requires that the decedent’s property be distributed according to the named shares. If a 
woman has made a will giving her property in equal shares to her children, the executor must 
do so, even if one of them now requires expensive medical treatments.  
The problem with following the analogy between being obliged by the civil law and 
being morally obliged comes when one asks what obliges one to adhere to the moral law. In 
the case of the civil laws, we are obliged by the state to comply with the rule that the state 
has decreed. The executor who hands more assets to the ill child can be held in contempt of 
court—coerced into compliance and punished for noncompliance. If the analogy is to be 
complete, there must be someone or something standing in the powerful coercive role of the 
state in the case of moral obligation. Anscombe thinks that this must be God if the idea of 
                                                
25 Raz believes that it is characteristic of law that legal rules are protected reasons to do 
certain actions and to refrain from acting for other reasons that might otherwise tip the 
balance of reasons in favor of a different course of action (Raz 1979, 30). 
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moral obligation is to be a coherent one.  
 As the arguments of this chapter have shown, however, the analogy need not be 
complete in order for the idea of a moral obligation to be an intelligible one. It is not 
nonsense to say, in a moral sense, that I must keep my promise and not thereby mean that 
God has commanded me to do so.  
The idea of God can be introduced to moral theory, not as part of the concept of 
moral ought, but as the ground of moral ought. In this role, the concept of God is supposed 
to answer the question of why moral oughts are binding26 and provide a criterion for 
distinguishing which actions are morally required. Such a divine command theory asserts that 
God has commanded certain things and that an action is morally obligatory if and only if 
God has commanded it. This theory is not a definition of moral ought but rather assumes 
the coherence of the notion of moral ought. 
In summary, there are three questions which we can distinguish. The first is whether 
we have an intelligible concept of moral obligation. This is what Anscombe alleges we lack 
(sans divine command view) and that I have demonstrated we possess. The second is 
whether we are indeed subject to moral obligations. I agree with Prichard that experience 
answers this question for us, insofar as we do “feel the force of the various obligations in 
life.” The third is why moral obligations have their peremptory character.27 A divine 
                                                
26 The question of why moral oughts are binding is equivalent to the question of why moral 
oughts are what they are. 
27 Answering it can also furnish us with a criterion or first principle for judging or deriving 
which actions are in fact moral obligations. For instance, one might hold that moral 
obligations are moral obligations because there are certain actions that agree with the human 
telos and others that do not. In this case, we have a foundational explanation of moral 
obligation. Moreover, if we also know the human telos, we can determine which actions are 
obligatory and which are not. 
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command theory is a possible answer to this question.28 However interesting we may take 
this third question to be, we need not be able to answer it (or accept that divine command is 
the answer to it) in order to answer the first question in the affirmative. 
 Anscombe was correct to assert that the deontic terms, in their moral sense, do not 
just relate to good or bad, as in the claim that “machinery needs oil, or should or ought to be 
oiled” (Anscombe 1958, 5). Indeed, she rightly affirmed that in their moral senses, words like 
“ought” and “must” are the equivalent of “is obliged” or “is bound,” “in the sense in which 
one can be obliged or bound by law” (5). As we saw, the bindingness of moral oughts means 
that they are peremptory just as the civil law is peremptory. Anscombe nonetheless erred in 
asserting that no sense can be made of a person being bound without thinking of a law or 
lawgiver. While the analogy with civil law helps us understand the peremptory character of 
moral oughts, we need not make the analogy complete and identify a moral lawgiver to have 
a coherent concept of moral obligation. 
  
                                                
28 Given belief in God and His lawgiving, it also answers the second question in the 
affirmative. 
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Chapter Three, Living with a Maximizing Theory 
“A man has not everything to do, but something; and because he cannot do everything, it is not 
necessary that he should do something wrong.” – Henry David Thoreau 
 Consequentialists make good fundamental and define which actions are right 
derivatively, in terms of the amount of good they produce. In this chapter, I will not attack 
this mode of proceeding in ethics. Rather, I will caution the consequentialist, specifically the 
utilitarian, regarding how their deontic claims are formulated. My contention is that how a 
moral theory characterizes which actions are right is of great moral-psychological import due 
to the connection between the deontic and feelings of guilt. The utilitarian must be very 
careful what she says and how she says it: the person who hears and believes her will take his 
idea of what is required of him—and which acts or omissions he should feel guilt over—
from what she asserts. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by arguing that guilt, by its nature, is linked 
to an agent’s beliefs about his or her obligations. To isolate the notion of duty that is linked 
with guilt feeling in our moral psychology, I endorse A.C. Ewing’s distinction between the 
use of deontic language to state simply that an action is fitting to the circumstances and its 
use to say that an action is a moral obligation. It is the use of deontic language to 
communicate moral obligation, not fittingness alone, which must be given special attention 
when utilitarians attempt to derive which actions are right from which states of affairs are 
good. 
To show what can go wrong in fixing a utilitarian definition of right action, I offer 
the example of Roger. Having been convinced of the truth of utilitarianism by one of its 
philosophical proponents, Roger—a single, middle-income American who wants to do right 
and shun wrong—takes his duty to be the maximization of utility in every action. In 
consequence of the tremendous, asymptotic sacrifice demanded of him by this prescription, 
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he suffers from chronic guilt. This forms a psychological problem for utilitarianism that is of 
the same character and occupies the same dialectical position as Bernard Williams’ alienation 
objection from Utilitarianism: For and Against. 
 As a solution to this problem of chronic guilt, I offer an alternative characterization 
of utilitarian duty that avoids the problems of guilt and alienation that bedevil the simple 
maximizing formulation. To do so, I borrow a page from Peter Railton’s response to the 
alienation objection. Railton distinguished between utilitarianism as a criterion of evaluation 
and utilitarianism as a decision procedure. A “sophisticated consequentialist,” he said, would 
not try to maximize utility directly but would by and large remain in conventional morality. 
The sophisticated consequentialist would avoid becoming alienated and would produce 
better results than the naïve consequentialist who follows a decision procedure of utility 
calculation. 
 Borrowing Railton’s warrant for abandoning naïve consequentialism, I will argue that 
the convinced utilitarian can still do better than sticking to conventional morality. I will 
contend that the convinced utilitarian should take his duty to be the cultivation of 
benevolence. Benevolence means regarding the happiness of others as equally important to 
your own. In less technical terms, benevolence means being a great humanitarian, it is the 
quality we associate with people like Albert Schweitzer or Dorothy Day who are renowned 
for their altruism. Although it is like a virtue in that it encompasses thought, feeling, and 
action, I make no claim to subsume benevolence to orthodox virtue theory. 
 On the view I will present, the convinced utilitarian is to understand his duty as the 
cultivation of benevolence. His actions conform to duty insofar as they are consistent with 
the development of benevolence. By removing the burden of maximization of utility in every 
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action, the theory avoids judging the agent as guilty for every action that fails to maximize 
utility. 
My account of a sophisticated consequentialist has advantages over Railton’s 
position. First of all, Railton’s article did not address the problem of chronic guilt that my 
work raises and answers. As we will see, in its original form, his conception of a 
sophisticated consequentialist is ill-equipped to cope with the guilt problem. This is because 
it remains the case on Railton’s view that the sophisticated consequentialist believes that 
actions are right if and only if they produce the most good of those available to the agent. I 
propose a tweak to the view such that the maximizing principle is used only to express a 
criterion for which actions are right given perfect information—not which actions are right 
given the psychological limits on mortal human beings. It is only the latter principle that 
describes an agent’s moral duty as opposed to which actions are right in a weaker sense that 
signifies fittingness or reasonableness. 
Secondly, I will contend that the cultivation of benevolence is a better way to be a 
sophisticated consequentialist because the duty to cultivate benevolence pushes one to 
improve, to become a better utilitarian agent, in a way that Railton’s recommendation does 
not. My concerns about chronic guilt notwithstanding, I regard it is a strength of 
utilitarianism that it reminds us of how much more we could be doing, especially we in the 
affluent West, to reduce the suffering of others. For the persuaded utilitarian, who has taken 
to heart the message that failure to give is tantamount to letting die, the duty to cultivate 
benevolence places him on a path to becoming the kind of altruistic humanitarian who can, 
without alienation, sacrifice luxuries and comforts large and small in favor of others. 
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1. The Problem at Hand  
1.1 Guilt and the Deontic 
 Guilt feelings, by their nature, are influenced by a person’s beliefs about whether 
what she does is right or wrong. As I established in Chapter One, guilt is a deontic emotion 
that is partially constituted by the thought that one has violated one’s obligations. Given 
guilt’s cognitive content, whether it is justified depends upon whether the person feeling it 
has indeed violated her obligations.  
It thus makes sense to speak of guilt as either rational or irrational, and we are 
fortunate in possessing a psychology in which our feelings are to an extent rationally 
tractable. Accordingly, there is a link, albeit an imperfect one, between an agent’s considered 
judgments about the rectitude of her conduct and her emotions. Someone who becomes 
convinced that it is wrong to eat animals may subsequently feel guilt if he has a hamburger, 
though he formerly gobbled them with nary a pang of conscience. On the other hand, 
emotions have a certain degree of drag or inertia in the face of reflective judgments that 
contradict their representations—witness the person who knows that the cooked crickets he 
is served for dinner are sanitary but nonetheless feels disgust (ipso facto representing them 
as unclean) when looking at his plate. This obstinacy is characteristic of guilt as well; we can 
imagine a lapsed Catholic who reasons that there is nothing wrong with eating beef and pork 
on Fridays but feels guilt when he does so. 
The fact that there is a link between one’s judgments about duty and one’s feelings of 
guilt means that there is also a bridge connecting philosophical pronouncements about 
rightness with feelings of guilt in those who believe the philosophers’ theories. To 
understand this connection fully, we need to consider carefully how deontic words are used 
and when they express the psychologically loaded notion of obligation.  
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Our language has a multitude of words that can be used to express the same deontic 
thoughts: “ought,” “duty,” and “right” are some of these words. In The Definition of Good, 
A.C. Ewing holds that the difference in usage between these words is of little philosophical 
importance (Ewing 1947, 123). For Ewing, an action that ought to be done is an action that 
is a duty. The converse is true as well. Furthermore, an action that ought to be done is an 
action that is right. Ewing notes, however, that “right” can be used of an action that is one 
of several that can be performed consistent with obligation—whereas “ought” and “duty” 
are used of a specific action that is required to the exclusion of others (124). Consequently, it 
does not follow that if an action is right that it is an action that ought to be done or is a duty. 
It is for this reason that Ewing thinks that “right” is synonymous with “not wrong” and may 
be used of actions that are “indifferent” or permissible (124). By following Ewing’s pattern, 
we can finish our deontic lexicon. If “right” is synonymous with “not wrong,” it stands to 
reason that an action that is not right is an action that is wrong. A wrong action is an action 
that is forbidden. If an action is forbidden, then we ought not to do it and have a duty to 
omit it. 
Each of the deontic words can be used in a way that restricts it to some context. We 
can say of an action that it was the right thing to do all things considered, given the available 
evidence, or given what the agent believed at the time he acted. Ewing points out that we 
abbreviate these sentences by omitting the phrase that specifies the context. He refers to 
these abbreviations as “senses” of ought. Nonetheless, these senses are best understood as I 
have described them, i.e., as restrictions of the same concept to different contexts, rather 
than as expressing variant ultimate concepts. Ewing would agree: “I have mentioned three 
distinct senses of ‘ought’, but I do not think that there are three distinct ultimate concepts 
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involved here, for it seems to me that these three merely apply the same concept in different 
relations” (Ewing 1959, 104). 
 Which restriction of the concept is the relevant one for assessing whether an agent’s 
guilt feelings (her representation of herself as having violated her obligations) are justified? 
What an agent ought to do all things considered, for instance, does not seem to be at issue 
here. This is the action that we ought to do “taking everything into account” (Ewing 1947, 
118). It is “the action which an omniscient and perfectly wise being would advise us to 
perform” (118). Of course, we are not omniscient and perfectly wise. It should then strike us 
as inappropriate to assess the rationality of an agent’s guilt feelings on the basis of whether 
or not she did what was right all things considered. It is no one’s duty to do what he or she 
ought to do all things considered. 
 The reader will note, however, that this last thought is in tension with my previous 
claim that “ought” and “duty” are different words for expressing the same deontic concept. 
At this juncture, we can borrow a further insight from Ewing’s work. In Definition, he 
distinguished two deontic concepts: fittingness and moral obligation (132). The former 
applies to actions that we say one should do yet do not think of as moral obligations. “You 
ought to try the soup,” we say, without meaning that it is our interlocutor’s moral duty to 
order it.  
“If I ought to do something there must be a certain relation between the action and 
its environment such that the action is fitting, appropriate, suitable, and its omission 
unfitting, inappropriate, unsuitable” (132). This relationship and nothing more may 
sometimes hold between an action and a circumstance bearing on one’s own happiness (the 
savory soup) without it being the case that it is your duty to try the soup. While actions that 
are morally obligatory are themselves fitting, the notion of moral obligation contains an 
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additional notion of bindingness that makes it stronger than fittingness alone. With moral 
obligation, “[w]e feel that we are under binding laws which we cannot break without being 
ourselves evil in a more serious and quite different way from that in which pain is evil” (133). 
I previously said that it is not a person’s duty to do what he or she ought to do all 
things considered. Taking “ought” and “duty” to be synonyms, I appeared to contradict 
myself. Differentiating the ought of fittingness from the ought of moral obligation gives us a 
way out. It may be the case that there is an action that I ought to do all things considered, 
but if we stipulate that we will use the word “duty” only for actions we take to be moral 
obligations and not merely fitting actions, we can avoid the contradiction. It may be the case 
that an action is right all things considered, that the action is indeed the fitting action taking 
everything into account, but this does not mean that this action is a moral obligation. 
Indeed, Ewing denied that the all things considered sense of “ought” or “right” expressed 
moral obligations (135). He thought instead that it is only when we use deontic words 
relative to an agent’s beliefs (his second sense) or relative to the evidence available to the 
agent (his third sense) that we are credibly speaking of moral obligation rather than mere 
fittingness (Ewing 1959, 102). On that note, it is useful to distinguish what is right or what 
we ought to do humanly speaking—given psychological limitations on human motivation, 
attention, and cognition—as a “sense” of deontic words that can plausibly express moral 
obligation. Farther along, we will see that it is this sense of deontic words that the utilitarian 
should insist captures an agent’s moral obligations. 
1.2 Ought for Utilitarians 
 Imagine that a person of conscience encounters moral theory. Once assured of a 
theory’s truth, his ethical earnestness is directed towards its realization in his own life. When 
our ethically concerned individual is convinced by an ethical theory, he applies the standards 
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of that theory to decide whether a given action is right or wrong. Of course, if he is 
convinced by utilitarianism, then he will judge his actions according to the utilitarian 
standard. For purposes of this paper, I take the utilitarian standard to be that an action is 
right if and only if it possesses a greater net expected utility than any of the alternatives 
available to the agent. Although there are other formulations in currency with utilitarian 
thinkers, this common version is the present target. 
 How will utilitarianism answer the conscientious person’s query as to the rectitude of 
his behavior? When he wants to know “Did I do the right thing?” or “Is this the right thing 
to do?”, utilitarianism will direct him to consider his action and the available alternatives to 
that action. If there exists or existed alternative actions available to him with greater expected 
utility, then the answer to his question is negative. 
Roger is a modern American who wants to live an ethical life. Reading a book on 
utilitarian ethics, he is persuaded and seeks to live accordingly. So he relinquishes his most 
obvious luxuries in the knowledge that the happiness he derives from such things pales in 
comparison with the reduction in misery the necessary resources could produce if otherwise 
directed. Abandoning eating at restaurants, fashionable clothing, and vacations, he donates 
all of his disposable income to a humanitarian charity like UNICEF. Still, it seems to him 
that there might be more that he could do to help others. In the hours that he has after 
work, he ceases spending this time reading books, watching television, or on outings with 
friends. Instead, he dedicates his time to working at a local soup kitchen.  
 Although Roger spends his every idle hour at a soup kitchen and gives all of his 
disposable income to charity, there are other courses of action open to him that do more to 
increase utility. Painfully aware of this fact, Roger decides to abandon his life in America 
entirely and travel to a country plagued with starvation and epidemic disease. Here, he 
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spends every waking hour working to relieve the suffering that surrounds him. Nonetheless, 
with the utilitarian precept ringing in his head, he is not at peace with his conscience. An 
extra hour of humanitarian labor on Roger’s part could mean the difference between life and 
death for a starving person, and if Roger sleeps five hours a day, he could certainly sleep four 
hours. Whatever he does, it seems that there is always something more that he could do 
whether it is giving up five minutes of sleep or half his pot of rice in another’s favor, and the 
utilitarian rule to which he adheres indicts him for his failure to do so. 
 Roger’s commitment to utilitarianism is a source of chronic guilt. In the example, 
there always seemed to be something more that Roger believed he could do to help others 
that would result in greater net utility. Accordingly, the answer that Roger will arrive at when 
he asks, “Did I do the right thing?” is a negative one. Since he believes that he acted wrongly 
he will naturally feel guilty.  
Even with respect to the most trivial action, like buying a can of Coke, the 
preference to self involved is likely to be cause for guilt given the good for others that spare 
change could have accomplished. Although he wants deeply to do the right thing, answering 
the question “How much is doing enough for other people?” causes him persistent 
difficulty. Of course, it may be true that there exists some utilitarian right action, but on a 
quotidian level, that action will prove exceedingly, maddeningly difficult to discern and carry 
out. Consider the questions he faced when he chose a life of service in the Third World: 
Should he sleep for four hours or five hours, and should he eat a whole bowl of rice or offer 
half of it to the hungry person next to him? Pressing the logic, should he offer him two-
thirds or four-fifths of his own meal?  
 One could say that utilitarianism already furnishes answers to these questions: 
Roger’s sacrifice should cease when the loss of utility to him equals the gain of utility to 
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others. But in practice, there would always be one more minute that could be given over to 
the service of others, and Roger will be bound to guilt by his utilitarian convictions.29 
 Along with guilt, Roger will also experience alienation of the sort famously described 
by Bernard Williams in his contribution to Utilitarianism: For and Against. After being 
convinced by utilitarianism, Roger’s decision-making process has a distinct character, one 
that Williams adamantly critiques: 
It is absurd to demand of such a man, when the sums come in from the utility 
network which the projects of others have in part determined, that he should just step 
aside from his own project and decision and acknowledge the decision which 
utilitarian calculation requires. It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and 
the source of his actions in his own convictions. It is to make him into a channel 
between the input of everyone’s projects including his own, and an output of 
optimific decision; but this is to neglect the extent to which his actions and his 
decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions which flow from the projects 
and attitudes with which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal 
sense, an attack on his integrity. 
 
 (Williams 1973, 116–17). The crux of Williams’ argument is found in his criticism of the 
utilitarian’s attitude or manner of deliberation. Specifically, utilitarianism demands that the 
individual treat the things that he enjoys or cares about, from the pleasure he derives from 
cookie dough ice cream to his life-long dream to become a famous cellist, as factors in a 
utilitarian formula that grants equal weight to comparable desires of others. In the process, a 
person’s own most basic values or commitments are necessarily compromised by being 
passed through the utilitarian prism. Since Roger is often forced to contravene his 
                                                
29 It is important to note that the chapter is not addressing the familiar demandingness 
objection to utilitarianism (Chappell, 2009). Unlike the present view, the demandingness 
objection is not concerned with guilt or an agent’s psychology but rather with the extreme, 
life altering demands that utilitarianism makes considered as objectionable in their own right. 
In the present paper, Roger’s change in lifestyle is discussed not to show that the changes 
themselves are inherently problematic but to illustrate the futility of efforts to tame utilitarian 
guilt by undertaking them. 
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commitments in action and always fated to alienate himself from them in deliberation, his 
integrity is inevitably compromised. 
 The conscientious person’s response to his encounter with utilitarianism reveals two 
problems of implementation: guilt and alienation. Both problems stem from utilitarianism’s 
character as a maximizing theory. Whereas conventional morality’s limited set of “thou shalt 
nots” and even smaller set of bounded “thou shalls” leaves room for an ample category of 
permitted actions, utilitarianism’s precept makes duty all encompassing. All and only actions 
which maximize expected utility are in accordance with duty: a moral state of affairs that, 
barring ties, leaves only one action in each situation that is not wrongful. 
 Conscious of the faults of a theory which directs one to maximize utility in every 
action, many philosophers have proposed modifications to utilitarianism that try to cope 
with the difficulties I have been describing. By and large, these theories entail establishing a 
distinction between utilitarianism as a decision procedure and utilitarianism as a criterion of 
evaluation.  
2. Solutions from the Literature 
 In his article “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Peter 
Railton presents a consequentialist theory that tries to cope with the alienation objection. At 
the heart of his paper, he distinguishes between what he calls subjective and objective forms 
of consequentialism. In his words, “Subjective consequentialism is the view that whenever 
one faces a choice of actions, one should attempt to determine which act of those available 
would most promote the good, and should then try to act accordingly” (Railton 1984, 152). 
Objective consequentialism, in contrast, is “the view that the criterion of the rightness of an 
act or course of action is whether it in fact would most promote the good of those acts 
available to the agent” (152). Railton proceeds to argue that the wise sophisticated 
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consequentialist will strive to live a life in accord with objective consequentialism but does not 
necessarily try to live a subjectively consequentialist life. Thus, according to Railton, a 
utilitarian should not necessarily employ a utilitarian deliberative procedure in making his 
decisions. Though he accepts utilitarianism and wishes to live a moral life, he is no fool and 
realizes that the best way to accomplish this is not to try to be a utilitarian directly. 
 Railton contends that his sophisticated consequentialist will be free from the 
alienation diagnosed by Williams. His example is a man named Juan who lives a fairly normal 
domestic life qualified by occasional moments of consequentialist reflection (150–51). Juan is 
a married man who loves his wife yet also has strong consequentialist convictions. Being a 
good husband, he is devoted to his spouse and confidently puts his relationship with her 
first. As Juan explains, his marriage is an example of the need to balance moral efforts with 
personal commitments. Juan says, “People get burned out, or lose touch, if they try to save 
the world by themselves. The ones who can stick with it and do a good job of making things 
better are usually the ones who can make that fit into a life that does not make them 
miserable” (150). Notice the synergy here between personal well-being and consequentialist 
demands: Juan is able to justify his marriage on the reasonable belief that allowing himself 
such commitments makes for a more objectively consequentialist world than repudiating 
them for a life spent solely in consideration of the needs of others.  
 Moral theory does interrupt Juan’s life in two ways. First, it is what drives him to 
consider the wider world and the needs of others beyond his personal commitments (151). 
This manifests itself in acts supporting charity or social reformation that aim at producing a 
more objectively consequentialist world (159, 161). Second, consequentialist morality serves 
as a fail-safe in Juan’s psychology. While ordinarily not engaged in consequentialist 
deliberation, he occasionally reflects and is willing to adjust or abandon his commitments if 
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they cease to be “morally defensible” (151). Summarizing Juan’s personality as a 
sophisticated consequentialist, he lives a life that involves authentic, unalienated personal 
commitments yet remains faithful to his consequentialist beliefs by retaining a willingness to 
submit his life to consequentialist criticism. 
 Railton’s article concerns Williams’ alienation objection and does not consider the 
problem of chronic guilt that I have identified. As we will see, the sophisticated 
consequentialist as sketched will remain susceptible to chronic guilt over the thought that he 
is failing to maximize utility by his actions. Nonetheless, I can adjust the view by insisting 
that the utilitarian principle that gives us the criterion for right action all things considered 
differs from the principle that expresses the right action humanly speaking and which states 
one’s moral duty. The former does not express moral obligation at all but is only a statement 
about what makes actions fitting all things considered. Given perfect information, this would 
be the reasonable action to do—the action that is “fitting, appropriate, suitable” to the 
situation. 
 Railton tells us that he is propounding a form of act consequentialism, not rule or 
motive consequentialism (156–57). The sophisticated consequentialist believes that 
maximizing utility is the criterion of right action but he also believes that he can best live an 
objectively consequentialist life by cultivating dispositions to care about things other than 
maximization (157). However, unlike a motive consequentialist (e.g., Adams 1984) who 
believes that acting in accord with a certain motive is the criterion of right action or the rule 
consequentialist who thinks that it is right to adhere to the rule that would have best 
consequences if everyone followed it, the sophisticated consequentialist does not think that 
acting from these dispositions is the criterion of right action. It remains the case that only 
the action that maximizes utility is the right action. Thus, as Railton allows, a sophisticated 
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consequentialist may recognize that he ought to develop dispositions that, while productive 
of an objectively consequentialist life, are such that they will cause him to “act worse than 
those he would have performed had he stopped to deliberate” (Railton 1984, 157). In other 
words, “he continues to believe that an act may stem from the dispositions it would be best 
to have, and yet be wrong (because it would produce worse consequences than other acts 
available to the agent in the circumstances)” (158). 
 When the sophisticated consequentialist performs a wrong action from a disposition 
that he was right to develop, Railton asserts that what he does is wrong but that he is not 
blameworthy.30 He is able to make this claim because he assumes that whether someone has 
done something wrong is a separate question from whether the person deserves to be 
blamed (Railton 1984, 159). Familiar as we are now with the guilt literature, we know that 
guilt feelings and the idea of transgression are too tightly bound for this maneuver to 
succeed. In brief, the sophisticated consequentialist accepts that an action is right if and only 
if it maximizes utility. When a sophisticated consequentialist knows she has performed a 
suboptimal action from a disposition she was right to cultivate, Railton calls this a case of 
blameless wrongdoing. The idea of blameless wrongdoing though only makes sense if we 
take the rightness and wrongness at issue to be a matter of simple fittingness and not moral 
obligation. Otherwise, if we are dealing with moral obligation, we have a case in which the 
agent knows that she has violated her obligations, and it is in just such cases that guilt is a 
warranted emotion. 
 The bones of a solution to the problem should be clear however. If we amend 
Railton’s proposals, we can provide a characterization of the sophisticated consequentialist 
that does not have him do what he believes to be morally forbidden. The proposal is that the 
                                                
30 Derek Parfit calls these cases of “blameless wrongdoing” (Parfit 1984, 32).  
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sophisticated consequentialist should be understood as one who accepts that actions are 
right, all things considered, if and only if they maximize utility. Though he believes this 
formula, he does not take it to express his duty but rather understands the rightness at issue 
to concern fittingness alone. Again, it is no man’s duty to do what he ought to do all things 
considered. Rather, the sophisticated consequentialist knows this and accepts that it is his 
duty to do what he ought to do humanly speaking. And humanly speaking, as Railton has 
shown, it is not the case that a person should act to maximize utility but instead that he 
ought to act largely as conventional morality would dictate (e.g., as Juan does). It is this last 
deontic formula that gives an agent’s duty, that states his moral obligation.  
 The reader may question whether this reworking of Railton’s position transforms 
him from an act consequentialist to a sort of indirect consequentialist like a rule 
consequentialist. The proposed alternations do not work such a substantial change. It 
remains the case that actions are right all things considered if and only if they maximize 
utility. At the same time, this statement is understood to be using “right” to refer to 
fittingness and not to moral obligation. That the sophisticated consequentialist accepts a 
different dictum with respect to duty, what he ought to do given human psychological 
limitations, does not void the view’s act consequentialist credentials. On the contrary, it is 
still the case that what makes an action right all things considered is utility maximization, and 
this principle grounds what makes an action right humanly speaking. 
 The difference between an act utilitarian and a rule utilitarian falls along the line 
dividing a direct consequentialist from an indirect consequentialist. A direct consequentialist 
holds that the moral character of an action depends solely on the consequences of that 
action (Sinnott-Armstrong 2015). An indirect consequentialists holds that the moral 
character of an action depends on the consequences of something else, such as what would 
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be the case if everyone were to follow a certain rule (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015). The 
sophisticated consequentialist as amended is emphatically a direct consequentialist and an act 
consequentialist. Either of the principles he accepts, concerning respectively what is right all 
things considered and what he ought to do humanly speaking, is concerned with acts and 
their consequences (e.g., the consequences of acting to develop a certain disposition) and not 
the consequences of a certain rule or motive’s being in place. 
In sum, the change proposed to Railton’s position is that, in addition to 
distinguishing the use of consequentialism as a criterion of evaluation from its use as a 
decision procedure, we also distinguish what is right all things considered and is a matter of 
fittingness from what is right humanly speaking and is a matter of duty. Whatever principles 
or procedures would produce an objectively consequentialist life, the reimagined 
sophisticated consequentialist believes it is her duty to act accordingly, not to do whatever 
would maximize utility and would be right all things considered. Railton’s article spoke 
univocally about right and so left even the sophisticated consequentialist—thinking that he 
was doing wrong by not maximizing utility—setup for chronic guilt. 
* * * 
 We should now reimagine our character Roger as he would be if he responded to his 
utilitarian convictions after the fashion of Railton’s Juan. As a sophisticated consequentialist, 
Roger will allow himself to cultivate friendships, romances, keep his promises, and give some 
money to UNICEF. He will not hesitate to spend a dollar on a Coke, to favor his spouse 
over strangers in giving gifts, or to remain in America close to his friends and loved ones. 
From time to time, he may have recourse to his moral theory to scrutinize his lifestyle and 
consider changes. In major cases, he may invoke utilitarian considerations to forbid himself 
to carry out an important personal project, but by and large, he will live an ordinary life in 
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accord with the affections and personal commitments that constitute the hodgepodge of a 
conventional moral existence. 
 Roger’s life as a sophisticated consequentialist is pleasantly free of the psychological 
pitfalls into which a naïve consequentialist led him. Railton’s view thus deserves credit for 
steering the consequentialist agent clear of alienation, and when modified to take account of 
the difference between fittingness and moral obligation, for evading chronic guilt as well. 
Nonetheless, there are two deficiencies in Railton’s model of the sophisticated 
consequentialist.  
First, it fails to represent sufficiently the maximizing character of utilitarianism. In 
telling someone like Roger to avoid utilitarian calculation in plotting his way through life, it 
directs him to act in a way that is more objectively utilitarian than simple act utilitarianism 
but is nonetheless disconnected from the goal of maximizing utility. While a life of 
conventional morality may result in higher net utility than naïve action maximization, there 
may be other ways of life more disposed to maximizing utility that do not entail acting like a 
utility calculating machine. Whereas Railton proposes allowing oneself to consult 
utilitarianism to occasionally take stock of one’s life in reflective moments, one would 
probably come closer to maximizing utility if one cultivated particular values or attitudes 
more likely to maximize utility than conventional morality. While empathy and charity are 
amongst the qualities of a conventional moral life, insofar as they are concerned with the 
happiness of others, they ought to be disproportionately emphasized in the character 
development of an ideal utilitarian agent.  
 The second point of criticism also relates to the maximizing character of 
utilitarianism: Railton’s theory does not explain how it could ever be morally obligatory to 
give one’s money to UNICEF instead of buying a can of Coke. As we have noticed from our 
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talk about Roger, utilitarianism dictates that we devote a far greater share of our time and 
resources to the needs of the desperately impoverished. We saw that such demands were 
hazardous for leading the conscientious person towards chronic guilt and ethical anxiety, and 
while these features certainly are objectionable and avoided by Railton’s theory, he does not 
address them in the right manner. Although we may wish to avoid the unpalatable 
psychological ramifications of simple act utilitarianism, it would be better if our theory could 
find some way to capture the claims utilitarianism makes on us in regards to assisting the 
desperately needy. 
 Railton counsels that the proper response to utilitarianism is basically the life of a 
highly ethical suburbanite, but given the resolve with which utilitarianism directs our 
attention to the plight of the world’s poorest, that response is inadequate. One of 
utilitarianism’s merits is its ability to unmask complacency when it comes to the mass of 
preventable suffering co-existing with us in the world. More explicitly, it forces us to 
consider the juxtapositions that I have imagined Roger contemplating between the needs of 
a homeless man and one’s own pleasure in reading quietly at home. In the next section, I will 
try to better Railton’s work in this respect and avoid losing the enlightening stringency of 
utilitarianism. 
3. A New Approach 
 The utilitarian agent ought to cultivate the disposition to see the happiness of others 
as equally important to his or her own. I will call this personal quality benevolence. It is a 
character trait, and as such, refers to a stable disposition of thought, feeling, perception, and 
motivation. By acquiring benevolence, one does not relinquish one’s own interests but one’s 
concern for self is no greater than one’s concern for the other. The other is not humanity en 
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masse, but the individual one encounters. The benevolent person’s concern for each other is 
equal to her concern for herself. It is not an equal concern for everyone, for all of humanity.  
The parity between the altruistic and the egoistic in the benevolent person is not only 
an equality of strength but also a sameness of kind. In explaining the equivalence, I wish to 
follow Bishop Butler. His focus is the the Biblical injunction to “love . . . they neighbor as 
thyself”:  
[T]he precept may be understood as requiring only that we have the same kind of 
affection to our fellow creatures as to ourselves: that, as every man has the principle 
of self-love, which disposes him to avoid misery and consult his own happiness, so 
we should cultivate the affection of goodwill to our neighbor, and that it should 
influence us to have the same kind of regard to him. 
(Butler 1983, 58–59). To appreciate Butler, it is important to grasp how he conceives of self-
love. According to him, the principle of self-love consists in “regard to our own Interest, 
Happiness, and private Good” (48). It is to be contrasted with the “several particular 
passions, appetites, and affections,” a category that includes every particular desire for 
something, from the desire for an ice cream cone to the desire that one’s brother recover 
from an illness (28). Whereas self-love has regard for the agent’s happiness, particular 
passions do not; they are directed at their particular objects (38–39). In consequence, self-
love can come into conflict with particular passions, as it does in the case of a man who has 
not drunk for days but knows that the water he has found is poisonous. 
 Significantly, self-love is not a description or amalgamation of one’s sundry particular 
desires. It is a discrete disposition in a person to “avoid misery and consult his own 
happiness.” It is a kind of advocate, a lobbyist pleading not for any particular object, but for 
the happiness of the person as a whole. However, a person’s happiness is at least partly 
dependent upon the satisfaction of his particular desires. Accordingly, self-love leads a 
person to consider those desires and the possibilities for their satisfaction.  
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If it were a psychological element of the same kind as self-love, benevolence then 
would be a disposition to avoid the misery of the other and to consult his or her happiness, 
including his or her desires and the possibility for their satisfaction. “[R]eal benevolence to 
our fellow creatures would give us the notion of a common interest . . . for in the degree we 
love another, his interest, his joys and sorrows, are our own” (59). To the extent that self-
love moves a person to attend to his own desires, benevolence moves that person to attend 
to the other’s desires. It is a lobbyist pleading for the happiness of the other, an “advocate 
within our own breast, to take care of the interest of our fellow creatures” (59). 
 Regarding pluralities of others, the benevolent person regards the happiness of each 
person she encounters as equally important to her own. When confronted with a multiplicity 
of people, she sees each person’s happiness as equally important to her own and thus equally 
important to that of each of the other persons. She is not a utilitarian god, however, and she 
does not consciously consider or address the happiness of all six billion of the Earth’s 
inhabitants. As John Stuart Mill acknowledges, “[I]t is a misapprehension of the utilitarian 
mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide 
a generality as the world, or society at large” (Mill 2015, 132). He asserts that “[t]he great 
majority of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of 
individuals, of which the good of the world is made up” (132). Accordingly, “the thoughts of 
the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons 
concerned” (132).  
 The reader may yet question whether a person who possessed self-love and love of 
others in equal shares would not end up a case of unsustainable self-neglect—her affection 
for herself, being equal to her affection for the other, drowned given the large number of 
others before her. Thus far, I have said that the benevolent person views the happiness of 
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each person she encounters as equally important to her own. I have also said that the love of 
the other is like an advocate in the benevolent person standing at the bar with the advocate 
called self-love. The advocate for the other carries far more petitions than the advocate for 
self, but each of the petitions brought by the former is as moving and affecting as the lone 
entreaty pressed by the latter. This ensures that when the benevolent person faces a decision 
in which her interests are out of line with those of a large group of others, the voice of the 
love of others will resound over that of self-love and press the benevolent person to make 
the choice that is worse for her.  
That this does not result in untenable self-neglect is a function of the fact that self-
love and love of the other are not the only two elements in the psychology of the benevolent 
person. The benevolent person still gets hungry, still has a taste in music, and does not ipso 
facto lose her sweet tooth. In Butler’s terms, she retains her “several particular passions, 
appetites and affections,” and these are still a goad to provide for her own needs (62). 
Furthermore, while both self-love and benevolence serve as spurs to act for the sake of 
either self or other, these psychological forces do not exclude their bearer from deliberating 
and acting for reasons. We need not assume a Humean theory of motivation on which 
reason’s only role is to serve whichever passion is for the time the strongest. Just as 
preference for self does not prevent an ordinary person from repairing an old car at great 
expense to herself, doing so because the car will “look really cool” in the end, the benevolent 
person who lacks preference for self is not barred from acting for reasons that are neither 
self- nor other-regarding. Indeed, the suspicion that the benevolent person will drown in her 
own altruism should weaken if we recall that the benevolent person need not act only for 
consequentialist reasons. Whether or not a consequentialist theory acknowledges the 
existence of reasons to do anything other than maximize the good, we have already decided 
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that the sophisticated consequentialist should not deliberate as if “He’s my spouse” or “That 
wallpaper would really suit the room” did not communicate reasons for action.  
A benevolent person may act in such a way that her needs are met—even when that 
means neglecting the interests of a large group of others—without acting out of a preference 
for self which she no longer shares with the rest of us. What is significant about the 
benevolent person is that one particular disposition, self-love, is counterbalanced by another 
disposition, the love of the other. The benevolent person is free of egoism, not because she 
is monomaniacal about helping others, but because the peculiar disposition that focuses her 
care and attention on herself is always matched by a disposition to attend to the happiness of 
each other person in the same way. While this means that the voice of self-love can be 
swamped when the number of others at issue is great enough, this does not mean that the 
benevolent person is without other motivational bases to sustain herself and her projects. 
Finally, in speaking about the benevolent man or woman, I do not mean to say that 
any such person has ever existed or is likely to exist. It may be that a certain degree of 
narcissism or egoism is an inescapable fact of human nature. Nevertheless, the fact that 
perfect benevolence may be a practical impossibility does not necessarily preclude 
demanding that one strive to cultivate it. Though we fail to achieve many traditional virtues, 
we do not therefore feel absolved from our duty to pursue them. Here it is true of the duty 
to cultivate benevolence what Kant said was true of his wide and imperfect duties: “It is a 
human being’s duty to strive for this perfection, but not to reach it . . . and his compliance with 
this duty can, accordingly consist only in continual progress” (Kant 1996, 196). The duty of 
benevolence prescribes that one make it one’s goal to advance in benevolence. 
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3.1 A Remedy for Guilt and Alienation 
 When Roger took his duty to be maximizing utility in his every action, he found 
himself unable to quiet his conscience. Prosaic tasks like purchasing a movie ticket became 
sources of guilt when he thought of the relief his time and resources could have otherwise 
provided to those in need. And even extreme self-sacrifice left him in doubt as to whether 
he might have done more to help others. Benevolence relieves this pressure by shifting 
obligation from maximizing utility in every action to becoming a utility-promoting 
humanitarian. This transition makes the question “How much is doing enough for others?” 
more manageable. To see how, we can return to the example of the conscientious utilitarian 
buying a can of Coke. 
 In the immediate aftermath of a decision to buy a soda, the question, “Did I do the 
right thing?” is no longer interpreted as “Did I maximize utility by my choice?” Instead, 
“Did I do the right thing?” is parsed as “Did I act in a manner consistent with cultivating 
benevolence?” The answer to the first question is negative: buying the Coke failed to 
maximize utility because the money could have saved a life if given to UNICEF. For the 
second expression, the answer will generally be affirmative. Insofar as one’s actions are in 
keeping with the cultivation of benevolent traits like empathy, compassion, and equal 
respect, they do not infringe on one’s duty. Buying a can of Coke is not necessarily 
incompatible with these traits or the life of a benevolent person who possesses them to a 
large degree.   
When I say that purchasing the Coke was consistent with the development of 
benevolence, I do not mean that the action promoted benevolence. In order to be consistent 
with the development of benevolence, an action need not be a cause of incremental 
progress. To the contrary, to be consistent with the development of benevolence an agent’s 
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action must be such that the agent will continue to make long run progress. An action may 
even be consistent with benevolence if it causes the line of the agent’s progress to descend 
for a time but to ultimately rise to a new peak. Again, a comparison with Kant’s wide duties 
is apt: the duty to cultivate benevolence gives the agent latitude to achieve the prescribed end 
and does not require that every action advance that end.  
Turning to a different topic, we can consider how well the view copes with Williams’ 
alienation objection. Clearly, the person striving to develop benevolence is not acting like a 
utility calculating machine. On the contrary, he is attempting to acquire habits of thinking 
and feeling which will lead him to naturally and spontaneously act in a way that maximizes 
utility. In doing so, he is not abandoning his existing commitments but placing them in a 
larger context of commitments to others. There is no schism here between commitments 
and action. Of course, the development of a trait requires acts of self-discipline in 
contravention of existing inclinations. However, insofar as benevolence demands that one 
occasionally reproach oneself for vicious feelings and actions, it does no more than any 
newly adopted normative theory. 
3.2 Advantages Over Railton’s Model 
 In a prior section, I criticized Railton’s example of a sophisticated consequentialist—
Juan the ethical suburbanite—on two grounds: (1) failing to adequately represent the 
maximizing character of utilitarianism and (2) failing to explain how it could ever be morally 
obligatory to engage in extraordinary acts of self-sacrifice to meet the even greater needs of 
the impoverished. In what follows, I will show how the view on offer can in contrast satisfy 
these two concerns. 
 I am arguing that the utilitarian duty is to cultivate a trait of treating the happiness of 
others as equally important to one’s own. As such, there is a prospective, forward-looking 
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character to the duty to cultivate benevolence. Although action maximization is not required, 
the agent remains oriented to the ultimate goal of maximizing utility. Gradually, one tries to 
become the kind of person who acts in keeping with utilitarian standards. Railton’s model 
lacks this progressive aspect and instead interprets utilitarianism as requiring that one remain 
largely in conventional morality. Whereas the pursuit of benevolence possesses traits which 
guide one towards the theoretical goal of maximizing utility, a life of conventional morality 
does not necessarily contain such seeds of continuous utilitarian growth. While bettering 
oneself in conventional morality could involve increased acts of charity, it countenances 
limits on that charity that the development of benevolence would allow one to gradually 
surpass. 
 When we imagined Roger’s life as a simple act utilitarian, I described him 
undertaking the utmost self-sacrifice in order to benefit those in desperate need. Attempting 
to live a utilitarian life, he took as his duty many things which would normally be considered 
supererogatory. Railton’s theory fails to show how these acts could be considered morally 
obligatory. As the following paragraphs aim to demonstrate, the benevolence approach is 
able to show how such acts may come to be obligatory for some people without making 
them a matter of duty (and a source of either chronic guilt or alienating demands) for 
ordinary people. In doing so, the theory preserves more of (though not all of) the utilitarian 
perception that those in the affluent Occident ought to be doing more to relieve radical 
poverty and deprivation. 
 In Heroes, Saints, and Ordinary Morality, Andrew Flescher argues that particular acts 
may be supererogatory for some people and obligatory for others. He points out that many 
real life heroes and moral saints—such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Dorothy Day—
claimed to be doing only what duty required of them (Flescher 2003, 7–9). Ordinarily, we 
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write off their words as expressing characteristic humility and regard their deeds as 
supererogatory—i.e., good, noble, and praiseworthy, but outside the scope of duty 
nonetheless. Flescher distinctively wants to take heroes and saints at their word when they 
say what they do is a duty. At the same time, he wants to avoid making the claim that the 
acts of heroes and saints are ethically obligatory for everyone (11). In his book, he proposes 
a solution to this dilemma: 
Precisely what morality demands of us at any one time depends on the particular pace 
at which we variously proceed towards the goal of moral betterment. What we have in 
common with each other is that we each ought, in our own distinctive ways, to dispose 
ourselves to become better people. This maxim, which is Aristotelian in nature, 
corresponds to the acquisition of virtue. As we become more virtuous, we become 
increasingly capable of perceiving the true nature of our responsibilities toward others, 
and better able to harness the courage required for successfully acting responsibly. 
Thus, there is a direct relationship between moral development and the expansion of 
duty. 
 
(238–39). 
For our purposes, Flescher’s thesis is significant because it can explain how duties 
vary depending on one’s progress in benevolence. Consider the ordinary person who as yet 
possesses a small share of benevolence. For her, buying a can of Coke in lieu of giving the 
money spent to UNICEF is permissible, but for the moral saint, highly developed in 
benevolence, the purchase would be contrary to duty. In this way, even the most 
extraordinary altruistic deeds (recall Roger moving to the Congo) may come to be obligatory 
as one progresses. 
 In what way might growing more benevolent modify one’s obligations? According to 
Flescher, growth in virtue expands duty because it makes one more capable of perceiving 
one’s responsibilities and translating those perceptions into action. He writes, “The 
enlightened consciousness of saints leads them to embrace a worldview in which the 
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distinction between self and alter is transcended and which, as a result, leads them to engage 
in altruistic conduct that from a nonsaintly perspective must be judged as excessive” (237). 
 Like the moral saint, the fully benevolent person is distinguished by an attitude 
which both leads her to altruistic acts and alters for her the scope of moral obligation. Recall 
that the question, “Did I do the right thing?” should be translated as “Did I act in a manner 
consistent with cultivating benevolence?” The answer to the latter question depends upon 
one’s progress in benevolence. For a highly benevolent person—whose feelings and 
thoughts make him keenly aware of others’ suffering, however distant—it is an act leading 
away from benevolence to ignore them and buy a Coke. However, for the typical person, it 
is not inconsistent with progress towards benevolence to neglect that far away suffering. 
Admitting that Flescher’s thesis is controversial, I have hopefully demonstrated the 
theoretical feasibility of apparently supererogatory acts becoming a matter of duty, as 
utilitarianism insists they are. 
4. Summary 
 This chapter considers how an individual’s duty should be understood under 
utilitarianism, in light of the psychological perils for conscientious agents who accept it as 
true. A given moral theory may not be well suited to addressing the moral-theoretical 
questions and needs of such an audience. Mill grounds utilitarianism in an appeal to the fact 
that “each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness” (Mill 
2015, 148). As such, the argument for utilitarianism commences from an external and 
impersonal observation: it talks about what is good and bad on the basis of what people in 
fact do or do not seek. Absent is any mention of ethical phenomenology, especially the 
experience of obligation and the guilt attendant upon a violation of obligation. 
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 If utilitarian thinkers have neglected the perspective of the individual wrestling with 
conscience in the design of their theories, it stands to reason that the conception produced 
will be born blind to the psychological demands of the ethically earnest person. However, 
even if utilitarianism first appeared in a form better suited for the guidance of parliamentary 
committees, it should be possible to address it to the needs of individuals in search of 
applicable ethical theory. Indeed, as philosophers like Railton have previously shown, 
adapting utilitarian prescriptions to account for human psychology is not mere indulgence of 
weakness but is supported by the distinction between sophisticated and naïve 
consequentialism. Thus, the benevolence view can defend its retention of the act-utilitarian 
title despite its differences from simple maximizing utilitarianism. 
 That said, what is the advantage of the convinced utilitarian understanding his duty 
in the particular way delineated in this paper—i.e., the cultivation of benevolence? In answer, 
its chief advantage lies in its way of coping with the maximizing character of utilitarianism. 
With maximizing moral theories, the easy answers to the question, “How much is doing 
enough for other people?” fall short: it is not sufficient to live and let live or to help people 
in obvious emergencies. Rather, one has to locate the required level of altruism at a much 
higher point than that which conventional morality dictates or with which most of us are 
personally comfortable. Still, despite the extremity of its demands, utilitarianism’s 
imperatives can prove difficult to ignore. Granted that many of us in the affluent West do 
not accept that it is our duty to give away the vast majority of our “hard-earned money” to 
strangers, we do sometimes feel that we ought to be doing much more to help the 
desperately needy. When Peter Singer lays out the case for famine relief in Bengal and tells 
us how far the money spent on the Sydney Opera House could go to saving lives, most of us 
likely feel a little guilty about our own indulgences. For someone who finds himself 
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sympathetic to Singer’s argument but cannot imagine giving up everything he knows to live 
the life of a moral saint, what kind of guidance can we offer? Surely we do not want to ask 
him to continue just suppressing the pangs of conscience and repressing the awareness of 
inconsistency that arises whenever he thinks about his moral obligations. 
 Benevolence gives us something better to say, something that neither tells the 
morally concerned agent to ignore completely his moral convictions nor demands that he 
stop whining and pack his bags for the Congo. It dictates that he ought to strive for 
benevolence but also states that he does not have to achieve such excellence overnight and 
does not have to act like a utilitarian saint in the interim. Since it is likely to be ineffective 
anyway, he should not try to be a utility calculating machine and thereby suffer a life of 
alienation and ethical anxiety. Day by day, striving to become a more compassionate, a more 
fair-minded individual, he has before him a task that he can manage but that leads him 
towards the higher flights of morality that utilitarianism demands of him. The result will be a 
much more utilitarian life as his striving manifests itself in increased acts of benevolence. 
Even better, he may find himself one day approximating full benevolence, living the life of a 
great humanitarian like Albert Schweitzer. However, if he does someday reach that level, it 
will have been an organic transformation, not one that cataclysmically rips him away from 
his family and his deeply held commitments. Thanks to its gradual, progressive approach to 
coping with a maximizing theory, this is an apt model for translating the utilitarian theory of 
the good into deontic terms.
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Chapter Four, Moral Anxiety and Moral Staining 
 It is common to distinguish the use of “ought” to express a moral obligation from its 
use to express a conclusion about what it would be rational, perhaps merely prudent, to do. 
The former we take to be graver than the latter. A.C. Ewing wrote of moral obligations, “We 
feel that we are under binding laws which we cannot break without being ourselves evil in a 
more serious and quite different way from that in which pain is evil” (Ewing 1947, 133). He 
struggles here to articulate what makes moral duty so important, what makes immoral 
actions so serious. 
 T.M. Scanlon speaks of two questions around morality: priority and importance. The 
question of priority asks why it is that moral obligations are thought to take precedence over 
other oughts (Scanlon 1998, 160). The issue of importance refers to why we feel that 
violations of obligation make a person subject to special disapprobation, up to and including 
punishment (158–60). Scanlon concludes that moral obligations have priority and 
importance because they concern what we owe to others. When we fail in them, we act in 
ways that cannot be justified to others and experience a distressing estrangement from our 
fellow humans (163). 
 Ewing’s words point us elsewhere: it is not our relationships with others that are 
marred by wrongdoing but our selves. Wrongdoing renders you evil—it may follow that this 
estranges you from your fellows—but in the first instance it is you that are changed not your 
relationships. How we are rendered evil Ewing cannot say, only that it is a different way of 
being evil than that in which pain is evil. At this juncture, the idea of sin and the idea of 
karma come to mind. 
 In this chapter, I offer an interpretation of how it is that breaches of moral 
obligation render one evil. My model is familiar from the literature on guilt. Gabriele Taylor 
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has persuasively argued that guilt differs from shame and remorse in being concerned with 
(1) the idea that you have violated an obligation and (2) the idea that the violation has stained 
or disfigured the self. There is also in the guilt literature a prominent view that coheres with 
Scanlon’s relationship theory. Herbert Morris has argued for the view that guilt is concerned 
with (1) violation of obligation and (2) the severance of valued relationships. 
 For the reasons that follow, I believe that Taylor’s view of guilt is superior to that of 
Morris. I think that a model of guilt as moral staining better captures guilt’s reflexive, first-
personal character than a relationship-severance model. It also has the potential to explain 
the importance and priority of moral obligation by linking violations of duty with threats to 
one’s personal identity. This is because, as Christine Korsgaard has argued, it is through our 
actions that we construct our personal or practical identities. Immoral actions leave stains 
that threaten your integrity because, like all other actions, they contribute a piece to the 
ongoing project of self-constitution. As we will see, a threat to the integrity of personal 
identity is existential peril; wrongdoing compromises the self and leads the agent to despair 
over the loss of self. My suggestion is that this despair is the evil that Ewing was baffled to 
name: the evil that is more serious and quite different from the evil of pain. 
To illustrate these points, I offer an explanation of what I call “scrupulousness.” As I 
will shortly show, the scrupulous person—one who is persistently anxious about whether a 
minor action was right or wrong—is concerned with the possibility that the action has left 
her morally stained. 
1. The Problem: A Scrupulous Student 
 Imagine a high school student sitting down for a geography test. Before the bell 
rings, she looks over the map of the world one last time before cramming the book back 
into her open backpack. During the test, while puzzling about the name of that country 
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which sits below Kazakhstan and west of Uzbekistan, she idly glances downward. To her 
chagrin, the book is sitting half open and she spies the name of the country, “Kyrgyzstan.” 
“What should I do?” she wonders. “The name was on the tip of my tongue; I was just about 
to remember.” So she decides to write “Kyrgyzstan.” 
 But then she pauses. “Maybe the answer wouldn’t have come to me. The right thing 
to do is leave the question blank.” “But I studied so much,” she retorts, “I’m sure I would’ve 
gotten the right answer on my own eventually. Why should I self-handicap like that?” So she 
scribbles “Kyrgyzstan” in the blank and finishes the exam. Still, she can’t help rehearsing 
these arguments, both when she gets home that night and when her exam is returned the 
next day with a shiny red A in the margin. She is worried—worried that what she did was 
wrong. She asks herself, “Was what I did cheating? Do I need to confess, or would that be 
absurd?” Attempting to answer her question, she might reason, “Well, I didn’t look at the 
book on purpose and I would’ve got the answer anyway.” However, the next moment she 
says to herself, “It doesn’t matter if you did it on purpose or not; you had an unfair 
advantage. Besides, you can’t be sure whether you would’ve remembered that name.” 
Suppose she carries on fretting like this all week and that six months later she has to shake 
the thought out of her head to avoid bringing on another round of casuistry. All that fuss 
over a (perhaps innocent) answer on a high school geography exam! 
 Henceforth, I will use the word “scrupulousness” to identify the student’s 
psychological state of retrospective anxiety and doubt. I adopt the word “scrupulous” 
because it suggests traits I wish to discuss, namely, the student’s anxiety and doubt about the 
morality of her minor past actions. Though it has come to signify someone who is circumspect or 
painstaking in moral matters or acting in general, there is an older use of the word like to my 
deployment of it here. The second entry in the OED reads, “cautious or meticulous in 
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acting, deciding,” while the first entry states, “Troubled with doubts or scruples of 
conscience.” The Dictionary’s definition for “scruple” emphasizes the element of doubt: “a 
doubt, uncertainty or hesitation in regard to right and wrong, duty, propriety, etc.” An 
illustrative quotation from the sixteenth century for this usage refers to Henry VIII’s state of 
mind after his marriage to his deceased brother’s wife Catherine, a situation Leviticus may be 
read to condemn. 
1.1 The Solution 
 My immediate goal in this chapter is to explain scrupulousness. Specifically, why is it 
that the possibility of a small ethical infringement can occasion so much anxiety after the 
act? What is it about the uncertainty surrounding a single possible transgression, however so 
slight, that can cause people like the student to second guess themselves and question 
whether what they did was right long after the event has passed? 
 I propose that scrupulousness derives from anxiety about the effect of immoral 
actions on one’s self. The idea is that unethical deeds leave one changed for the worse. 
Obviously, you bear a specific relationship to a past misdeed: you are the person who at time 
t did immoral action x. However, I have in mind something different. To wit, there is a 
further, non-relational fact about your present state: you are somehow stained by the 
blameworthy action. On my model, scrupulousness is a manifestation of anxiety about the 
ethical staining of the self. The scrupulous person is unsure whether what he did was wrong, 
and in his uncertainty, he fears the worst, fears that acting unethically has tainted him. 
 The notion that wrongdoing leaves one morally stained is congruent with Gabriele 
Taylor’s theory of guilt. In her book, Pride, Shame, and Guilt, she observes, “[W]hen feeling 
guilty I think of myself as having brought about a forbidden state of affairs and thereby in 
this respect disfigured a self which otherwise remains the same” (Taylor 1985, 92). Unlike 
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shame in which the person experiencing it feels inferior as a whole, the guilty person sees 
himself as having disfigured himself by an isolated violation of obligation: “Guilt is a burden 
he [the guilty person] has to carry, he cannot disown it, it must leave its mark upon him” 
(92). 
 In the early going, I want to distinguish the notion of staining from a more familiar 
idea prominent in the virtue ethics tradition. The staining that is of concern to the 
scrupulous person is not the degradation of character that the virtue ethicist believes 
proceeds from bad actions. The worry is not that bad actions will turn into bad habits of 
thought, feeling, and action but that the bad action itself has simply left a black mark. Our 
student (let’s call her Emily) is plainly a young woman of good character in the virtue ethical 
sense; after all, the vicious person is neither so attentive to ethical matters nor as self-critical 
when it comes to her own peccadilloes. Whichever way she chooses to respond to her 
worries, Emily is not about to become a serial cheater or routine liar. As such, her concern is 
not with the effects that cheating would have on her future dispositions but on the effect 
that the possible31 act of cheating may have had on her self. She worries about the propriety 
of her actions because she worries that—although she may go on to live a virtuous life, 
disdaining dishonesty of every sort—she will henceforth be tainted by the act of cheating. 
 Nor is Emily concerned about what the action reveals about her character; she is not 
worried that her character is not what she thought it was. She has not discovered anything 
new, unfavorable about her temperament—if anything, her aversion to cheating is now 
shining most strongly. Her action, we may suppose, is unquestionably out of character for 
                                                
31 It’s important to recognize that Emily is truly in doubt as to whether her action was right 
or wrong. Thus, when I use the word “possible,” I mean to say that it is uncertain, at least to 
Emily, whether her actions were right or wrong. Moreover, I myself take it that it is not 
obvious whether what Emily did was right or wrong. 
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her. As we will later see, it was her choice that concerns her—a choice that was not a mere 
result of facts about her character.  
 If moral staining is not to be explained in terms of the development of a vicious 
character, then how should we understand it? According to the proposed theory, immoral 
actions somehow change a person for the worse. Accordingly, there must be something 
about the person going forward that is altered, something that corresponds to the stain. 
However, if we have ruled out the development of bad psychological traits as the change 
involved, then it is hard to identify a suitable candidate. Once changes in a person’s 
thoughts, feelings, and habits are set aside, what it means for a person to be stained by an 
unethical action is difficult to grasp. 
2. Korsgaard and Practical Identity 
The above remains long on metaphor and short on explanation. To flesh out the 
imagery, we can use Christine Korsgaard’s work on practical identity to explain how bad 
actions taint the self. However, employing Korsgaard requires some exegetical labor. In what 
follows, I summarize Korsgaard’s thinking about practical identity as presented in Self-
Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. 
 In brief, practical identity is the same thing as personal identity.32 That sounds simple 
enough, but Korsgaard also thinks that a person’s practical identity is constructed by her 
choices. Unlike her identity as an animal or a living thing, her practical identity is up to her. 
She can build her personal/practical identity in this way because she is rational, which allows 
her to reflect on and choose the principles of her actions. Indeed, Korsgaard tells us that 
personal identity is composed—literally made up of—one’s actions. 
                                                
32 Indeed, Korsgaard uses the phrases “practical identity” and “personal identity” 
interchangeably (Korsgaard 2009, 7). 
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 Korsgaard’s claim that we construct our practical/personal identities by our choices 
relies on a notion of personhood developed from her reading of Aristotle. In her mind, “The 
identity of a person, of an agent, is not the same as the identity of the human animal on 
whom the person normally supervenes” (19). To understand the view, recall that Aristotle 
divided the living world into three forms of life: the vegetative, the animal, and the rational 
(127–29). The vegetative life of nutrition and reproduction, which is shared by all plants and 
animals, lies at the bottom. The intermediate animal form, characterized by “perception and 
sensation,” is shared by humans and the other animals (129). Thanks to these distinctive 
abilities, humans and animals possess a kind of identity (animal identity) that plants lack 
(129). Atop the ladder, humans participate in the life of rational activity. This form of life is 
the source of practical identity. Just as an animal possesses a kind of identity that a plant 
lacks, so do humans possess a kind of identity that animals lack. Although humans still 
participate in the animal and vegetative forms of life, their participation in the rational form 
of life allows them to construct personal or practical identities over and above their identities 
as animals or living things (128). 
 Rationality entails the ability to construct one’s personal identity because it means 
being able to choose the principles of one’s actions, à la Kant. For an animal, its instincts are 
its principles of action (110). Instincts are principles because they determine how the animal 
will respond to the incentives that it experiences: “They are the laws of [the animal’s] 
causality in the sense that they determine what she does for the sake of what” (110). In 
contrast, although humans possess instincts (116), they are also capable of acting in 
accordance with rational principles of their own choice and devise (110). By adopting a 
principle, we sanction it as a law for our will in the same way that an animal’s instincts are a 
law to it (116). 
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The process of deliberating upon and selecting the principles of our actions is the 
work of self-constitution (19–20). Personal identity “is constituted by our chosen actions” 
(130). Note that Korsgaard uses the word “constituted” rather than “constructed.” This is 
because personal identity is not just the result of our actions; it is composed of our actions. 
Actions are the bricks of which the house of personal identity is formed. Korsgaard goes so 
far as to tell us that “they [our actions] are us, because we are what we do” (130). She 
explains: 
When you deliberately decide what sorts of effects you will bring about in the world, 
you are also deliberately deciding what sort of a cause you will be. And that means 
you are deciding who you are. So we are each faced with the task of constructing a 
peculiar, individual kind of identity—personal or practical identity—that the other 
animals lack. 
. . . 
It is as the possessor of personal or practical identity that you are the author of your 
actions, and responsible for them. And yet at the same time it is in choosing your 
actions that you create this identity. What this means is that you constitute yourself as 
the author of your actions in the very act of choosing them. 
 
(19–20). Given this connection between freedom, action, and self-constitution, Korsgaard’s 
theory is ripe for application to the problem of moral staining. 
3. Applying the Theory 
 Ethical staining is easy to understand if one accepts Korsgaard’s practical identity 
theory. Our practical identities are constructed by our choices. When we choose to act 
unethically, we are like craftsmen inserting rotten timbers into a frame house. Our work is 
thus sullied in the same way that the work of a cook who pours a spot of rancid milk into 
the soup mars his own labors. Like the soup, the self is a work-in-progress to which many 
ingredients have been added. One does not become a wicked person by one wicked action, 
but like the soup, one nonetheless has at least one undeniably bad element composing 
oneself. The ethical stain that bad actions leave is just their contribution, a few shoddy nails 
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and boards, to the ongoing process of self-construction. When we choose to do wrong, we 
reshape ourselves, however so little, for the worse. 
 The critical point I adopt from Korsgaard is that our actions are both free and 
constitutive of a developing self. Alternative theories of identity are consistent with my 
arguments about moral staining so long as they accept that our qualitative identity is at least 
partly constituted by our free actions. If one’s believes instead that character is immutable or 
denies that our actions are free, the balance of this chapter is apt to be unconvincing. 
 Scrupulousness is anxiety about the contributions that immoral actions make to self-
construction. When we act unethically, we are shaping ourselves for the worse. It is only 
natural that we worry. When our young student is fretting about the ethics of her exam 
taking, she is worried that she has altered herself in a bad way by her actions. This is not a 
possibility that she regards as one would regard a mere historical fact. Rather, she looks at 
the possibility with apprehension because it means that she may be a person partly 
composed by a bad action. Her misdeed then is not just a past fact—the fact that at time x 
she performed immoral action y—but a present reality. 
 The difference between regarding your immoral actions as past facts and seeing them 
as part of you in the present is a substantial one. The latter holds your attention and cries out 
for expiation in a way that the former does not. The former may be brushed aside, treated as 
errors that should only be dwelled upon to the extent that reflecting on them will help you 
avoid making the same mistakes in the future. The latter, on the other hand, are matters of 
pressing concern in the present. If immoral actions leave one stained, then the platitudes 
about “learning from your mistakes and moving on” cannot be credited without reservation. 
This is because poring over one’s past misdeeds is not just idle retrospection but consists in 
facing what is a persistent part of oneself. Thus, to look over past blameworthy acts is not 
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idle; at a minimum, it is needed for honest self-appraisal. Moreover, it may be important for 
expiation, insofar as that is possible or desirable. 
 The impact of bad actions on who you are goes a long way to explaining 
scrupulousness. Someone like our student worries about the ethics of what she did because 
ethical staining is a grave prospect, a prospect that both drives her to find an answer to the 
question, “Was what I did wrong?” and makes her afraid of the answer. When looking back 
on an ethically ambiguous situation, our student feels compelled both to conduct an honest, 
uncompromising investigation and to mount a vigorous defense of herself. This accounts for 
why she cannot help but keep rehashing the events of the exam along with the relevant 
ethical considerations. Her obsessive exercises in applied ethics are driven by a desire 
(grounded in anxiety over what the answer might be) to know whether or not she has 
stained herself. Her worried mulling bears the relief of exoneration in one hand and the pain 
of encountering the ethical black mark in the other. Further, her task is made all the more 
maddening insofar as she knows to distrust herself as one sitting as judge over her own 
cause. Recognizing this tangle of emotions helps explain why she would spend so much 
time—even drive herself to distraction months later—thinking about such a slight ethical 
peccadillo, one which might not even be a peccadillo but be completely innocent.  
I want now to bring out two additional ideas about ethical staining and crystallize 
them with the aid of Korsgaard’s theory. These two ideas help explain how even the slightest 
moral wrongs can be the cause of all the nervousness and worry observed in the scrupulous 
person. 
 Firstly, if you are shaped by the choices that you make, then you are something 
uncomfortably precarious. According to Korsgaard, man is the only animal who has the task 
of creating his own form. In other words, each human being makes herself into a unique 
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person.33 Your practical identity is a one-of-a-kind work of your own making. It is thus more 
intimately and fully yours than the deliveries of nature. Though this sounds romantic, it is 
also a sobering idea. Not only does it mean that you and you alone are responsible for 
making yourself into the person that you are, but it means that when you choose, you are 
working without a net. One false move and the project is marred. Outside the self you 
construct for yourself, there is no default state on which to fall back. This is because, per 
Korsgaard, your actions and your actions alone constitute your practical identity.34 If you 
make a misstep, then that misstep will be part of you.  
 To understand how this sense of precariousness contributes to scrupulousness, the 
metaphor of the tight-rope walker working without a net is both helpful and misleading. It is 
misleading in that, while a single ethical slip does leave a mark, it need not have catastrophic 
consequences for your practical identity. Korsgaard thinks that practical identity has inertia; 
so one immoral action does not make one an immoral person.35 The metaphor is helpful 
though in that it emphasizes that there is no content apart from your choices on which to 
fall back. So when one does make an immoral choice, however small it may be, it raises hard 
questions about the sort of person you are. Just like a tight rope walker who makes a 
misstep, wobbles, and looks down, the person who commits a minor unethical act glimpses 
the fragility of his practical identity. 
 He glimpses the fragility of his practical identity in the small immoral choice because 
he sees the potential both for bad action and to become a bad person by repeated bad 
                                                
33 “Because he is alive in a further sense, then, a person has an identity in a further sense. He 
has an identity that is constituted by his choices. . . . Every person must make himself into a 
particular person” (Korsgaard 2009, 129‒130). 
34 “[Y]ou can walk out even on a factually grounded identity like being a certain person’s 
child or a certain nation’s citizen . . .” (23). 
35 The self for Korsgaard is a work-in-progress to which each new action contributes; it is 
not created anew with every fresh choice (35–36). 
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actions. The potential exists because he is a free being constituted by his own choices. 
Remember that people usually like to think of themselves as decently moral individuals. A 
person may even take pride in the fact that he is loyal or kind. However, if Korsgaard is to 
be believed, then he is only those things to the extent that he chooses to make himself loyal 
and kind. If he insensitively shouts at a clumsy coworker, then his kindness is called into 
question. Truly, he does not thereby cease to be a kind person. Yet, like the tight-rope walker 
who shudders after seeing the ground below, he perceives in his act the fact that it is only his 
own free choices that separate him from being a callous, wrathful person.36 
 This possibility is all the more keen since it lies in his own freedom. His abusive 
action showed him how easily he may make a wrong decision. Just as a tight-rope walker 
may, in a flash, make a misstep, a person may make a moral misstep all the more easily. He 
can do so as fast as he can will: he need only decide to let an immoral principle govern his 
actions. Furthermore, since his choice is free, it is surrounded with a kind of mystery. What 
made him choose wrong over right in this instance? If he is free (as Korsgaard understands 
that concept), then ultimately the answer can only be that he chose to act immorally. This 
intensifies the feeling of fragility because thinking of the capriciousness of his own will 
emphasizes to him how precarious his self-constituted personhood is. 
 Catching a glimpse of the precariousness of one’s practical identity is part of what 
explains the scrupulous person’s sensitivity over minor ethical violations. To make the point 
                                                
36 In using words like “kind,” “loyal,” “callous,” or “wrathful,” I do not mean to renege on 
my earlier commitment to treating moral stains as non-psychological properties of 
individuals. To use these words consistently with that commitment, however, I must ask the 
reader to understand them not as expressing actual psychological traits (e.g., the warm 
feeling typical of the kind person) but as states of persons whose actions have corresponded 
to these traits. Thus, in this manner of speaking, the kind person is not necessarily kind in 
the sense that he is disposed to warm feelings and finds it easy to lend a helping hand; rather, 
he is a person who has done kind things and thereby, on the Korsgaardian theory, 
constituted himself a kind person. 
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concrete, we can consider our student Emily. When she is arguing with herself over the 
morality of her actions weeks ago on test day, she might think (supposing her internal 
prosecutor has gotten the advantage for the moment), “No, what I did was wrong. But, does 
that mean that I am a cheater? I’ve never done anything like that before, and I won’t do it 
again . . . I hope . . . but there’s still some bad in me that made me do that. Can I really 
truthfully say that I’m an honest person, honest deep down?” For Emily, her worries about 
who she is “deep down” stem from a sense of the insecurity of her practical identity, an 
insecurity perceived in the minor transgression that she worries she has committed.  
 The second idea is that scrupulousness is driven by a melancholy perception of loss 
in the immoral action and consequent moral staining. It is melancholy because it is a harm to 
something irreplaceable, the damage done to which is (seemingly) irrevocable.37 Put more 
poetically, a person who has done something immoral may feel that he has lost himself. 
Since the immoral action has stained him, he worries he can never be the person he had 
been or had aspired to become. 
 For an explanation of the feeling of loss, ostension will have to substitute for 
analysis. Consider a family heirloom such as a diary written by your great-grandmother. 
Suppose that you are looking through the diary and come across an interesting story. As you 
pick up the old book, you accidentally knock a bottle of liquid paper over on to the page. 
The text you were so excited about reading is now crisscrossed with white liquid. At a 
moment like this, you’ll probably have a sinking feeling in your stomach. It is a different 
                                                
37 As I interpret Korsgaard, practical identity has “inertia” but is nonetheless malleable. That 
said, cleaning up one’s practical identity is not a topic that Korsgaard specifically addresses. 
In a later section, I will suggest that our bad actions are not a permanent part of our identity 
but that a theory of repentance is necessary to explain how they may be excised. For now, it 
is sufficient to say that, even if the stain can be erased, it has sufficient special stickiness to 
make a person feel as if he has perpetrated an irrevocable harm. 
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feeling than the one you would experience if you spilled red wine on an expensive new coat. 
While the coat can be replaced, your great-grandmother’s diary cannot. It is also a different 
feeling than you would have if in your haste you had ripped the page. Whereas the paper can 
be mended, the white liquid cannot be removed. In sum, blotting out the text occasions a 
special kind of sorrow because the words are believed to be lost forever. 
 Second, consider an Olympic sprinter who stumbles off the starting block at the big 
race.  Although he is only thirty years old, he is an old man by the standards of his sport. He 
has been running all his life but this is his first and likely only trip to the Olympics. Growing 
up, he was always told what a talent he had for running, and from an early age, he himself 
realized what amazing potential he had as an athlete. His awareness of that potential helped 
fuel his ambition; he always hoped to win a medal at the Olympics in order to prove his 
greatness as a sprinter. When this person stumbles as the critical moment, the loss is an 
especially doleful one. He is grieved not only because he lost this particular race but because 
he feels he has lost himself. He always knew he was a great sprinter, maybe even the greatest 
sprinter, but the loss of his last chance at the Olympics means that his potential will never be 
proven or realized. Men of such ambition sadly and frequently lack the the wisdom and 
confidence not to see gold medals as the only things that could validate them as their sport’s 
best.  Such an ambitious man may thus feel that he has ruined or lost himself. 
 For the scrupulous person, the same feeling of loss makes even small ethical lapses 
take on outsized significance. This helps explain why she is so nervous about miniscule 
ethical violations. Though the black marks on her identity are small, they are there 
permanently. If an heirloom vase is chipped, the piece can be reattached with glue, but a 
crack will remain. The vase can never be fully restored. Similarly, a scrupulous person sees in 
petty unethical actions minute cracks in her self. Just like in the case of the vase, an abiding 
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loss has occurred, one that carries it with it the same unique flavor of melancholy observed 
in the cases of the diary and the sprinter. 
 Let’s consider Emily again. Suppose that she has convinced herself for the time being 
that what she did was immoral. Instantly, she resolves never to repeat her mistake. “But, can 
that really take away what I have done,” she frets. “Years from now, I will still be the person 
who cheated.” “Maybe I can make up for it by giving to charity . . . .”  Emily’s worry here is 
that her bad action has left a permanent mark on her. Its irreversibility depresses her. She may 
seek solace in forgetfulness; she might think, “I wish I could stop thinking about this, but 
then, I’d just be hiding the truth from myself, and besides, you can never really forget 
something if you’re trying to forget it.”  In the alternative, she thinks about what she could 
do to erase it (ponders supererogatory acts, confession, etc.). The sadness she feels is the 
sadness of a permanent loss. Like the sprinter who feels he has lost himself because he can 
never be the great sprinter he thought himself to be, Emily feels she has lost herself because 
of the ethical black mark on her self. 
* * * 
 I promised a discussion of expiation. One of the reasons the scrupulous worry about 
ethical staining is that the stain is regarded as permanent. In my discussion of the sense of 
loss accompanying moral staining, I provisionally credited these beliefs and described moral 
stains as permanent or irrevocable. Korsgaard does not address whether bad actions can be 
excised from the self. She does though tell us that “[c]onstructing, creating, shaping, 
reshaping, maintaining, improving, in all these ways constituting this kind of identity is the 
everyday work of practical deliberation” (129, emphasis added). The word “reshape” 
encompasses the possibility that practical identity, over time, can be reformed even if bad 
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actions cannot be wholly extirpated. Insofar as this is Korsgaard’s position, I agree—but 
with reservations. 
 My reservation is that Korsgaard’s position makes it too easy to reshape our practical 
identities when we have done wrong. Namely, expiation must involve something more than 
a resolution, made good upon, to be better in the future. Otherwise, one cannot make sense 
of the human urge to pursue more purposeful forms of atonement. I have in mind 
confession, supererogatory acts, self-denial of the fruits of a crime, and collateral forms of 
self-imposed austerity. A good theory of repentance should account for these phenomena. 
 The significance of these acts of expiation cannot be to expunge, that is to fully 
extirpate, the moral stains we bear. If we are constituted by our actions, then our past actions 
cannot be thus uprooted. It follows that the impact of atonement is limited to, as Korsgaard 
says, “reshaping” our practical identity so that the bad mud is still there, but more good clay 
can be added to make the best of the pot we are spinning. 
In Christianity, nothing short of miraculous divine grace is sufficient to wipe away 
the stains of our misdeeds. I find it plausible that expungement of moral stains is only 
conceivable in religious terms. If we confine ourselves to ethical categories, then the 
significance of acts of expiation can only be understood as deliberate efforts to do good (not 
merely refrain from wrong) in order to counterbalance the stain we have affixed to 
ourselves. I therefore have written and will continue to write of moral stains as “permanent” 
on the supposition that so long as we confine ourselves to thinking in strictly ethical terms 
we must look on moral stains as permanent. 
 I set out to answer the question: why is it that minor ethical infringements can 
occasion so much anxiety after the act? My answer is that scrupulousness is anxiety over 
moral staining. But what is moral staining? Korsgaard propounds that personal or practical 
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identity is constructed by our actions. Thus, immoral actions become a part of who one is. 
On Korsgaard’s theory, you literally construct yourself via your actions. Thus, the staining 
metaphor captures the effect of bad actions on the self. 
 If we keep Korsgaard’s theory of self-constitution in mind, it is understandable for a 
person to fret about the effect unethical actions have on who she is. In short, unethical 
actions cannot be written off as past mistakes but follow you into the future because they 
form a part of you. When someone like Emily worries that she has already done wrong, her 
desire to know whether or not this is true of her (that she has stained herself) drives her to 
conduct the exercises in applied ethics that we see driving her to distraction. As I said 
however, this does not completely explain scrupulousness because it does not account for 
the lack of proportionality between the size of the ethical errors and the harried nerves of 
the scrupulous individual. There are two reasons small ethical slips take on such outsized 
significance for the scrupulous person. The first is that they reveal the fragility of your 
personal identity so that you face painful questions about who you really are “deep down.” 
The second is that moral lapses, however small, still leave permanent black marks. This 
inspires a melancholy sense of loss akin to that felt when a vase is chipped. Just as you may 
be touched with sorrow at the thought that the vase can never be the same again, you may 
feel a like sorrow at the thought that an unethical action has permanently altered you. 
4. Two Theories of Guilt 
 Guilt understood as a moral stain is both distinct from and has advantages over 
another, more prevalent view of guilt—that of guilt as consisting in the rupturing of valued 
relationships with others.38 I compare the two to show that the staining view is unique and 
                                                
38 Herbert Morris propounds a prominent version of this approach in his essay “Guilt and 
Suffering” (Morris 1976, 96–97). 
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that it accurately captures the phenomenology of guilt as a reflexive, inward phenomenon. 
The version of the severance view I describe is that of Herbert Morris. 
On the severance view, the “concept of wrongdoing” is connected with the concept 
of “being joined together with another or others, the idea of union” (96). In this union, “one 
is complete, one is whole, in a way that one would not be without it” (96). Wrongdoing 
(when yoked with fault) embodies the severance of these connections.39 Given that one’s 
own integrity is dependent on these connections with others, their severance also entails a 
painful self-sundering. 
 The severance view emphasizes that ideas about wrongdoing exist side-by-side with 
notions of restoration (96–97). Thus, practices such as “receiving forgiveness, making 
sacrifices, reparation, and punishment” are significant as “rite[s] of passage back to union” 
(96). These are importantly rites of passage because they accomplish what mere forgetting does 
not: “For restoration there must be a bringing back by certain appropriate responses which 
carry significance for the parties” (97). This is because, “A wrong . . . is not understood as 
righted when matters are simply where they were before the wrong . . .” (97). 
 Like guilt as moral staining, guilt as estrangement distinguishes between guilt and 
guilt feeling (89, 98–99). I agree with separating the two. One can be guilty without feeling 
guilty, perhaps because one does not believe oneself to be guilty. More typically, one believes 
oneself to be guilty (because one is guilty) and consequently feels guilty. Of course, if you 
believe you are guilty, you might also feel guilty, regardless of whether or not you are in fact 
guilty. With other permutations, one can feel guilty without believing oneself to be guilty, 
both when one is, and when one is not, in fact, guilty. 
                                                
39 “When one is guilty of wrongdoing, one separates oneself from another or others with 
whom one was joined (96). 
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 These combinations aside, differentiating feeling guilty and being guilty is significant 
because it allows one to recognize what Martin Buber called guilt’s “ontic character” as 
something “whose place is not the soul but being” (Buber 1971, 58–60). Both the severance 
and the staining views recognize guilt’s ontic character. Where guilt as estrangement differs 
from guilt as moral staining is in the nature of that something “whose place is . . . being.” On 
the severance view, it consists in the real rupturing of relationships with others, relationships 
that themselves were crucial to the unity of the offending individual. In this chapter, it 
derives from the fact that actions are self-constitutive, such that immoral actions form a part 
of you and leave you persistently tarnished. 
 Guilt as moral staining contrasts favorably with the estrangement view in at least one 
meaningful respect. To wit, moral staining better represents the self-concerned, self-
occupied character of guilt. This quality of guilt is well-captured in the work of Gabriele 
Taylor on distinguishing guilt from remorse. Taylor, who also propounds a view of guilt as 
self-disfigurement, distinguishes guilt from remorse by focusing her attention on the guilty 
individual’s preoccupation with the removal of the burden of guilt he bears in 
contradistinction to the remorseful person’s concern with remedying or recompensing harm 
done to others. Viewed in this light, guilt as estrangement mistakenly emphasizes severing of 
relationships and the urge to repair them, matters more typical (if we believe Taylor) of 
remorse than guilt. 
 Taylor writes of remorse: “The thought in remorse . . . concentrates on the deed 
rather than on the agent as he who has done the deed” (Taylor 1985, 98). Remorse then is 
like regret for they both involve something ill which has come to pass, the occurrence of 
which is bemoaned or lamented. Remorse differs from regret though in that the former is 
“always felt about an event which the agent sees as an action of hers” (98). While much 
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regret is idle regret, remorse carries with it an expectation that the remorseful person will try 
to right the wrong they have done: Taylor explains, “The person feeling remorse is tied to 
her action as the person feeling regret is not. She must do something about it, or it will 
continue to worry her” (99). 
Although the person feeling remorse “is tied to her action,” her concentration is still 
on the harm she has done, not on herself. Taylor writes, “Remorse is not an emotion of self-
assessment, the concentration of thought here is not on the self, on its disfigurement or 
lowly standing, but is on her actions and their consequences” (99–100). The implication is 
that guilt, by contrast, is an emotion of self-assessment: 
[E]ven where the person feeling guilt believes that she has harmed another and 
believes that she should now repair this damage, her thoughts are not primarily on 
this aspect of the situation, they are primarily on herself. In this sense, too, the 
thought of damage caused and so to be repaired is inessential. In feeling remorse, on 
the other hand, it is precisely these thoughts which are the agent’s identificatory 
beliefs, i.e., when feeling remorse the agent believes that she has done harm which 
she ought to try and repair. 
 
(104).  
Taylor’s differentiation of guilt and remorse is incongruent with the severance theory, 
since according to Taylor, an emphasis on outward harm (e.g., broken relationships) is 
characteristic of, not guilt, but remorse. Compare the prior indented quote from Taylor with 
Morris’ conclusion about guilt:  
The central, though not the only, case of being guilty of wrongdoing is one in which 
one is both at fault and responsible for wrongdoing and thus is separated from 
others, obligated to them, and deserving of some hostile response from them. I say 
this case is central, for I believe that the concept is employed here with its full 
panoply of associated concepts, concepts such as being guilty before another or 
others, asking for and gaining forgiveness, and mending what has been broken. 
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(Morris 1976, 98, emphasis supplied). As I believe Taylor has shown, emphasis on broken 
relationships is misplaced in a theory of guilt. The urge to repair the harm done is typical of 
remorse, not guilt. 
 The reflexive turn in guilt is also visible in the phenomenon of guilt over harmless 
and unnoticed misdeeds. Situations in which one acts immorally, but the wrong is both 
undetected and innocuous, lend themselves better to the moral staining view of guilt than to 
the rupturing of relationships theory. The action of our scrupulous student Emily is one 
example of this genus of misdeeds. Suppose for a moment that what Emily did was in fact 
cheating and was in fact immoral. Still, she only cheated on one question of a high school 
geography exam, hardly a great injury or breach of faith with her teachers and classmates. 
The consequences of her action, the difference between earning an “A-” or an ill-gotten “A” 
on the exam, hardly seem worthy of remorse. And yet, if Emily truly did cheat, then she 
nonetheless has done something immoral and is guilty. 
 Other examples may be produced. If envy is in fact immoral, then a person who 
resents his friend’s promotion has done something unethical, albeit only internally. We could 
also add unnoticed white lies or failed, unseen attempts to injure one’s fellows. In another 
example, an ethical vegetarian is tempted to eat some leftover hamburger sitting in the family 
refrigerator. If he eats the surplus vittles, no harm will be done to an animal and no 
encouragement given to animal slaughter. Nonetheless, the ethical vegetarian may feel guilty 
(and arguably is guilty) after eating the leftover flesh. For all these cases, there is no apparent 
object of remorse, but there is nonetheless guilt.  
The protagonist of Robert Coover’s novel The Universal Baseball Association is a 
particularly colorful example. The character is an accountant who in his spare time plays a 
game of his own invention, the eponymous Universal Baseball Association. It is a private 
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form of fantasy baseball, in which players pitch and hit and teams win or lose according to 
elaborate rules befitting the man’s mathematical profession. When the rules of the game 
dictate that his favorite player “die,” the protagonist is thrown into a crisis. “Cheating” and 
letting the player live brings on feelings of guilt. Though we may question whether feelings 
of guilt are appropriate for the protagonist (i.e., whether anything immoral has actually been 
done), the example nonetheless highlights the inward looking, reflexive character of guilt. 
 Admittedly, the severance view possesses a means to account for these examples of 
guilt that is not other regarding. In his essay, Morris expressly recognizes that thoughts, 
which do not injure others, may nonetheless make one guilty. He says of such thoughts: 
While conduct that is injurious to others is central to the concept of wrongdoing, it is 
important to note that certain relationships can be damaged by an individual’s having 
a certain state of mind alone, a state incompatible with the relationship as it may be 
defined and valued. An intention to do an act that would betray a friend, for 
example, is itself a state that damages the relationship between friends. 
 
(97). Thus armed, the severance view can attempt to account for the cases canvassed above 
in which guilt is present but harm is not. By telling a white lie, one fails to treat one’s spouse 
with respect (one condescends by hiding the truth), and without respect, the relationship is 
compromised. Likewise, when one feels envy towards one’s friend or secretly plots to harm 
her, the friendship is poisoned: the bond is broken even though only one side is aware of it.  
In responding to cases of unseen, unfelt wrongs however, the theory of guilt as the 
severance of relationships must strain and become unintuitive. For example, supposing for a 
moment that Emily is actually guilty, one would need a story either about trust or about a 
communal practice—e.g., academic achievement or competition—that loses its significance 
for Emily once she cheats. By failing the trust or subverting the practice, Emily would be 
cut-off from the corresponding community. Although this is a plausible account of how 
someone like Emily might experience guilt if she was invested in the relevant communal 
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values, it fails to account for cases in which Emily cares little for grades and academics but 
nonetheless believes that cheating is wrong, perhaps because it is a species of dishonesty. In 
these latter cases, it is hard to imagine the severance view agreeing with the phenomenology 
of Emily’s guilty mind.  
 Perhaps the reason that the severance theory has difficulty accounting for harmless 
guilty deeds is that it takes “conduct that is injurious to others [to be] central to the concept 
of wrongdoing” (97). In the alternative, we might say as Taylor does, that it is sufficient to be 
guilty to have violated a law or command (Taylor 1985, 85). The violation of a law is distinct 
from whatever harm that violation may or may not have caused (86). “[T]he person who 
feels guilty thinks in terms of duties not performed and obligations not fulfilled” (87). She 
need not think in terms of harm caused. Contra the severance view, harm to others is not 
central to guilt. Rather, the notion of a violation of an obligation is essential and salient. 
 Unlike a theory of guilt as the severance of relationships, guilt as moral staining need 
not strain itself to account for guilt arising from mere breach of moral obligation. On the 
contrary, a hidden, innocuous violation of moral law is an action of the individual that stains 
the self, regardless of the consequences for others or for one’s unity with the community. 
The wrong done may have passed completely unseen or even have produced good results in 
the world, but for the individual facing herself in her own thoughts, there remains the fact of 
having chosen an immoral action that remains a part of her. 
* * * 
 The goal of this section has been to recommend moral staining as a theory of guilt. I 
have chiefly championed it for matching the phenomenology of guilt. In this regard, I 
believe it compares favorably with Morris’ severance theory as it accurately treats guilt as an 
inward, self-directed phenomenon rather than an external harm-focused one. It also has 
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much to recommend it as a “secular theory of sin,” reflecting the experience of guilt as a 
perduring res that lies behind the widespread religious concepts of sin and karma.  
Alongside the phenomenological discussion, I have more timidly adopted a 
metaphysical view. As I stated, I agree with Morris that guilt corresponds to something real 
in the world. This position was implicit from the beginning of the chapter. I initially 
specified that a moral stain is not a mere relational property (the fact that at time x you 
performed action y) and excluded a character ethics interpretation. Instead, I characterized a 
moral stain as a real change in a person’s properties, and by adopting Korsgaard’s view that 
the self is continually constituted by one’s choices, sought to explain what such a property 
could be. 
Yet, I believe that a better account can be given of moral stains that does not lean on 
the metaphor to explain what is bad about being “stained” by a past immoral action. The 
trouble with Korsgaard’s view of personal identity and freedom is that it lacks a 
complimentary metaphysics (apart from her references to Aristotle’s tripartite view of 
humans as compounded of rational, animal, and vegetative natures). She asserts that we are 
free and that our personal identities are not fixed but she says little about how this is the 
case. At the same time, there are unacknowledged echoes of the existentialists in these 
claims. In the Sickness Unto Death, Søren Kierkegaard argued that a human being does not 
have a given nature ready at hand but has the task of becoming herself in freedom. A person 
despairs when this seems like a lost cause. In the next chapter, I will escape the staining 
metaphor by linking guilt to this existential despair. 
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Chapter Five, Guilt and Existential Despair 
 In the previous chapter, I contended for the moral staining model of guilt and 
argued that it could explain the priority and importance of moral obligation and 
transgression. Moral staining though is a metaphor and so to explain what a moral stain is, I 
incorporated Christine Korsgaard’s claims that our personal identities are composed of our 
actions. In this chapter, I will explore Søren Kierkegaard’s theory of despair in The Sickness 
Unto Death as an alternative account of moral staining. The advantage of Kierkegaard’s view 
is twofold: (1) it can explain the priority of the moral in terms of the ethical person’s project 
of living a life defined by the objectivity and consistency of morality; and (2) it can explain 
the importance of moral transgression in terms of the failure of this project and consequent 
despair over oneself. 
 The reason not to rest on the metaphor of moral staining is to see if there is more 
than psychological truth to the metaphor. If our project is only psychological, then the fact 
that we conceptualize guilt as a moral stain stands as a discovery about the emotions. That 
we think of guilt as a stain, for example, helps us explain the moral anxiety of the scrupulous 
person. If we want to proceed from a psychological truth to a truth about ethics, however, 
we must see whether the metaphor reflects reality, i.e., whether the self is changed by 
transgression in a way that deserves to be called a staining. 
Korsgaard’s Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity is an attempt to show that 
each human being constructs her personal identity through her actions (Korsgaard, 7). She 
tells us, “I am going to argue that in the relevant sense there is no you prior to your choices 
and actions, because your identity is in a quite literal way constituted by your choices and 
actions.” (19). If this is so, then the metaphor of moral staining is apt because those 
wrongful actions of yours are a persistent part of you just like an ink stain on a pair of slacks. 
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 Korsgaard also thinks that human beings choose the principles of their actions. They 
are free inasmuch as they can act for reasons of their own devising not given by antecedent 
desires. With her belief in freedom and a personal identity that we craft for ourselves, 
Korsgaard’s position is reminiscent of the existentialists, and yet, she does not use the word 
“existentialism” or write the names of the movement’s famous figures at any point in her 
book. This is so despite the fact that she begins her book with a dramatic sentence—
“Human beings are condemned to choice and action” (1)—reminiscent of Sartre’s claim that 
man is “condemned to be free” (Sartre 2007, 29). 
 By looking back on Chapter Four, we can see that Korsgaard’s view satisfied two 
requisites for an account of moral staining, i.e., an account of what transgression does to a 
person that makes the staining metaphor apt: 
1. A person must be a work in progress such that her actions are at least partly 
constitutive of her. 
2. Actions must stick. They must not be capable of easy dismissal as belonging to the 
past but must be part of the person in the present. 
In addition, we want the account of moral staining to explain the priority and importance of 
moral duty, and so: 
3. We must have reason to care about the fact that we are stained. Past moral 
transgressions must fit Ewing’s hypothesis that they are different from merely 
irrational actions in rendering the agent “evil in a more serious and quite different 
way from that in which pain is evil.” 
To go from Korsgaard to Kierkegaard, we will draw out his claims about the self and despair 
that satisfy each of these criteria. 
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1. “Every moment that a self exists, it is in a process of becoming” 
 The body of The Sickness Unto Death begins, “The self is a relation that relates itself to 
itself or is the relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is 
the relation’s relating itself to itself” (The Sickness Unto Death, 1). The relation in question 
is a synthesis between the “psychial and the physical.” This is the traditional view of a person 
as a rational animal with both mind and body. Yet, Kierkegaard stresses that the self is 
intentional, reflective, and self-aware, hence, the “relation’s relating itself to itself.”  
 It is because a person is a reflecting relation that a person is always in a process of 
becoming.40 Each moment that a person exists she is engaged in this synthesis. This is 
because the self is not simply there, premixed and ready at hand: “the self κατά δύναµιν [in 
potentiality] does not actually exist, is simply that which ought to come into existence” (30). 
In other words, a person does not exist with her essence always in her back pocket—not 
even as something present but latent as potential energy resides in a coiled spring. Instead, 
the self has the “task” “to become itself . . . to become concrete” (30).  
 This will be sharper if we consider what Kierkegaard says about the two relata of the 
synthesis. He describes the psychical-physical synthesis as equally a synthesis of the infinite 
and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, and of possibility and necessity (1, 35). The 
reason that the synthesis is a continual task is that these are contradictory so that one cannot 
be fully one and the other (30). 
 Kierkegaard first elaborates on the opposition between infinitude and finitude. 
Infinitude corresponds to mind and encompasses thought, feeling, and imagination. There 
are no boundaries on thinking (witness the excesses of metaphysics) or fantasizing, and this 
                                                
40 The “self is a “conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude that relates itself to itself, 
whose task is to become itself . . .” (The Sickness Unto Death, 29). 
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is why Kierkegaard’s favorite metaphors for infinitude are volatility and flight. The abstract, 
sentimental, or imaginative person is always at risk of vaporizing or floating away. The 
scientist contemplating nature or the philosopher thinking of possible worlds is at risk of 
floating away if this knowledge has no relationship to self-knowledge and she forgets that 
she is a particular person in a particular situation (31). Likewise, the aesthete or the mystic 
becomes “more and more volatized and finally comes to be a kind of abstract 
sentimentality” (31). In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard describes these people as “strangers 
in the world”: 
The knights of infinity are ballet dancers and have elevation. They make the upward 
movement and come down again, and this, too, is not an unhappy diversion and is 
not unlovely to see. But every time they come down they are unable to assume the 
posture immediately, they waver for a moment, and the wavering shows that they are 
aliens in the world. 
(Fear and Trembling, 41). 
 Finitude corresponds to the body, to a person’s circumstances, and her history. 
The person of finitude identifies himself with his talents, his social position, and his 
nation. If the risk in infinitude is to float away, then the risk in finitude is to be mired in 
the ground: “Surrounded by hordes of men, absorbed in all sorts of secular matters, 
more and more shrewd about the ways of the world—such a person forgets himself . . .” 
(The Sickness Unto Death, 33). 
 Because infinitude and finitude are rising and falling, “the progress of the becoming 
must be an infinite moving away from itself in the infinitizing of the self, and an infinite 
coming back to itself in the finitizing process” (30). A person for Kierkegaard is like the 
expansion and contraction of the lungs: there is no static equilibrium but rather a continual 
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back and forth.41 The danger is bogging down or floating away because existing is a 
continual jumping off that needs a ground for the leverage to leap and a location to land. “In 
the life of the spirit, there is no standing still . . .” (94). Put in plain terms, we are always 
going back and forth between thinking, planning, and imagining—actions that take us away 
from our situations and their limitations—and living moment to moment with a particular 
history, body, and social position.  
  The finite in a person includes her history and what she has done.42 We can see this 
if we look at another way Kierkegaard characterizes the relation as possibility–necessity. 
When a person suffers a great blow or makes a great error, he can be overwhelmed by 
necessity. Kierkegaard speaks of a person with a gift for imagining the most terrifying 
nightmares. One day, “this very horror happens to him” and he despairs (38). There can be 
no hope when the worst has come to pass, and so this person of prodigious imagination 
comes to despair in the present failure of his imagination to see any hope in the situation. 
 Kierkegaard also describes what may become of an ambitious person whose efforts 
fail. This person’s motto is “Either Caesar or nothing” (19). When he does not become 
                                                
41 “Personhood is a synthesis of possibility and necessity. Its continued existence is like 
breathing (respiration), which is an inhaling and exhaling” (The Sickness Unto Death, 40). 
42 This view of Kierkegaard is reflected in Roger Gottlieb’s analysis of the treatment of ethics 
in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre (Gottlieb 1979, 355). Gottlieb quotes the following passage from 
Either/Or: “[the individual] has a history, and this not merely a product of his own free 
actions. The inner work, on the contrary, belongs to him and must belong to him unto all 
eternity” (355). He interprets the reference to “inner work” as a description of ethical 
decision making, relying on the following passage from the same text: “in the ethical realm, 
there is never any question about the external but only about the internal . . . however much 
the external may change, the moral content of action may nevertheless remain the same” 
(355).  
Kierkegaard appears to agree with Kant that the moral worth of an action is an inward 
matter: “[T]he ethical actuality is not the individual’s historical externality.  That my intention 
was this and that, I can in all eternity know absolutely, because this is an expression of the 
eternal within me, is myself, but the historical externality in the next moment can be reached 
only approximando” (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 575). 
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Caesar, this man despairs, and while we might think that what he is despairing over is this 
state of affairs, what he is actually despairing over is himself: “precisely because he did not 
get to be Caesar, he now cannot bear to be himself” (19). Thus we see that a person’s history 
is part of his necessity and finitude, and when he cannot rid himself of it, he may despair 
over it. 
2. “Eternity . . . will nail him to himself” 
 To do justice to the staining metaphor, immoral actions must not only be part of the 
self, they must be durably so. Neither a successful resolution not to repeat the transgression 
nor forgetting should be sufficient to leave the wrong behind in the past. Neither means of 
sloughing off the past can succeed on Kierkegaard’s view. 
 What the person in despair wants most to do but cannot is precisely to rid himself of 
his self. The reason he cannot do this is that he is capable of reflection and so of taking the 
eternal point of view on his existence. From the viewpoint of eternity, all times are equally 
present. Kierkegaard writes, “It is always the present tense; in relation to the actuality there is 
no pastness of the past . . .” (17). So long as a person does not lose herself in immediacy, so 
long as she recognizes that she has a self that persists across time, then she can also see that 
from the perspective of the eternal, she and her past are not something that ceases to be. 
Such a person cannot then credit the “worldly wisdom” that says “‘Wait and see,” “Don’t 
worry,” Forget it” (56). 
 Consider the doctor, Judah Rosenthal, played by Martin Landau in Woody Allen’s 
Crimes and Misdemeanors. Judah successfully solicits the murder of his mistress in order to 
prevent her from informing his wife of their affair. He escapes suspicion, and we find him 
some years later speaking to Woody Allen’s character at a wedding. Describing himself under 
the guise of a hypothetical, Judah narrates how a man who committed murder could go on 
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living a normal life: “Well, people carry sins around with them. Maybe once in a while he has 
a bad moment, but it passes. And, with time, it all fades.” 
 Judah’s veiled account of himself would seem to give the lie to Kierkegaard’s 
observations about despair. But Kierkegaard, insisting on the “obstinacy of truth” (42), 
denies that there is refuge in the passage of time and in the weakness of memory. Most 
people are indeed not conscious of being in despair because they live lives of immediacy. 
They are, however, always at risk of being overcome by despair should they suffer a worldly 
reversal or should the prospect of death confront them. Kierkegaard powerfully expresses 
this in a memorable passage: 
When the hourglass has run out, the hourglass of temporality, when the noise of 
secular life has grown silent and its restless or ineffectual activism has come to an 
end, when everything around you is still, as it is in eternity, then . . . eternity asks you 
and every individual in these millions and millions about only one thing: whether you 
have lived in despair or not, whether you have despaired in such a way that you did 
not realize that you were in despair, or in such a way that you covertly carried this 
sickness inside of you as your gnawing secret . . . . And if so, if you have lived in 
despair, then, regardless of whatever else you won or lost, everything is lost for you, 
eternity does not acknowledge you, it never knew you—or, still more terrible, it 
knows you as you are known and it binds you to yourself in despair.” 
(27–28). 
 Kierkegaard knows that people like Judah will try to live by forgetting: “The adult 
despairs over the past as a present in præterito that refuses to recede further into the past, for 
his despair is not such that he has succeeded in forgetting it completely” (59). But what of 
the person who does succeed in forgetting or forgets in consequence of the brain’s fragility?  
The person who “succeeds in healing it by forgetting it” simply becomes “his own 
receiver of stolen goods” (60). That is to say that the person who fully forgets has a false 
innocence. This is the innocence of the child who takes himself not to have done wrong if 
what he did was not perceived by his father. Like a game of reverse peekaboo, the wrong 
does not exist if it is not kept in mind. But of course, the wrong is still there as much as the 
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wrongdoer’s self is still there: “Eternity is obliged to do this [nail himself to himself], because 
to have a self, to be a self, is the greatest concession, an infinite concession, given to man, 
but it is also eternity’s claim upon him” (21). 
 But what trace of despair is there in the quotidian of the guilty amnesiac? Even 
Judah, who still remembers what he did, describes a day when “one morning, he awakens 
and the sun is shining and his family is around him and mysteriously the crisis has lifted.”  
The amnesiac, though, is alienated from himself and lacks continuity. After all, what event in 
his life is more significant than the time he murdered another person, and yet he has no 
memory of it. It is as if Aristotle should forget having been the student of Plato and the 
tutor of Alexander. The significance of this loss stems from the fact that a person becomes 
who they are through each moment of their life: 
The existing person becomes concrete in what has been experienced, and as he 
proceeds he has it with him and can lose it at any moment.  He has it with him, not 
the way one has something in a pocket, but through this, this specific thing, he is 
what he is more specifically defined and loses his own more specific definition by 
losing it.  Through the definition in existence, an existing person, more specifically 
defined, has become what he is.  If he sets it aside, it is not he who has lost 
something, so that he does not have himself and has lost something, but then he has 
lost himself and must start from the beginning.” 
(Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 489). 
This form of despair is actually the most common one even if it is not usually linked 
to amnesia: “But how rare is the person who has continuity with regard to his consciousness 
of himself!” (The Sickness Unto Death, 104). A man like Judah but who, perhaps from a 
blow to the head, did completely forget that he had once murdered his lover, would achieve 
nothing more than a return to the thoughtlessness characteristic of the life of immediacy: 
“They play along in life, so to speak, but they never experience putting everything together 
on one thing, never achieve the idea of an infinite self-consistency” (107). The prize for the 
exceptional stroke of luck in not only getting away with murder but forgetting that one has 
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murdered is nothing equally exceptional but something common. The formula for despair 
here is the same as that for the man of immediacy: “in despair not to will to be oneself” (52). 
One may doggedly insist that the amnesiac cannot be troubled by missing a part of 
himself of which he is completely ignorant. Yet blithe ignorance is the condition of the 
person of immediacy. In his thoughtlessness, the immediate person is not even conscious of 
having a self and has only the faintest awareness of being in despair (42). To suffer from 
amnesia and forget that one is a murderer then is just the focused form of the low-grade 
ignorance of self that afflicts most people. It is not even true that the former is necessarily 
the greater loss. After all, what is forgetting a great formative decision in your life to 
forgetting that you have a self with a long tail of a life? Kierkegaard admits that the person 
who is ignorant of having a self may appear “to others to radiate health,” but “it makes no 
difference . . . he is in despair just the same” (44–45). 
3.  “The self has the task of becoming itself in freedom” 
 In the preceding two sections, I unpacked the staining metaphor in Kierkegaard’s 
idiom. We saw that a person’s life is a process of becoming what she is and her history is 
part of what she is becoming. With this account of past actions and personhood in mind, I 
intend to explain why immoral actions being part of your history matters. In the last chapter, 
I took it for granted that being stained by a past transgression was bad and vexing for a 
person, but in this section, I will explain why this is so. At the end, I hope that we will 
understand what Ewing could have meant when he said that transgression renders you evil 
in a way different from that in which pain is evil. 
 Kierkegaard tells us that sin is “aggravated despair” (77). The metaphor is judicial—
assault is aggravated by the use of a weapon—but what aggravates despair is that sin is 
before God. Guilt, then, is still despair but not aggravated despair: “[W]hat really makes 
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human guilt into sin is that the guilty one has the consciousness of existing before God” 
(80). If we know then that to be guilty is to be in despair and already knew that a moral stain 
is guilt, then it follows that to be stained is a way of being in despair.43 
 To understand what it means for being stained to be a form of despair, we will look 
to how the ethical person copes with being a person—that is to say, how she carries out her 
task of becoming herself in freedom (35). Recall that the self “does not actually exist, is 
simply that which ought to come into existence” (30), and that as such the self is charged 
with becoming concrete. When a person by contrast lives by the motto, “Live for your 
desire,” she ignores this charge to become concrete and instead pours herself into the 
various external sights, sounds, and objects she comes across. Such a person is a scattered 
person: “[D]esire is a multiplicity, and thus it is easy to see that this life splits up into a 
boundless multiplicity . . .” (Either/Or, 183).   The missing thread that would weave such a 
person’s life together is serious choice, consciously committing oneself to live one life rather 
than another (177). The importance of this choice lies not so much in what is chosen; rather, 
Kierkegaard has the ethical Judge Wilhelm place the accent on the choosing, understood as a 
choice to be one way or another: “[T]he point is still not that of choosing something; the 
point is not the reality of that which is chosen but the reality of choosing. . . . The 
consciousness integrates and he is himself” (176–77).  By choosing herself through her 
                                                
43 Not all despair is guilt. As Kierkegaard’s indicates, the person of immediacy may despair 
over himself because he did not get to be Caesar, did not get accepted to Harvard, lost his 
fortune on a short sell, broke two bones in his pitching hand, etc.  None of these necessarily 
involve immorality. Indeed, despair is sometimes linked with shame—a person feels as if he 
is an ugly or bad thing, without agency and the ability to change. But this is less-developed 
than ethical despair, because as usual, the aesthetic person does not know what is truly 
valuable or to be feared. That the person feeling shame regards himself as an object is typical 
of the aesthetic stage when a person is not aware of having a self but identifies himself with 
his appearance, his talents, his place in the world, etc. 
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action, a person makes herself responsible for her choice. And by positing herself as 
responsible, she posits the ethical (177). 
 “The ethical is the universal and thus the abstract” (255).44 Therefore, the “person 
who views life ethically sees the universal, and the person who lives ethically expresses the 
universal in his life” (256). Through adhering to the universally human demands of morality, 
the ethical person seeks to bind the disparate threads of his life together under the moral 
law: 45 “His self in its immediacy is defined by accidental characteristics; the task is to work 
the accidental and the universal together into a whole” (256). The result, Wilhelm assuredly 
holds, is that the “individual rests with confident security in the assurance that his life is 
ethically structured” (257). Note the emphasis on “rest”—the ethical person believes that he 
has found the rock on which he will build his life: “He has put on duty; for him it is the 
expression of his innermost being” (254). When one has a task to perform—as Kierkegaard 
says we all have the task of becoming ourselves in freedom—how heartening it is to have 
something to rest on as Wilhelm says the ethical person rests in the ethical! 
 Rest reappears in The Sickness Unto Death in Kierkegaard’s description of the religious 
form of life. He writes, “The formula that describes the state of the self when despair is 
                                                
44 It follows that the idea of a diabolic consistency, a consistency in immorality, is an illusion 
because there are no universal principles to unify a diabolic will from moment to moment. 
The aesthetic person was captive to the multiplicity of desire—one moment it was absorbed 
in one thing and the next moment another. The transition to the ethical required another 
basis for choice than the transient objects of immediacy. A principle was needed that could 
unify the will across time. Such a principle would have to be universal, that is to say 
applicable to all situations at all times. Reason, with its abstracting power, is the only source 
of universal principles, and reason’s principles are those of morality. Thus Kierkegaard says 
that the consistency of the diabolic person is similar to an alcoholic who keeps himself drunk 
out of fear of stopping drinking. The person who would will an immoral consistency has no 
universal principles to follow but can at best continuously throw himself at one object or 
one sensation (The Sickness Unto Death, 108). That this is a false consistency follows from 
the fact that these objects are existing, and therefore shifting, things. 
45 “The ethical is the universal and thus the abstract. That is why in its perfect abstraction the 
ethical is always interdictory. Thus the ethical takes the form of law” (Either/Or, 255). 
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completely rooted out is this: in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests 
transparently in the power that established it” (The Sickness Unto Death, 14). This power, of 
course, is God. Consider the formula for faith: “Faith is: that the self in being itself and in 
willing to be itself rests transparently in God” (82).46 
 Recall now that the self is in a process of becoming and has itself ahead of itself as 
something that it ought to become rather than something already given behind it. Likewise, 
to exist as a human being is to be a self that relates itself to itself in the relation. This effort 
continues in faith—“in being itself and in willing to be itself”—but the self is held up by 
God in doing so. The person of faith is like a toddler swimming who is held up by his 
mother’s hand on his belly. 
 Resting in God appears to be a matter of existing before God or of having God as 
“the criterion” of one’s existence. Kierkegaard explains, “[T]his self takes on a new quality 
and qualification by being a self directly before God. This self is no longer the merely human 
self but is . . . the self directly before God” (79). From being that which “does not actually 
exist” (30), the self gains “infinite reality . . . by being conscious of existing before God, by 
becoming a human self whose criterion is God” (79). The idea here is similar to that 
expressed in the Gospel lyric “His eye is on the sparrow” and the parables of the lost sheep 
                                                
46 This is not to say that the religious person, Kierkegaard’s knight of faith, cannot feel guilty. 
He or she has faith in Christ’s atonement but at the same time, he knows that he has done 
wrong and can feel guilty over what he has done. Faith, for Kierkegaard, is always an in-
spite-of, so the person who did not acknowledge and feel his guilt would not be religious. 
Despair and guilt are nevertheless overcome in the movement of faith that proceeds through 
consciousness of guilt and despair. This is why Kierkegaard calls despair “the thoroughfare 
to faith” (The Sickness Unto Death, 67). Kierkegaard takes himself to be repeating Lutheran 
orthodoxy when he says, “Only the consciousness of sin is absolute respect. And just 
because Christianity insists on having absolute respect, from any other perspective 
Christianity must and will appear as madness or horror simply in order that the qualitative 
infinite emphasis can fall upon the fact that the consciousness of sin is the only admittance . 
. . .” (Practice in Christianity, 67–68). 
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and the lost coin.47  An individual with faith, who lives his life with his relation to God in 
mind, has the staggering thought that he too, amid the billions and billions of people who 
live, have lived, and will have lived, matters to God. And because he matters to God (the 
absolute), he has “infinite reality.” Kierkegaard writes: 
A self directly before Christ is a self intensified by the inordinate concession from 
God, intensified by the inordinate accent that falls upon it because God allowed 
himself to be born, become man, suffer, and die also for the sake of this self . . . 
Qualitatively a self is what its criterion is. That Christ is the criterion is the 
expression, attested by God, for the staggering reality that a self has, for only in 
Christ is it true that God is man’s goal and criterion, or the criterion and goal. 
(The Sickness Unto Death, 114–15). This passage reveals a nuance in Kierkegaard’s use of 
the word criterion. A criterion is a measure by which something is graded, but just as a 
balance is used to grade something (65 grams), a balance can be used to recognize or detect 
something. Copying Kierkegaard’s diction, to say that a self has a balance as its criterion is to 
say that a self “before a balance” is a self with a mass. To exist before God, to have God as 
one’s criterion, is to be a self with the panoply of qualities that God recognizes. But unlike a 
balance or even the prototype kilogram in Paris, God is not a relative thing but is the 
absolute, and so Kierkegaard says that to exist before God, to have God as one’s criterion, 
confers “infinite reality” on a person. By way of illustrative contrast, the color red has 
                                                
47 “What man of you, having an hundred sheep, if he lose one of them, doth not leave the 
ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until he find it? / And 
when he hath found it, he layeth it on his shoulders, rejoicing. / And when he cometh home, 
he calleth together his friends and neighbours, saying unto them, Rejoice with me; for I have 
found my sheep which was lost. / I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven over 
one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, which need no 
repentance. / Either what woman having ten pieces of silver, if she lose one piece, doth not 
light a candle, and sweep the house, and seek diligently till she find it? / And when she hath 
found it, she calleth her friends and her neighbours together, saying, Rejoice with me; for I 
have found the piece which I had lost. / Likewise, I say unto you, there is joy in the presence 
of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth” (Luke 15:4–10, KJV). 
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relative, limited reality for one who believes that redness is only a power to cause certain 
sensations in human beings.  
 The rest of the ethical person that Wilhelm describes, by contrast, is repose in a 
human criterion—the moral law is her measure and that by which she is recognizable, 
identifiable. In the intermediate stages between the aesthetic and the religious, there is an 
increasing awareness of having a self (79). Within these gradations, however, Kierkegaard 
tells us that the “consciousness of the self is within the category of the human self, or the 
self whose criterion is man” (79). But this is to be expected given what Wilhelm says about 
the ethical life—duty is an internal relation (Either/Or, 254) through which the individual 
works to become himself by being the universal human being (256). Or, as Wilhelm puts it, 
“[W]hen the ethical individual has completed his task, has fought the good fight, he has 
come to the point where he has become the unique human being—that is, there is no other 
human being like him—and he has also become the universal human being” (256). That the 
ethical is the universally human is significant to the security from a changeable world that 
Judge Wilhelm perceives in the ethical. One does not need to be blessed with talents and 
opportunities to be moral. As Kant said, neither the “peculiar disfavor of fate” nor “the 
meager endowment of step-motherly nature” can make the fulfillment of duty impossible 
(Kant 2002, 10). 
 From the foregoing, we can understand the ethical life as a solution to the problem 
(task) of being a self. Judge Wilhelm recommends the ethical life as a way to find rest and 
coherence in the universal requirements of duty. By becoming the universal man and 
adhering to duty, the ethical person secures for himself his own identity as a particular 
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human being.48 We will now see how moral transgression subverts this project, depriving the 
individual of his or her ethical resting place, and throws him or her into despair. This we can 
identify with the evil of a different type than pain. 
 Kierkegaard describes what happens to a person who has decided to live her life as 
the ethical human being but falters in this task. When a person has committed herself to an 
idea, as the ethical person is committed to duty and the universally human, transgression is 
an inconsistency that breaks the “ethical structure” that Wilhelm said gave the ethical person 
his “confident security”: 
Every existence that is within the qualification spirit, even if only on its own 
responsibility and at its own risk, has an essential interior consistency and a 
consistency in something higher, at least in an idea. Such a person has great fear of 
any inconsistency, because he has an immense apprehension of what the result can 
be, that he could be torn out of the totality in which he has his life. The slightest 
inconsistency is an enormous loss, for, after all, he loses consistency. In that very 
moment, the spell is perhaps broken, the mysterious power that bound all his 
capacities in harmony is diminished, the coiled spring is slackened; everything 
perhaps becomes a chaos in which the capacities in mutiny battle one another and 
plunge the self into suffering, a chaos in which there is no agreement within itself, no 
momentum, no impetus. The enormous machine that in consistency was so tractable 
in its steely strength, so supple in all its power, is out of order; and the better, the 
more imposing the machine was, the more dreadful the tangled confusion.—The 
believer, one who rests in and has his life in the consistency of the good, has an 
infinite fear of even the slightest sin, for he faces an infinite loss. 
(The Sickness Unto Death, 107). 
Thus, the formula for despair in the failed ethical person is not to will to be oneself. 
Kierkegaard compares the ethical person who falls into despair to a father who 
disinherits a son: “The self does not want to acknowledge itself after having been so 
weak” (62). This self-dread, he notes, is paralyzing—the agent henceforth has “no 
momentum, no impetus.” Joseph Conrad illustrates this in Lord Jim. Jim is one of a small 
                                                
48 Compare Socrates’ remark to Phaedrus, “I want to know not about this, but about myself: 
am I a monster more complicated and swollen with passion than the serpent Typho, or a 
creature of a gentler and simpler sort, to whom Nature has given a diviner and lowlier 
destiny?” (Phaedrus, 230a). 
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number of crewman onboard a European steamship carrying pilgrims from the East to 
Mecca. During the night, there is a collision and the ship begins to take on water. Jim 
thinks it will sink but aims to save the passengers. Nonetheless, when he sees the other 
crewmembers taking to a life boat without aiding the passengers, he impulsively jumps in 
with them. Though the passengers are ultimately saved by another passing ship, Jim feels 
guilty about abandoning them. His life, prior to its redemptive second act, is passed in a 
desultory series of jobs in the ports of the East Indies. Cut off from the devotion to duty 
that had hitherto described him, he does not greatly purpose to be anything at all. 
The irony is that the threat to the ethical comes from existence in time, a corner 
from which it thought it took strength. On the one hand, the ethical person purportedly 
“turns time to account” and sees in it the prospect of acquiring a history (Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, 254). On the one hand, every moment lived is an occasion for 
transgression. 
Judge Wilhelm’s defense of marriage offers an example of how the ethical person 
means to turn time to account. Responding to the charge that marriage is the enemy of 
love because it is habit and repetition that kills passion, the judge answers that marital 
love grows through repetition. Because the married lovers have a past and an indefinite 
commitment for the future, marriage has in it “a law of motion” (Either/Or, 94).49 After 
the excitement of falling in love, love needs other food to sustain itself but finds that in 
recollection and in hope (142). Hope “hovers over it as a hope of eternity that fills out 
the moment,” and recollection “places a sharp on the note of the moment . . . if in the 
present year he experiences an erotic moment, this is augmented by his recollection of it 
                                                
49 Wilhelm’s law of motion in marriage is an ominous reminder of what the ethical person 
loses in transgression—“the mysterious power that bound all his capacities in harmony is 
diminished.”   
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in the previous year etc” (142–43). The married man’s “possession has not been inert 
property, but he has been continually acquiring its possession” (138).  
The threat to the ethical project that stems from time is the possibility of 
transgression every instant. Because a person exists in time, she must live her life from 
moment to moment, and she must continually choose duty in the face of temptation if 
she is to be ethical.   A person cannot simply will to be ethical at a stroke and thereby tie 
off the rope of her life. She could do so if she were eternal and did not exist in time, for 
then there would be no question of what she might do next. But as Kierkegaard is keen 
to stress, a person is “merely a fantast if he fancies himself to be sub specie aeterni” 
(Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 192).  
 We have now made substantial progress beyond the staining metaphor for we 
have seen that ethical transgression fractures the harmony in which the ethical person 
sought to fulfill his task of becoming himself. The task was an inescapable task—the 
ethical person did not invent the task but he clearly recognized it where the man of 
immediacy did not. What’s more, the ethical strategy was not idly chosen amongst an 
array of options but was the only alternative to loss of self in immediacy. The ethical “is 
the universal and thus the abstract” (Either/Or, 255). There is no second ethics, for 
there is no second reason. Violating moral obligation renders you evil in a way different 
from that in which pain is evil—it puts you in despair at ever successfully walking what 
seemed to be the only road to becoming a coherent self.50 
                                                
50 That a guilty person does not feel guilty does not exempt them from ethics. That guilt 
grounds the priority and importance of the ethical on my view does not entail that the 
absence of guilt feeling deprives moral obligations of their force. The ethical is the universal 
and thus applies to all people. But because most people, most of the time, live lives without 
reflection, they are most often not conscious of having a self, of being ethically responsible, 
and of having failed in their responsibilities. Within the aesthetic stage, there are varying 
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* * * 
 In what remains, I would like to revisit the work of the last chapter and 
Korsgaard’s theory of self-construction. I aim first to relate what I said about how moral 
staining can explain scrupulous worries over even small, possible transgressions to what 
I have brought forth here about guilt and existential despair. Second, I want to bring out 
an element in Korsgaard’s work that I did not note in the prior chapter—her claim that 
action in accord with moral duty is necessary for successful self-construction—and 
compare it to Kierkegaard’s idea (expressed by Judge Wilhelm) that living ethically is a 
matter of becoming a universal human being. 
 One of the reasons that I claimed that moral staining could make sense of 
scrupulousness was that moral stains, though small, were the occasion for the agent to 
glimpse the fragility of her identity. The agent’s concern was not that her ethically 
dubious action had made her a person of bad character but that it revealed that there was 
nothing between her and being immoral but her free choices. These choices too seemed 
mysteriously capricious—no explanation for acting wrongly could be given but that she 
chose thusly.  
 We can express these same concerns more rigorously in Kierkegaard’s existential 
idiom. That the scrupulous person is not worried about her character, in the virtue 
ethical sense, but about her freedom can be explained in terms of Kierkegaard’s account 
of the self in terms of the duality possibility–necessity. A person’s character, understood 
as temperament, disposition, or personality, is a part of her necessity like her stature or 
                                                                                                                                            
levels of awareness of all of this, but there is usually some dim, peripheral vision of it: “Very 
often the person in despair has a dim idea of his own state, although here again the nuances 
are myriad” (The Sickness Unto Death, 48). Pangs of conscience fit this dim awareness, and 
their spastic reemergence in the face of time, casuistry, and indifference is famous from 
literature. 
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place of birth. It is tractable to her choices, but it is in great measure determined by 
genetics and environment. At the same time, her necessity does not exhaust her (she is a 
synthesis of possibility–necessity) and she may act against character. This is Kant’s 
thought when he distinguishes between being endowed by nature with a pleasant or 
morose disposition and the ability to act beneficently from moral principle (Kant 2002, 
14). 
The scrupulous person is not concerned with her character when she is feeling 
anxious about whether she did wrong. Objectively viewed she may be a person with a 
character that is honest and benevolent: this is the figure she has cut in the world, these 
are her inclinations, this is what a psychologist would say about her personality, etc. All 
of this, her necessity, does not guaranty though that she is “a creature of a gentler and 
simpler sort, to whom Nature has given a diviner and lowlier destiny” for her ethically 
dubious action has reminded her of her possibility of being “a monster” “complicated 
and swollen with passion.” 
 Furthermore, that the scrupulous person, glimpsing the fragility of her identity in 
the dubious action, is uneasy about her freedom falls straightforwardly under the 
existentialist notion of anxiety. In The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard calls anxiety the 
“dizziness of freedom” (The Concept of Anxiety, 61). What the scrupulous person fears 
is not a character proclivity like Mr. Creakle’s bad temper but her freedom to be and 
choose wickedly. This possibility is not there on the horizon like a rain cloud pushed 
towards you by the prevailing winds, but “the nothing that is the object of anxiety” is a 
possibility for the individual in her freedom (61). That the individual has gone or will go 
over to this possibility is a leap “which no science has explained and which no science 
can explain” (61). 
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 I said as well in the last chapter that “scrupulousness is driven by a melancholy 
perception of loss in the immoral action and consequent moral staining.” I added that it 
is “melancholy because it is a harm to something irreplaceable, the damage done to 
which is (seemingly) irrevocable.” This analysis has plain parallels in what was said about 
the persistence of immoral actions as part of an individual’s necessity and in the feeling 
of loss that accompanies transgression. Firstly, we saw that Kierkegaard stresses that in 
eternity “there is no pastness of the past” (The Sickness Unto Death, 17). Eternity 
“knows you as you are known and it binds you to yourself in despair” (27–28). Hence, 
the metaphor I invoked in the prior chapter of spilling whiteout on your grandmother’s 
diary—there is a sense of irreparable harm to something irreplaceable in guilt. Secondly, 
despair (of which guilt is a form) is always despair over the self. This is because when the 
ethical person transgresses, he loses consistency, and the ethical person is “one who rests 
in and has his life in the consistency of the good.” Having lost the consistency in which 
he rested, the guilty individual wills in despair not to be himself—“The self does not 
want to acknowledge itself after having been so weak.” That this sort of willing is willing 
in despair is evident from the impossibility, hence the hopelessness, of the goal: he is a 
synthesis of possibility–necessity and cannot rid himself of his history. Thus Kierkegaard 
compares the ethical man’s feeling of loss to a father who laments a disinherited son. For 
to will hopelessly is to will in despair, and the father’s feeling of loss shows that he is 
hopelessly attached to the one he despairingly intended to cast off. 
 I last want to highlight similarities between Korsgaard’s contention that the 
requirements of morality are conditions of successful self-constitution and Kierkegaard’s 
claims, through Judge Wilhelm, that being ethical is a matter of becoming a universal 
human being. The novelty in Korsgaard’s Self-Constitution: Agency, Integrity, and Identity, is 
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her emphasis on the idea that we constitute our personal or practical identities through 
our free actions. This innovation is connected throughout, however, with Korsgaard’s 
wonted Kantian ethics. Thus, she tells us that the categorical imperative is a “constitutive 
principle of action” without which “you are just a mere heap of impulses, and not an 
agent after all” (Korsgaard 2009, 213). This is so because uniting those sundry impulses 
requires a unified will and in order to have a unified will, “you must will in accordance 
with a universal law” (213). A universal law is rational in all situations and so it 
commands “you to act in a way that any rational being could act” (214). 
 Wilhelm too describes the ethical as the universal and the abstract. He stresses 
that it is through ethical principle that the individual is able to “work the accidental” 
characteristics of immediacy (Korsgaard’s mere heap of impulses) into a whole. Just as 
Korsgaard claimed that adherence to principles holding for everyone was necessary for 
being an agent, Wilhelm agrees that it is only by becoming a universal human being that 
the individual is able to become himself.  
4. Conclusion 
 We began the previous chapter with T.M. Scanlon’s twin questions about the 
priority and importance of moral duty. I hypothesized that A.C. Ewing’s view that moral 
trespasses render you evil in a different way than pain is evil could explain both. Guilt 
looked like a likely candidate for this special kind of evil, and I, following Gabrielle 
Taylor, argued that the best way to understand guilt was in terms of moral staining. 
Korsgaard’s theory of self-constitution offered a way to understand moral staining in 
terms of the contribution of an agent’s choices to her personal identity. In this chapter, I 
have meant to go beyond the staining metaphor and explain why moral stains were 
supposed to be vexing. In place of the staining metaphor, I explained guilt as a source of 
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existential despair, the inconsistency of ethical transgression compromising a man’s 
attempts to have “his life in the consistency of the good.” I thus came to the conclusion 
that despair—willing not to be oneself, losing oneself—is the evil that is different from 
the evil of pain. This is what grounds the priority and importance of the moral, not that 
it is what we owe to others. 
 Looking ahead, I believe the connection that Korsgaard and Kierkegaard draw 
between being ethical and constituting oneself a human agent suggests a way of 
connecting the specific content of the ethical to what I have contended is the ground of 
its priority and importance. For at first glance, a view that says that moral obligations are 
what we owe to others is better situated to explain why specific reasons are or are not a 
matter of moral duty. If Korsgaard is correct, however, that the categorical imperative is 
a constitutive principle of action and adherence to it necessary to be an agent, then we 
can see how the content of normative ethics is a function of the ethical demand’s 
grounding in the existential task of working the accidental and the universal into a whole 
that is the self. 
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